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General Abstract 
 
Similarities in brain size, life histories, psychology and behaviour in parrots, 
corvids and apes suggest that certain socio-ecological selection pressures 
may have driven the convergent evolution of cognition in these families. 
However, very little is known about parrot behaviour and cognition, outside of 
African greys and kea. Therefore, captive red-shouldered macaws 
(Diopsittaca nobilis) and black-headed caiques (Pionites melanocephala) 
were presented with a variety of tasks to assess their social and physical 
cognition and behavioural flexibility. Although these species possess many 
similarities in their life history and ecology, there are also substantial 
differences in their morphology and natural habitats that could have driven 
differences in their cognitive evolution. Observations of social and physical 
interactions in both species revealed that macaws engaged in high levels of 
affiliative behaviour, and object neophobia, whereas caiques displayed high 
levels of social play and object exploration. However, such differences did not 
appear to result in differences in their social or physical cognition. Macaws 
and caiques displayed comparable performances on Serial Reversal Learning 
tasks (as an index of behavioural flexibility). Both species also demonstrated 
similar performances on two Means-End transfer tasks and a series of 
innovative foraging tasks that were designed to assess their comprehension 
of object relationships. However, macaws and caiques appeared to solve 
such problems by generalising learned information across novel tasks. 
Overall, these findings suggest that these two species may approach certain 
socio-ecological problems using flexible cognition that may be generalised 
across different problems, supporting claims for a domain general 
intelligence.  
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1.1: Thesis Overview  
 
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate cognition in two species of 
Neotropical parrots, red-shouldered macaws (Diopsittaca nobilis) and black-
headed caiques (Pionites melanocephala). These particular species possess 
a similar brain size, which is relatively large for their body mass, and 
comparable to other species of parrots, corvids and apes (Iwaniuk et al., 
2005). Investigating behaviour and cognition in these species may therefore 
provide clues to the socio-ecological selection pressures that have been 
suggested to have lead to a convergence in cognitive evolution between apes 
and birds (Emery and Clayton, 2004a).  
 
While the relative brain size of red-shouldered macaws and black-headed 
caiques are comparable, each species is characterised by contrasting 
aspects of their natural ecologies. Macaws inhabit open wooded 
environments whereas caiques inhabit closed canopy forest (Juniper and 
Parr, 2003). Consequently, each species may experience different 
environmental challenges. For example, caiques may experience a fluctuating 
availability of resources in a closed canopy environment, whereas macaws 
may experience a relatively more stable supply in an open habitat. Such 
ecological differences may then promote adaptive specialisations in their 
foraging behaviours, as selection pressures shape foraging efficiency with 
respect to each particular habitat (Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-
Hofmann et al., 2002). Similarly, selection pressures may also promote 
differences in the social aspects of these species. Cognition has therefore 
been considered to have evolved in response to adaptive selection pressures 
that are associated within specific domains, particularly those associated with 
social and physical interactions with the surrounding environment 
(Shettleworth, 2010). However, domain specific intelligence, such as the 
capacity for tool use, may then be generalised across different domains 
through processes such as behavioural flexibility (Emery and Clayton, 
2004a). Hence, selection pressures may promote cognitive adaptations that 
favour an understanding of the underlying functionality of tool use. Such 
Chapter 1.1: Thesis Overview  
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cognitive adaptations may then be transferred across the physical domain to 
aid in solving problems in the social domain, such as learning about how to 
manufacture or use tools through social observation.  
 
The first chapter (Chapter 1) introduces the field of research on the evolution 
of cognition, with a particular focus on the cognitive divergences between 
humans and our closest living ancestors, the non-human great apes. This 
chapter then discusses current evidence in support of a convergent evolution 
of cognition between relatively large brained species of birds and mammals. 
A contemporary review of research on parrot cognition is also provided.  
 
As little is known about red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques in 
captivity or in the wild, Chapter 2 provides a baseline study on the social 
dynamics and behaviours of these species. Behavioural observations 
revealed substantial between-species differences. Macaws invest a greater 
amount of time in affiliative allopreening behaviours and are more social than 
caiques. Conversely, caiques were observed to participate in social play 
behaviours more than macaws. Dominance hierarchies and pair-bonded 
relationships were also quantified for subsequent reflections on individual 
behaviours.  
 
The experiments in Chapter 3 were conducted to investigate whether 
differences in the natural ecologies of these species correspond with 
differences in their propensities for object exploration. Macaws were highly 
neophobic and demonstrated relatively low levels of familiar object 
manipulation. Caiques by contrast showed low neophobia and interacted with 
a much greater variety and diversity of objects than macaws. The 
relationships between object exploration and the natural ecology of each 
species are discussed with respect to the demands of generalised or 
specialised foraging behaviours.     
 
Chapter 4 investigates whether different propensities to interact with objects 
influence innovative foraging behaviours. In the wild, foraging innovations 
Chapter 1.1: Thesis Overview  
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tend to be impaired in species that are highly neophobic (Reader and Laland, 
2003). Neophobic species may be less likely to approach novel objects or 
places and therefore unlikely to reveal the affordances of such interactions. 
Findings from this study reveal that macaws and caiques demonstrate similar 
capacities to solve a series of innovative foraging problems, irrespective of 
differences in their propensities to interact with objects. Macaws and caiques 
possess a comparable brain size, which has been demonstrated to correlate 
positively with rates of innovation (Lefebvre et al., 1997). Such findings 
therefore suggest that differences in neophobia may have little overall 
influence on foraging innovations. Alternative mechanisms that might drive 
variation in innovative rates are discussed in light of these findings.   
 
To further investigate whether between-species differences in object 
exploration influence an understanding of object relationships, two means-
end tasks were presented to subjects in Chapter 5 to assess their capacities 
for physical cognition. Both species demonstrated comparable performances 
on a task requiring an ability to discriminate between the functional properties 
of connected and disrupted materials to retrieve a reward. While subjects 
rapidly solved a task using familiar materials, their performances were 
however impaired when presented with novel materials. In a second means-
end task, a new Trap-Gaps paradigm, subjects were presented with a more 
challenging problem that required substantial experience to learn to 
discriminate between accessible and inaccessible foods based on size 
relationships. A transfer task was then designed to assess whether subjects 
required similar trial-and-error experience to relearn a functionally equivalent, 
but novel problem, or whether they could generalise learned information 
across tasks. One caique spontaneously solved the transfer task. These 
findings reveal that macaws and caiques demonstrate a comparable 
understanding of object relationships to corvids and primates, and suggest 
that their performances on such tasks may be mediated by higher-order 
cognitive mechanisms.  
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Macaws and caiques demonstrated flexibility in their behaviours on innovative 
foraging and means-end tasks. In Chapter 6, subjects were therefore 
presented with two serial reversal learning (SRL) tasks that have previously 
been considered an index of behavioural flexibility. Moreover, a comparative 
study of the performances of corvids on SRL tasks suggests that social 
complexity underlies such flexibility (Bond et al., 2007). While behavioural 
observations revealed that macaws were more social than caiques, both 
species demonstrated comparable performances on a SRL task involving 
colour discriminations. To further investigate the mechanisms underlying such 
flexibility, subjects were presented with a subsequent SRL task that varied the 
strength of the learned pre-reversal associations. Subjects trained to a highly 
reinforced pre-reversal criterion were faster to respond to the reversed 
contingencies than subjects in the low reinforcement condition. Macaws and 
caiques therefore used the highly reinforced associations to generate a 
conditional win stay-lose shift rule, rather than learning each new association 
by lower-level processes of conditioning and extinction. These findings 
suggest that higher-order cognitive mechanisms may facilitate behavioural 
flexibility in macaws and caiques.  
 
Together, the experiments presented in these chapters reveal comparable 
performances of macaws and caiques on a series of tasks that assess 
physical and social cognition. Such abilities occur irrespective of observed 
differences in their social dynamics, their different propensities to interact with 
objects, and differences in their natural habitats. While cognition may have 
evolved in response to domain specific challenges, the cognitive capacities of 
these species are suggestive of a domain general intelligence. Hence, large 
brains may afford capacities for higher-order cognitive mechanisms to 
generalise information across different domains through processes of 
behavioural flexibility.  
Chapter 1.2: Evolution of Cognition 
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1.2: Evolution of Cognition 
 
The way in which animals respond behaviourally to changes in their 
environment varies considerably, yet functions to maximise their fitness. In 
many species, responses occur at fundamental levels, such as reflexes, 
orienting, taxis, and simple forms of learning, such as habituation and 
sensitisation. However, some species respond using more sophisticated 
psychological processes, such as conditioning, memory, and reasoning, to 
predict and even manipulate environmental regularities. As such, cognition 
can be described as the ability to acquire, process, and retain information, 
which can then be used to influence decision making (Shettleworth, 2010). 
Such processes are commonly inferred when animals apply generalised 
principles obtained from learned experiences to solve novel problems. It is 
thus in the manipulation of ‗knowing that‘ information (declarative; episodic 
and semantic), rather than ‗knowing how‘ information (procedural), that 
animals may demonstrate reasoning about the underlying causality of 
problems they experience in their environment (Shettleworth, 2010). 
 
Darwin (1897) noted that certain behaviours found in non-humans, such as 
imitation, tool use, and the use of sounds in communication may provide 
insights into human intellect. Consequently, he concluded ‗the difference in 
mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of 
degree and not of kind‘ (Darwin, 1897, p. 128). Although research in 
comparative psychology has progressed considerably since Darwin, similar 
key questions remain today as to whether animals, like humans, possess a 
number of cognitive abilities that collectively contribute to their intelligence 
(Premack, 2007, Wasserman, 1993). Research on animal intelligence has 
traditionally focused on our closest living relatives, the great apes, based on 
the erroneous view of a ‗ladder of life‘ or ‗scala naturae‘, which places 
humans at the top and apes, dolphins, birds, reptiles, fish, amphibians, and 
insects below in relative order (Hodos and Campbell, 1969). As a result, the 
special status of apes, based on their evolutionary relationship to humans, 
has predisposed views that cognition in non-human animals is largely focused 
Chapter 1.2: Evolution of Cognition 
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within the primate family. This elementary approach soon developed into a 
phylogenetic model based on the tree of life, maintaining similar assumptions 
that complex cognition (so-called intelligence) is coupled with recent 
evolutionary events (Healy et al., 2009). 
 
However, cognitive evolution does not conform to a simple linear scale 
aligned with phylogeny. Irrespective of phylogenetic relationships, species 
may share commonalities in the socio-ecological challenges they face in their 
environments (Seed et al., 2009, Shettleworth, 2010). Such problems might 
include learning about the nutritional values of certain foods, the location, and 
timing of ephemeral resources, or the recognition of a territory, nesting or 
dwelling site relative to local landmarks. Common ecological selection 
pressures, like those responsible for analogous (i.e., convergent) evolution of 
flight in bats and birds, might then converge on similar cognitive functions due 
to how an organism interacts with its habitat rather than its ancestry (Emery 
and Clayton, 2004a). Thus, the comparison of cognitive processes among 
more distantly related species, such as birds and mammals and their 
particular environments, might also reveal clues to how cognition evolved 
(Lewontin, 1998). 
 
METHODS FOR RECONSTRUCTING THE EVOLUTION OF COGNITION 
 
To describe how cognitive traits may have evolved, changes in the history of 
observed characteristics of living and extinct ancestral species that may be 
proxies for behaviour and cognition need to be examined. Such tangible clues 
such as nest building, burrowing sites, or stone-tool artefacts may provide the 
best clues we have because behaviour does not fossilise. Aspects of 
cognitive evolution may be inferred by describing changes in the length and 
shape of certain bones, cranial size, and patterns in brain endocasts or fossil 
materials found with other fossil remains, but what is more important are 
those actions in extant species with clues to cognitive functioning, such as 
patterns of locomotion, manual dexterity, food gathering, and communal 
activities (Gould and Lewontin, 1979). Indeed, this is how biological 
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anthropologists reconstruct views of what human ancestral life may have 
been like. For example, we can observe the adaptation of bipedal locomotion 
from skeletal remains, leading to speculation about whether the hands were 
freed to carry objects or make tools, freeing the mouth and facilitating vocal 
communication. Did an increase in cranial size support the enlargement of the 
frontal and temporal lobes furthering linguistic capabilities? What about 
evidence for the cognitive processes underlying the use of fire, hunting with 
tools, religion, or the production of art? Are these mere speculations (‗Just So 
Stories‘) that fit our assumptions or viable, testable hypotheses? 
 
Phylogenetic Analyses 
 
If we revisit Darwin‘s statement—the distinction between human and non-
human intelligence is one of degree, not of kind—we might expect there to be 
no qualitative differences in cognition between species (Macphail and Barlow, 
1985). That is, cognition is governed by general processes common to all 
animals. This claim has been supported by experimental psychologists who 
proclaim basic rules of association account for learning and memory 
throughout the animal kingdom (Macphail and Barlow, 1985). The General 
Process view considers that the fundamentals of complex cognition result 
from the strengthening of positive, neutral, or negative responses that are 
paired with associative stimuli and applied across an extensive range of 
problems (Papini, 2002). Although simpler processes, such as habituation, 
are shared by all species, there may also be qualitative between-species 
differences in capacities for conditioning, problem solving, and the formation 
of abstract concepts, which may be restricted to more cognitive species. Of 
the greatest complexity—said to be unique to humans, but with precursors in 
other animals—is language (Hauser et al., 2002). While we may differ only in 
degree from our closest non-human relatives, chimpanzees, which share 
about 98% of our genetic profile (Lewontin, 1998), major cognitive changes 
have occurred during human evolution. Humans and chimpanzees might be 
very similar in their DNA, but are vastly different in the size and structure of 
their brains and their resulting cognitive faculties (Sherwood et al., 2008).  
Chapter 1.2: Evolution of Cognition 
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Ecological Correlates of Cognition 
 
It is possible, with the use of large data sets, to demonstrate global trends    
across species and infer relationships between cognitive traits and socio- 
ecological variables (Nunn and Barton, 2001). However, caution is warranted 
as methodological inconsistencies may confound interpretations. For 
example, experimental designs need to incorporate ecologically valid 
approaches, as it may be illogical to rank complex cognition among different 
species with different life histories (Bitterman, 1975, Chittka and Niven, 2009). 
Thus, behaviour may be influenced by a number of processes that are not 
specifically cognitive. For example, polygynous species may require a larger 
home range to successfully breed, whereas monogamous species, which 
have ready access to mates, may not. As a result, differences in species‘ 
ecologies may influence their spatial memory abilities. To control for such 
variation, alternative methods that incorporate more comparable cognitive 
correlates such as relative brain size may prove more productive. 
 
Brain Size and Cognitive Ability 
 
Larger organisms tend to possess larger brains than smaller organisms. 
However, overall brain size per se is not a particularly useful proxy for 
cognitive ability. This is because brains are composed of many components 
that are not directly associated with cognition, but serve to control sensory, 
visceral, and motor functions. For this reason, measures of cognitive capacity 
are often gauged by comparing those areas of the brain more closely 
associated with cognition, such as the neocortex in mammals and the 
nidopallium (cortex equivalent) in birds (Jarvis, et al., 2005), with an 
organism‘s overall body mass. The resulting measure is referred to as relative 
brain size. 
 
Hypotheses about the function of relatively large brains have generally 
focused on the relationship between relative brain size and correlates of 
cognition such as behavioural innovation, group size, social learning, and tool 
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use (Healy and Rowe, 2007). This connection assumes that larger brains 
must be functionally adaptive considering the increased energetic costs 
associated with maintaining them (Striedter, 2005). Although studies on 
vertebrate species generally support this view, investigations into the 
cognitive mechanisms that underpin invertebrate behaviour contest whether 
bigger brains are actually better (Chittka and Niven, 2009). In mammals, 
primates and dolphins have the largest brains for their body weight, with 
humans showing the largest overall relative brain size (Roth and Dicke, 
2005). Trends also appear for larger brains during vertebrate evolution 
(Striedter, 2005). As a result, birds, although generally considered inferior in 
intellect to mammals, have larger, more cortically based brains and are thus 
considered more intelligent than their evolutionary predecessors, the reptiles. 
Surprisingly, however, some birds such as parrots and corvids (crows, rooks, 
jays, etc.) possess brains that are relatively comparable in size to those of 
chimpanzees (Emery and Clayton, 2005). Recent research also suggests that 
parrots and corvids share many of the features believed to be associated with 
advanced cognitive processing in primates such as high sociality, longevity, 
slow development, long parental investment, as well as a large forebrain size 
(Emery and Clayton, 2004b). 
 
A relatively large forebrain in birds is thought to be associated with innovative 
behaviour (Lefebvre et al., 2004). A large brain size may allow species to 
behave flexibly, enhance their ability to learn quickly, and thus adapt to 
environmental irregularities. Species that respond rapidly to novel or 
ephemeral food sources, or develop innovative foraging techniques, such as 
using tools, might benefit from accessing additional resources. Cognitive 
adaptations may subsequently influence species fitness by reducing 
extinction risk or enhancing invasion success (Sol et al., 2005).  
 
In fact, brain size appears to be correlated with a number of ecological factors 
and life history traits throughout different taxonomic groups (Striedter, 2005). 
Although forebrain size in birds is particularly associated with innovative 
behaviour, brain size (neocortex) in primates and ungulates is more closely 
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linked to social dynamics, such as group size and intra-group coordination 
(Dunbar and Shultz, 2007).  
 
Sociality has thus influenced complex social intelligence such as tactical 
deception and social learning (Fitch et al., 2010). However, bird sociality 
differs from primate sociality. Flock size in birds often varies seasonally and at 
times can comprise thousands if not millions of individuals. As such, sociality 
per se does not appear to correlate with brain size in birds; instead it may be 
the type and quality of bonded relationships that are more influential (Emery 
et al., 2007). 
 
Interpretations of correlations may therefore be confounded by differences in 
species‘ life histories. Frugivorous primates tend to have larger brains and 
larger home ranges than foliovores. As such, a large home range size might 
be necessary to accommodate the spatial and temporal variations in fruit 
supply, whereas leaves that are abundant year-round permit smaller home 
ranges. Nonetheless, other species that share polygynous or promiscuous 
mating systems also exploit large home ranges (Harvey et al., 1980). 
Locating mates or tracking resources throughout large home ranges might 
require certain cognitive capacities that result in an advanced spatial memory 
or sophisticated mental maps. For example, spatial cognition of food-storing 
birds may appear to have driven an increase in brain size. However, evidence 
to support such claims remains controversial (Healy and Rowe, 2007). Such 
discrepancies provide clear examples that large home ranges are not 
necessarily good predictors of large brains. Furthermore, these studies 
emphasise the importance of focusing on specific brain components, such as 
the hippocampus (in the case of spatial memory and caching), rather than 
brain size per se. 
 
Methodological Problems 
 
Using large data sets to interpret correlations between brain size and 
behavioural traits has resulted in numerous hypotheses, but they should be 
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treated with some caution (Healy and Rowe, 2007). In an attempt to increase 
sample sizes, researchers have integrated data from a variety of studies, 
some with different intentions that use different methods. Brain size, for 
example, has been calculated using post-mortem and frozen tissue, structural 
neuro-imaging data, and brain sections processed using outdated methods. 
Proxies of brain size have also been derived from cranial volume (Striedter, 
2005). Few studies attempt to address individual-specific factors such as age, 
which is known to influence brain size. Different measurements for body 
weight have also been applied, including substituting body weight for brain 
stem volume (Striedter, 2005). Thus the application of such a variety of 
controversial measurements may, as a result, obscure comparisons and 
compromise the integrity of interpretations, particularly if they are not 
consistent within a study. Large bodied species also tend to have large brains 
and may thus require larger neurons and hence more brain mass to process 
equivalent cognitive information compared to small-bodied organisms such as 
invertebrates (Chittka and Niven, 2009). 
 
The use of collated data sets detailing incidences of complex cognition as 
represented by behavioural flexibility and innovation, initiated by Lefebvre and 
colleagues (2004), has been integral to the analysis of species-wide 
comparisons in brain size. However, the frequency of reported instances of 
such behaviours may be subject to inadvertent observer bias. For example, 
large, diurnal species distributed within close proximity to human settlements 
may be more frequently observed than small, nocturnal species that reside in 
inaccessible habitats. Experimental versus observational accounts of 
behaviour may also fall prone to reporter bias. Incidences of social learning, 
for example, may easily be inferred by field observations but more difficult to 
establish experimentally in the laboratory. 
 
Caution is also required when defining analogous traits (i.e., those traits that 
arise independently among unrelated species through processes of 
convergent evolution), as ecological correlations between distantly related 
species are likely to be fundamentally different. Generalised definitions of 
Chapter 1.2: Evolution of Cognition 
 
 21 
social bonds or group structures, for example, between birds and mammals 
may not be directly comparable or representative of different species‘ life 
histories. As such, assumptions that social complexity, for example, has 
arisen from increased group size may be an over-generalisation of more 
complex behaviour. Social organisation in ungulates or flock size in birds, for 
example, is dynamic and varies throughout both time and space. Indeed, 
there appears to be no relationship between flock size and brain size in birds 
(Emery et al., 2007), although birds that engage in complex forms of social 
cognition appear to have relatively large brains (Pravosudov and de Kort, 
2006). 
 
When inferring cognitive abilities as the result of environmental selection 
pressures, it is also important to consider the phylogenetic relatedness of 
species. Species may exhibit similar characteristics not because they share 
similar environments, but because they are closely related. Any cognitive 
similarities may therefore have been inherited from a common ancestor rather 
than having been evolved independently under similar selection pressures. 
By considering species as independent data points, irrespective of their 
phylogenetic relationships, analyses may overestimate the importance of any 
relationships between variables (Nunn and Barton, 2001), which dramatically 
enhance the probability of obtaining positive associations. It is therefore 
important to correct for phylogeny by using approaches such as independent 
contrasts (Felsenstein, 1985). Independent traits that then occur repetitively 
across species can be more confidently identified as adaptive. 
 
Comparative Analyses 
 
An alternative approach to the generalised mechanisms thought responsible 
for enhanced cognition is that cognition is adaptive and domain specific 
(Pinker, 2010). Such adaptations may arise to solve specific problems 
associated with particular environments and then be generalised and applied 
to novel situations. This hypothesis emphasises an ecological perspective, 
focusing on how an animal‘s environment shapes its cognitive abilities (Healy 
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et al., 2009, Shettleworth, 1993). Natural selection shapes the morphology 
and behaviour of organisms in terms of differential survival and reproduction. 
Consequently, distantly related species may converge on similar cognitive 
characteristics due to shared environmental selection pressures. Adaptive 
changes caused by natural selection may also lead species to converge on 
similarities such as omnivory, agility, or acute vision; characteristics required 
for success in certain habitats such as dense forest. Similarly, animals that 
occupy the vast open plains of Africa might share characteristics of an 
herbivorous lifestyle. To determine whether such selection pressures produce 
similar cognitive abilities across species, it is necessary to systematically 
compare differences and similarities in cognitive tasks between closely as 
well as distantly related species. As such, different species that inhabit similar 
environments may develop similar intellectual abilities, enabling them to 
better survive in specific habitats. Species may therefore differ not only in 
degree, but also in the nature of their intelligence. 
 
Comparing Abilities 
 
The comparison of closely related species with different ecologies is essential 
when investigating cognitive adaptations. Any divergence in cognitive ability 
may therefore be attributed to independent evolution under different selection 
pressures (Papini, 2002). Many corvids and parids, for example, store food 
for retrieval in periods of food scarcity. Within these two families, some 
species store more food than others and depending on the species and their 
environment, recovery can occur from hours to months later. Such differences 
in caching propensity and latency of retrieval may then result in species-
specific differences in spatial memory. Thus by comparing memory among 
closely related species within the same family, ecological influences on 
certain cognitive and neural processes may be revealed. Although research in 
this area has provided mixed results, it has been proposed that birds that 
store more food have a better spatial memory than those that do not. Support 
for this hypothesis is from a positive correlation between the relative size (and 
thus ‗storage‘ capacity) of the hippocampus, the brain area involved with 
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spatial memory processing, and the caching propensity of a given species. 
 
Comparisons between distantly related species may also provide valuable 
insights into convergent evolution of cognition (Emery and Clayton, 2004a). 
Although any comparisons between distantly related species must account for 
differences in perceptual and/or morphological characteristics, similarities in 
life history traits and environmental conditions might provide analogous cues 
to the development of cognition. For example, the convergent evolution of 
complex cognition in apes and corvids is thought attributable to shared 
environmental pressures (Emery and Clayton, 2004a, Seed et al., 2009a). 
Such comparisons are supported by the fact that both groups are 
omnivorous, visual animals that live in complex social groups and 
demonstrate sophisticated forms of object manipulation, manifest in extractive 
foraging, and tool use. 
 
When evaluating species differences, it is important that any assessments are 
ecologically representative of the challenges that individual species could 
confront in their environment. In this regard, standardised tests may not 
necessarily account for differences in a species‘ physical ability. It is thus 
important to adopt paradigms that can be generalised and applied to 
numerous species irrespective of their physical capabilities. For example, a 
battery of tests that incorporates functional similarities, but varies in terms of 
its independent variables, such as retention intervals or levels of difficulty, can 
allow direct comparisons of cognitive processes between distantly related 
species such as apes, dolphins, and birds. However, such tasks should not 
be too difficult that most animals fail, or too easy that they all pass, resulting 
in ‗floor‘ or ‗ceiling‘ results that obscure group differences. Potentially 
unavoidable experimental circumstances may also confound interpretations. 
For example, when comparing human children with chimpanzees, it is the 
children who are tested by members of their own species, probably while their 
mothers are present, whereas apes are tested by another species (humans) 
on a task designed by humans (Boesch, 2007). 
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Why an Evolutionary Approach is Important 
 
By comparing differences in cognitive abilities across species, inferences can 
not only be made about how animals perform certain tasks with respect to 
environmental selection pressures, but also when such capabilities evolved. 
Distantly related species may show similar cognitive abilities such as tool use 
or social cognition, for example, corvids and apes (Emery and Clayton, 
2004a, Seed et al., 2009a). Although these characteristics appear to have 
functional similarities, they are likely to result from very different cognitive 
mechanisms (Seed et al., 2009a). Traits that are not shared by a common 
ancestor may have converged through independent evolutionary processes 
(Figure 1.1). Similarly, if the common ancestor showed the trait, then it is the 
absence of the trait in extant species that also signifies adaptation. For 
example, in the case of tool use, it was recently assumed that only New 
Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) habitually used tools in the wild 
and therefore there was something ‗special‘ about their cognitive adaptations 
for tool-related cognition (Bluff et al., 2007). However, recent studies on non-
tool- using rooks (Corvus frugilegus) have found complex forms of innovation 
and flexibility in the use of objects as tools, similar to that demonstrated by 
New Caledonian crows (Bird and Emery, 2009). Therefore, we may now 
assume that the common ancestor of corvids, or at least members of the 
Corvus genus, likely possessed the cognitive adaptations for object 
manipulation that developed into tool use—under the correct environmental 
conditions—for one species of crow. Reconstructing the evolutionary 
relatedness of species and the presence or absence of cognitive traits may 
therefore help clarify when cognitive adaptations arose. In this case, we need 
to determine whether other corvids both inside and outside the Corvus genus 
can use tools or manipulate a variety of objects in tool-related contexts in the 
same way as rooks, to determine when these particular adaptations may 
have arisen. 
 
Another reason why a broad evolutionary approach to comparative cognition 
is important is because it removes anthropocentric bias. The historical focus 
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of animal cognition has centred on a limited number of species (Beach, 
1950), specifically great apes, pigeons, and rats. However, the fundamental 
processes of learning and cognition are said to be the same for all animals 
(Pearce, 2008). By comparison, the anthropocentric approach has focused on 
whether supposedly unique human cognitive abilities, such as categorisation, 
reasoning, theory of mind (ToM), mental time travel, and symbolic 
communication are also found, to some degree, in other animals. More 
recently, comparative studies have incorporated an increased variety of 
species into this project (Shettleworth, 2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Phylogenetic trees and evolutionary principles. Schematic 
representation of a phylogenetic tree with relatively large-brained 
vertebrates—corvids, parrots, elephants, cetaceans, and apes. The circles 
represent the types of evolutionary principle that may govern the evolution of 
cognition (Sherwood et al. 2008). Homology (black circle) refers to evolution 
of similar traits in closely related species with a common ancestor (e.g., 
African elephant and Indian elephant). Parallelism (light gray circle) refers to 
the evolution of similar traits in relatively closely related species (e.g., corvids 
and parrots). Divergence (white circle) refers to the evolution of dissimilar 
traits by distantly related species (e.g., elephants and apes). Reversal (dark 
gray circle and hatched circle) refers to the evolution of a trait seen in a 
descendant that recovers features of the common ancestor (e.g., cetaceans). 
Convergence refers to the evolution of similar traits in distantly related 
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species (e.g., apes and corvids). Chimpanzee, elephant, and dolphin brains 
from Comparative Mammalian Brain Collection (brainmuseum.org). Parrot 
brain provided by Andrew Iwaniuk (University of Lethbridge). Corvid brain 
from own collection. 
 
 
MAJOR THEORIES OF COGNITIVE EVOLUTION 
 
A number of theories have posited evidence that the evolution of cognition is 
linked to specific aspects of species‘ life histories, such as sociality, 
qualitative relationships, culture, extractive foraging, tool use, or behavioural 
flexibility, yet no one all-encompassing hypothesis fits a global model. As 
such, it is likely that there are a number of environmental selection pressures 
contributing to cognitive evolution, each depending on particular species and 
their socio-ecological circumstances. 
 
Social Living 
 
The Social Intelligence Hypothesis (Humphrey, 1976) proposed that the 
flexible intelligent mind of primates was attributable to challenges that species 
experience in their social environment. This hypothesis later developed into 
the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis, which considered social 
manipulation as evidence to suggest that primates perceive conspecifics as 
intentional agents that can be deceived (Byrne and Whiten, 1988). Later, 
proponents of the Social Brain Hypothesis began focusing on the 
relationships between social intelligence in primates and relative neocortex 
size (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007, Reader and Laland, 2002). Fundamental to all 
three hypotheses is an association between the complexities of primate social 
interactions and social cognition. As such, it is those animals that live in large 
social groups, where individuals have to keep track of the identities and 
interactions of numerous individuals, which have developed advanced 
cognitive processes. Although this view has largely been restricted to 
primates, other species such as cooperatively breeding birds also show 
comparably complex social systems. As a result, positive correlations 
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between relative brain size and aspects of sociality have more recently 
appeared in other species (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007, Emery et al., 2007). 
However, complex cognition among particularly social, or cooperative species 
may not only be confined to the social domain. While cognition may have 
evolved through socially mediated selection pressures, the resulting 
adaptations may also allow animals to solve complex problems across 
different cognitive domains. 
 
Sex, Mating, and Relationships 
 
The relationship between group size and brain size in birds is less clear. This 
is not surprising as birds do not reside in stable groups like primates, but form 
seasonal flocks, colonies, or roosts, sometimes comprising millions of 
individuals. Thus, brain size in birds, unlike primates, does not appear to 
increase linearly with social group size. Yet some birds that live in pairs or 
small to medium flocks, such as corvids and parrots, have relatively large 
brains (Emery et al., 2007). This raises the question of whether sociality, in 
terms of group size, is directly comparable between such distantly related 
species. Although intelligence in primates and birds may have arisen through 
convergent processes, such selection pressures may be constrained by 
differences in life histories (Emery and Clayton, 2004a). Primates, for 
example, tend to form stable polygynous groups, whereas birds are often 
monogamous, either forming transient pairs each breeding season or 
remaining in lifelong bonds with the same partner across years. The type and 
quality of relationships between individuals within each taxon may be 
equivalent, but the extent of social relationships in birds may be more relevant 
to a few individuals, such as in monogamously mated pairs. After all, 
monogamous relationships require cooperation when establishing and 
maintaining strong affiliative pair bonds, particularly when defending a nest 
site, and rearing offspring. As such, those birds with lifelong pair bonds or 
birds that cooperatively breed tend to have the largest relative brain size 
(Emery et al., 2007). 
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In some animals, certain ecological problems such as survival, foraging, or 
the rearing of offspring are more effectively solved socially than individually. 
Thus, it may be those mechanisms that enhance social cohesion that drive 
brain-size evolution rather than group size per se. However, individuals that 
develop stable social relationships must also face cognitive demands that 
solitary individuals do not (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). But which aspects of 
sociality require such additional processing powers? 
 
Cognition may play a role in maintaining long-term relationships, so called 
relationship intelligence (Emery et al., 2007). This is reflected in the social 
bonds that are established and maintained by active food giving, behavioural 
synchronisation, allopreening, and post-conflict affiliation. Relationship 
intelligence, compared to general social intelligence, focuses on the role of 
cooperation and coordination in dyadic interaction, allowing individuals to 
better read the subtleties of their partner‘s behaviour, thus providing a 
competitive edge. 
 
Finding, Extracting, and Protecting Food 
 
Social learning and the evolution of socio-cognitive skills also play important 
roles in efficient foraging strategies (Reader and Laland, 2002). Social 
foraging may impose greater cognitive demands than individual foraging, as it 
may require the ability to store and manipulate information about social 
relationships (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007). An awareness of other group 
members also presents the opportunity to acquire specific foraging 
techniques through direct observation of more experienced group members. 
Individuals may thus benefit from social learning by enhancing their efficiency 
in manipulating or extracting foods that would have otherwise been more 
difficult or harmful to obtain through trial and error learning. As such, those 
species that use manipulative and explorative foraging techniques are less 
neophobic and more innovative than other species (Day et al., 2003). 
Similarly, those species that adopt a generalised diet, opposed to a 
specialised diet, possess greater behavioural flexibility and knowledge about 
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food sources and foraging techniques (Reader and Laland, 2002). Thus, both 
social and generalised foraging behaviours may contribute to the evolution of 
cognition. 
 
Species that track ephemeral food sources or retrieve food items stored in 
numerous locations also confront additional cognitive challenges. To 
efficiently locate food, frugivorous primates and food-storing birds rely on 
spatial and temporal abilities for learning and remembering the locations and 
permanence of food items that are scattered (Grodzinski and Clayton, 2010, 
Milton, 1988). Food-storing birds must be sensitive to their social context 
when caching, as their stores may be pilfered by nearby observers (Clayton 
et al., 2007). When storing food in the presence of potential thieves, corvids 
evaluate the quality of visual information available to observers and adopt 
strategies to reduce this information and thus minimise the risk of theft. 
Ravens and scrub-jays will wait until observers are distracted or cannot see 
them before storing food, store at further distances from observers, store 
behind objects, or in dark areas. Ravens and scrub-jays also use strategies 
that appear to tactfully deceive potential thieves such as leading them away 
from food stores, making false stores, or returning alone to restore food in 
new locations unbeknown to an observer (Clayton et al., 2007). 
 
Technology, Tools, Innovation, and Culture 
 
The application of flexible foraging and technical skills may be as important to 
the evolution of cognition as sociality (Byrne, 1997). Technical innovation and 
the acquisition of new food resources positively correlate with an increased 
brain size in both birds and primates (Lefebvre et al., 2004). Such flexibility 
may then be maintained or even improved through social learning and cultural 
transmission. Species that demonstrate proficient use and manufacture of 
tools show particularly complex cognitive capacities (Bluff et al., 2007, 
Pearce, 2008). Some corvids have demonstrated the ability to manipulate 
non-functional novel objects into functional tools to retrieve food rewards (Bird 
and Emery, 2009, Weir et al., 2002). Such innovative behaviours not only 
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display an accomplished perception of the problems at hand, but also suggest 
an understanding of the inadequacies and physical properties of available 
non-functional tools. 
 
Sociality may facilitate the transmission of innovative behaviour through 
observation and social learning. As a result, population differences in the 
types of tools manufactured, like those observed in New Caledonian crows 
(Hunt and Gray, 2003) and chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999), might 
culminate in cultural differences. The cumulative evolution of tool complexity 
or foraging techniques may also provide analogous clues to the technical 
innovations of humans (Hunt and Gray, 2003). Is the proficient use of tools 
then an expression of a pre-existing physical intelligence or the result of a 
technological ratchet; a mechanism that provides selective pressures for 
further cognitive adaptations? 
 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS 
 
The above views focus on evolutionarily adaptive explanations for the current 
functions of cognitive traits. However, the adaptive aspects of evolutionary 
history, as a direct result of natural selection, may not necessarily account for 
the causal basis of enhanced cognition. There may be other potential reasons 
for the origin of such traits. Complex cognition (i.e., cognitive processes that 
are over and above the basic psychology required by most species in order to 
survive) may instead be the result of nonadaptive processes that arose as a 
necessary by-product of other adaptations. Similarly, it may also be that 
complexities of a structure and its development impose restrictions on 
adaptive cognitive change (Gould, 1997, Gould and Lewontin, 1979). 
Certainly, the brain is an incredibly sophisticated structure that controls 
millions of different bodily processes, of which cognition is but one. However, 
the brain is too metabolically expensive to have resulted in a collection of 
traits that arose as an evolutionary accident. 
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New processes of evolution appear through previously existing organs or 
physiological activities (Lewontin, 1998). Advanced cognitive capacities may 
therefore have evolved as secondary consequences, or ‗correlations of 
growth‘ (Darwin, 1859), that later became useful through exaptive processes 
(Gould and Lewontin, 1979). It is therefore important, when searching for the 
evolution of cognition, not to separate current utility of adaptations from their 
historical origin. Making inferences about the ultimate reasons for the 
evolution of cognitive structures or behaviours with respect to a species‘ 
current fitness may only result in speculative ‗Just So Stories‘ (Lewontin, 
1998). 
 
IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE FOR DOMAIN-GENERAL INTELLIGENCE IN 
ANIMALS? 
 
The ecological view proposes a modular approach to learning mechanisms. 
For example, learning about space, time, or number is attributed to specific 
contexts. Hence in this view, cognition is considered a collection of adaptive 
specialisations that are domain specific (Shettleworth, 2010). However, it is 
the generalisation of such adaptive processes and their application to novel 
tasks that confer behavioural flexibility. It is for this reason that evolutionary 
psychology promotes the metaphor of the mind as a Swiss Army knife; a 
general-purpose tool made up entirely of special-purpose devices. But the 
question remains whether there is a module for everything? 
 
Cognitive adaptations may initially develop under certain selection pressures, 
but during the course of evolution become applicable to an expanding range 
of stimuli (Heyes, 2003). Can this process of generalisation, from adaptations 
to exaptations, promote a domain-general intelligence? Examples might be 
found outside of adaptive specialisations in species that may have 
secondarily lost adaptive traits characteristic of a common ancestor. For 
example, rooks and various species of monkeys do not use tools in the wild 
and yet demonstrate tool use and physical cognition in the laboratory (Bird 
and Emery, 2009, Hauser, 1997, Santos et al., 2003).  
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THE FUTURE OF COGNITIVE EVOLUTION 
 
As cognitive adaptations do not fossilise, is trying to reconstruct an animal‘s 
(including human‘s) cognitive evolutionary history redundant? Testing 
evolutionary hypotheses about cognition can be difficult because cognitive 
processes affect fitness indirectly through behaviour. Are then any 
hypotheses inferring adaptation no better than mere speculations (Lewontin, 
1998)? It is difficult to infer the mechanisms that drove divergence in brain 
size and cognition between humans and non-human apes, as all intermediate 
species that could provide such clues are extinct. Evidence from fossil 
remains of early hominids may provide useful clues, as Archaeopteryx did for 
birds and reptiles, but more rigorous tests of the relationships between 
adaptive behaviour and the environment are required. 
 
Testing cognition relies on direct observation, model building, experiment, 
and the comparative method (Shettleworth, 2010). However, the evolutionary 
questions about cognition involve both the evolution of cognition and the 
effects of cognition on evolution. Therefore, traits must be considered as both 
objects and subjects of evolutionary processes—consequences of a process 
of change and also the cause of change (Lewontin, 1998). Tests may claim 
that traits are adaptive by (1) modelling how well a character serves a 
hypothesised function, (2) comparing whether variations of a trait correspond 
to variations in ecology, or (3) directly by experiment. Comparisons can be 
made between contrasting groups of species; those with, those without, or 
those possessing traits at different degrees. Measurements of the 
reproductive effects of variation of the trait can then be made and any genetic 
differences that underlie different forms of the trait can be illuminated. 
However, it is important to remember that any interpretations of adaptations 
are limited to observations of their current effects on fitness. It might be 
interesting to know how cognition arose, spread, and changed, but our 
interpretations may always be reduced to elaborate speculations, and thus we 
may never know. 
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UNIQUELY HUMAN COGNITION 
 
This review has discussed how different species may have evolved similar 
cognitive abilities in response to either shared learning mechanisms or 
analogous environmental selection pressures. Examples such as causal 
reasoning in tool use, episodic-like memory of the type, state and location of 
food caches, and the ability to predict the behaviour of others during 
competition for food all suggest that a few species (e.g., apes, corvids, 
parrots, elephants and cetaceans) are endowed with more sophisticated 
cognitive capacities than other animals (Emery and Clayton, 2005). These 
examples appear to be related to socio-environmental traits such as complex 
social systems, unpredictable environments, altricial offspring, and an 
omnivorous diet, which are shared among these same large-brained, 
cognitively endowed species (Emery, 2006). Importantly, these complexities 
may also have been present in early hominids and so potentially responsible 
for driving the evolution of flexible forms of innovative behaviour in our 
ancestors. But do humans possess any unique cognitive abilities that do not 
show parallels in other animals? 
 
Occasionally, observations of previously unexpected human-like abilities 
appear in non-human animals, including those that are distantly related to 
humans, such as teaching (Thornton and Raihani, 2008), culture (Whiten et 
al., 1999), recursion (Gentner et al., 2006), episodic memory (Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1998), and planning (Raby et al., 2007). However, it has been 
argued that these abilities differ between humans and animals because they 
are based on a profoundly different cognitive architecture (Penn et al., 2008). 
For example, animals do not form symbolic representations that can be used 
during communication and cannot reason about unobservable states (e.g., 
feelings and forces) rather than behaviour. An additional contrast is that these 
behaviours tend to be highly domain specific, relatively inflexible, and species 
typical. Yet it remains unclear why such abilities should be considered less 
sophisticated just because they are domain specific. 
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Although the search for human uniqueness has traditionally been sought from 
studies of apes (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), more distantly related species 
also appear to share cognitive adaptations with humans for space, objects, 
tools, categorisation, quantification, understanding social relationships, 
intentional communication, social learning, and social cognition (Emery and 
Clayton, 2004a, Shettleworth, 2010). But many aspects of human cognition 
appear to be totally unique: people communicate across continents, write 
poetry, perform calculus, and make wine. Therefore, the question posed is 
whether a small difference in our evolutionary (or cultural) history made a big 
difference to the human brain and cognition? In this final section, we will 
assess whether supposedly unique aspects of human cognition are shared 
with other animals. 
 
Theory of Mind 
 
Humans have developed unique sociocultural adaptations that enable them 
to pay attention to the behaviour of other individuals in their social group. This 
ability is thought to have developed from an understanding of others as 
distinct mental entities that possess beliefs and desires of their own 
(Andrews, 2005). In short, these processes involve concepts of mental 
representation or a Theory of Mind (ToM). The possession of a ToM is 
derived from an understanding that the behaviour of others is intentional, 
which can then be used to predict others‘ future behaviours and provide 
explanations for their actions (Penn and Povinelli, 2007). 
 
To determine whether animals possess elements of a ToM, tests have 
focused on different categories of mental states, based on perceptual, 
informational, and motivational domains. For example, examining what 
animals know about what another can or cannot see tests their understanding 
that others have perceptual mental states, whereas examining what animals 
know about what another may know (for example, from what they may have 
seen in the past) tests their understanding that others have informational 
mental states. However, the benchmark for human ToM is testing whether 
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animals form concepts of false beliefs that (1) may contradict reality and (2) 
may be different from what the observer knows to be true (Emery and 
Clayton, 2009). Some animals, such as chimpanzees, dogs, and corvids 
show advanced predispositions to respond to certain behavioural cues, but no 
non-human animal has convincingly demonstrated an understanding of false 
belief; therefore, the possession of a true ToM may still be considered unique 
to humans (Tomasello et al., 2005). Only children around 4 years old have 
demonstrated the ability to separate their own representations of a situation 
from another‘s. 
 
Tomasello and colleagues (2005) suggest that this socio-cognitive skill 
promotes uniquely human joint attentional activities and shared intentionality 
that form the basis for culture. Shared intentionality requires the ability to view 
others as causal agents and make cognitive representations of others‘ minds, 
thus providing the motivation to collaborate in shared goals. Such 
collaboration may thus form the basis of cultural evolution, facilitating the 
creation and use of linguistic symbols, the construction of social norms and 
individual beliefs, and the establishment of social institutions (Tomasello et 
al., 2005). The development of such traits further enhances their transmission 
across generations allowing for cumulative cultural learning and unique 
processes of cultural cognition and evolution. 
 
Mental Time Travel 
 
Mental time travel is the process of recollecting one‘s past information about 
what happened where and when (retrospection) and using this information to 
project one‘s self into the future to anticipate future needs (prospection) 
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Episodic memory, in contrast to semantic 
memory, is information about personally experienced events, rather than just 
knowledge of the event itself. An example may be the reconstruction of where 
and when, and the associated emotional responses elicited from learning that 
George W. Bush was re-elected, as opposed from merely knowing the fact 
that he won a second term. The ability to make retrospective and prospective 
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decisions may have direct implications for survival in the future and thus be 
an important component of human cognitive evolution. In a fluctuating 
environment, species that distinguish certain regularities based on prior 
experiences and adapt this knowledge to future decisions have an advantage 
over those that do not. The question remains whether mental time travel is 
unique to humans because two critical components of human mental time 
travel involve phenomenological consciousness, namely autonoesis 
(awareness of authorship) and chronesthesia (awareness of the passage of 
time) (Clayton et al., 2008, 2009, Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), which are 
difficult to test without the faculty of language. 
 
Recent research suggests that apes, corvids, parids, and rats demonstrate 
behaviours indicative of episodic-like memory and future planning (Grodzinski 
and Clayton, 2010). For example, research on food-storing birds has utilised    
the natural caching behaviour of these animals to develop paradigms for 
investigating what jays may know about what they cached, where and when, 
who was present when they cached, as well as decisions about what and 
where to cache for future needs (Grodzinski and Clayton, 2010). However, it 
remains difficult to interpret non-verbal approaches to mental time travel and 
infer whether animals possess unconstrained capacities analogous to those 
of humans, rather than limitations imposed by instincts or conventional 
learning. Therefore, an approach based on behavioural rather than verbal 
criteria has to be adopted (Clayton et al., 2003). 
 
Culture 
 
Human culture has flourished as a result of identifying intentional behaviours 
in others. By distinguishing actions as a means to achieving underlying goals 
and recognising shared intentions in terms of aligning ones own goals with 
those of conspecifics, individuals can learn and be taught through the medium 
of a social–collective culture. Many animals display traits that are suggestive 
of culture (Hunt and Gray, 2003, Whiten et al., 1999). However, what may 
make human culture unique is the mechanism by which information passes 
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within and between social groups (Price et al., 2010). Material or symbolic 
artefacts can also be culturally transmitted through succeeding generations. A 
cumulative process (‗ratchet effect‘) of modifying, improving, or finding new 
ways to incorporate an artefact into social practices then results in cultural 
evolution; the new and improved version gets passed onto the next 
generation, and so on. Successful cultural transmission not only relies on 
imitation and teaching, but is also facilitated by collaboration and 
communication (Tomasello et al., 2005). These pressures may then result in 
the evolution of symbolic forms of communication such as language. 
 
Language 
 
Some researchers claim that humans alone are capable of acquiring 
language and that it is this capacity that accounts for our unique intellectual 
abilities (Premack, 2007). There is no doubt that language has played a 
central role in the evolution of human cognition. However, it is clear that 
language is not necessary for cognition to occur. Language is the result of 
adaptations derived from shared intentions and group-orientated coordination 
and collaboration (Tomasello et al., 2005). It is those underlying cognitive and 
social skills that motivate people to share personal information, knowledge, 
and perspectives that are unique to humans. As a result, language and 
thought are likely to have coevolved, ‗ratcheting‘ each other up as language 
created new cognitive niches. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past 30 years, the resurgence in comparative cognition has 
dramatically extended our understanding of the human and non-human mind. 
Such renewed vitality has spawned many creative and imaginative studies, 
each furthering our insight into the evolution of cognition. Research 
comparing subtle differences in cognitive processes between humans and 
other closely related species highlights evolutionary divergences in cognitive 
trajectories, whereas cognitive similarities between humans, other apes, and 
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more distantly related species, such as corvids, highlight evolutionary 
convergence. For example, contemporary approaches that focus on more 
distantly related species such as birds have revealed previously unsuspected 
humanlike abilities, such as mental attribution, episodic memory, future 
planning, and self-awareness, further illuminating the convergent processes 
of cognitive evolution. We now know empirically, as Darwin once speculated, 
that humans and non-human animals share many fundamental cognitive 
abilities, yet the development of such abilities differs in degrees across 
species. These differences are likely to be based on different computational 
demands in those species‘ socio-ecological environments (Penn et al., 2008), 
and especially that of the ancestral species. Although we will never fully 
realise what this environment and the associated selection pressures were 
like, many critics suggest that this makes the study of cognitive evolution a 
‗scientific dead end‘. We believe that comparative, phylogenetic, 
experimental, and theoretical tools are in place to allow us to try to 
reconstruct the evolution of specific cognitive traits and their neural correlates.
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1.3: Convergent Evolution of Cognition 
 
Introduction 
 
Our understanding of the convergent evolution of cognition hinges on 
comparative studies among phylogenetically distinct species. This is not to 
say that comparative cognition is solely restricted to studies of distantly 
related species; comparisons between closely related species, such as 
humans and other primates, especially chimpanzees, also reveal compelling 
insights into the divergent processes of cognitive evolution (e.g., Tomasello 
and Call, 1997). However, the defining criterion of convergent evolution is that 
it occurs across distantly related species. As a result, the convergent 
evolution of adaptive traits can be considered to arise independent of 
phylogeny and shaped by common solutions to similar socio-ecological 
problems. 
 
By considering cognition as an adaptive specialisation —that is, a trait that is 
driven by environmental selection pressures—such selection pressures can 
be shared among distantly related species that face similar socio-ecological 
challenges. As a result, analogous adaptations may evolve independently 
among distantly related organisms (Keeton and Gould, 1986). Any similarities 
in traits (i.e., cognitive abilities) can then be attributed to shared 
environmental selection pressures rather than to characteristics present in a 
common ancestor (Ridley, 1993). Consequently, the greater the phylogenetic 
separation between groups, the stronger the case for evolutionary 
convergence (Papini, 2002). 
 
One example of convergent evolution is the adaptation of active flight among 
distantly related vertebrate species (Seed et al., 2009a). Birds, bats, and 
pterosaurs, for example, share the functional ability of flight, but lack 
structural similarities in their forelimb morphologies (Figure 1.2). Flight in birds 
evolved through the extension of the bones of the forelimb, whereas bats and 
pterosaurs support the wing through extended digits: the fifth digit for 
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pterosaurs; and the second, third, fourth, and fifth for bats. Yet, the 
convergent shape of the wing is the result of environmental selection 
pressures and the functional constraints imposed by flight. 
 
Cognition has been described as ―the mechanisms by which animals acquire, 
process, store and act upon information from the environment‖ (Shettleworth, 
2010, p. 4). This chapter proposes a model of cognition as a domain-specific 
adaptive response to specific environmental selection pressures, which can 
then be generalised and applied to solve novel tasks of functional 
equivalence. This proposal predicts differences between species based on 
different adaptations for complex problem solving in the wild. An alternative 
hypothesis proposes that there are no qualitative differences in the processes 
of cognition between species (Bolhuis and Macphail, 2001), even in those 
species that live in different environments.  
 
 
 
 
In addition to such controversies is the debate about whether certain 
behaviours are, in fact, governed by so-called higher-order cognitive 
processes, or whether intelligent behaviour is simply the result of ―hardwired‖ 
Figure 1.2: Convergent evolution 
of wing and arm structure in 
pterodactyls, birds, bats, and 
humans. Although the structure of 
the wing is different in 
pterodactyls, birds and bats, the 
resultant behaviour—flight—is the 
same. This may represent a 
parallel to convergent evolution of 
cognition in corvids and apes, yet 
with very differently structured 
brains. 
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adaptive specialisations—conserved associative learning processes (i.e., 
conditioning). It is, therefore, important that cognitive processes are tested by 
determining whether certain behaviours can be flexibly expressed across a 
variety of tasks of general equivalence. 
 
COMPARING TANGIBLE TRAITS & INFERRING TANGIBLE PROXIES 
 
Unlike wings, which can be easily dissected to reveal any structural 
differences in morphology, cognition is an intangible trait ascribed to an 
organism‘s psychology. Thus, comparisons may be made across species only 
by identifying measurable proxies that are ecologically relevant to cognitive 
aptitude, such as measures of relative brain size. 
 
Brain Structure and Function 
 
One useful proxy for intelligence is the size of specific components of an 
organism‘s brain relative to its overall body mass (Figure 1.3). Overall brain 
size has been criticised as a poor measure of cognitive capacity, because (1) 
brain size correlates with body size, and (2) many brain areas control primary, 
sensory, and motor functions that are not directly associated with cognition 
(Jerison, 1973). However, more recent studies have found that overall brain 
size is a better predictor of general intelligence (at least in primates) than 
other measures, including relative brain size and neocortex size (Deaner et 
al., 2007). Yet there are certain areas of the brain that are more closely 
associated with higher-order processing, such as the neocortex in mammals 
and the forebrain in birds (Striedter, 2005). 
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Figure 1.3: Graph of log brain volume against log body weight for a number 
of birds (corvids, parrots, and pigeons), mammals (rats, primates, cetaceans), 
Australopithecus and Homo sapiens. Data on body size and brain volume 
were taken from various published sources. 
 
 
Jerison (1973) first proposed an index to rank the cognitive skills of species 
based on their relative brain size, called encephalisation quotient (EQ). 
Although there are obvious difficulties in making generalised comparisons 
across taxa that live in different environments, Jerison identified that some 
species are endowed with an exceptionally high EQ and, hence, a relative 
brain size that is much larger than would be predicted for their body mass 
(Jerison, 1973). Of particular interest was the finding that the relative size of 
the forebrain in corvids (crows, rooks, and jays) and parrots is significantly 
larger than those of other birds (cf. Emery and Clayton, 2004b). Corvids and 
parrots, in fact, possess brains that are relatively the same size as those of 
the great apes, and in both cases they are much larger than predicted for 
their body mass (Jerison, 1973). Although the issue of whether brain size 
reflects cognitive competence remains controversial (Striedter, 2005), it is 
clear that those avian species that have relatively large brains, such as 
corvids and parrots, also display cognitive abilities that have hitherto only 
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been demonstrated in large-brained mammals (primates, cetaceans, 
elephants), especially those with a large prefrontal cortex (Emery and 
Clayton, 2004a; see later). 
 
The common ancestor of birds and mammals, a stem amniote, lived over 300 
million years ago. During the course of such long independent evolutionary 
trajectories, corvids, parrots, and apes adapted to radically different 
environmental requirements, but these groups also shared similar life 
histories (relatively long developmental period before independence, great 
longevity, etc.), morphological adaptations (color vision, ability to track moving 
objects, fine object manipulation, etc.), and socio-ecological traits (omnivory, 
complex social groups, individualised relationships, etc.). 
 
Evolutionary divergence has resulted in the independent evolution of different 
neuroanatomical components and structures across species. Mammalian 
brains, for example, are comprised of different components to those of birds, 
and they are organised into a laminar arrangement of neurons compared to 
the nuclear clusters of neurons found in avian brains (Emery, 2006). Yet 
analogous functions of particular brain components have been identified 
between these two groups (Jarvis et al., 2005). In the mammalian brain, for 
example, it is the neocortex that mediates cognitive processes (memory, 
reasoning, concept formation, and social intelligence). However, birds do not 
possess a neocortex. Measures of higher cognition, such as foraging 
innovation and tool use are, instead, identified with certain areas of the avian 
forebrain (Lefebvre et al., 2002), with areas analogous to the mammalian 
prefrontal cortex, such as the nidopallium and mesopallium (Rehkamper et 
al., 1991, 2004). 
 
Although there may be fundamental differences in the size and structure of 
avian and mammalian brains, recent evidence suggests that both groups 
share advanced cognitive abilities (Emery and Clayton, 2004a). Pepperberg 
(1999) provides a helpful analogy: ―the structural differences between 
mammalian and avian brains are like the wiring and processing differences 
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between IBM-PCs and Apple Macs. However, in both cases, the resulting 
output (i.e. behaviour or algorithmic operations) is similar.‖ Such similarities in 
cognitive traits suggest that corvid and ape cognition has undergone a 
convergent evolution of mental processes (Emery, 2004, Emery and Clayton, 
2004a, Seed et al., 2009a). In fact, many animals demonstrate intelligent 
behaviour, suggesting that cognition may have evolved independently among 
several vertebrate groups, including great apes (Tomasello and Call, 1997), 
corvids (Emery and Clayton, 2004a), cetaceans (Marino, 2002), hyenas 
(Holekamp et al., 2007) and canids (Hare and Tomasello, 2005, Miklosi et al., 
2004), among others (see later). 
 
Is Cognition Similar in Different Species? 
 
Not only do corvids and apes appear to possess analogous neuroanatomical 
components responsible for cognitive processes, but they may also share 
similarities in how they form representations of their social and physical 
worlds. Thus, it is in the recognition of shared socio-ecological challenges that 
species face in their day-to-day lives that convergent adaptations may be 
revealed. For example, recent research has revealed evidence that corvids 
demonstrate similar reasoning abilities as great apes, with regard to how tools 
work, how social agents can be manipulated, and how events are 
remembered (cf. Seed et al., 2009a). 
 
Recognising behavioural similarities shared among different species provides 
a basis for inferring similarities in cognition. For example, using tools to aid in 
extractive foraging may not only be an adaptive response to acquiring an 
otherwise inaccessible resource, but proficiency might also be refined over 
time through social learning. However, it is only by going beyond the broad 
observations, such as that both apes and corvids are capable of tool 
manufacture, that information about how these species process such 
information can be revealed. For instance, what range of problems are these 
animals capable of solving? Do they make or use tools for particular 
purposes, adapting or modifying them depending on their context of use? 
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Does a species‘ understanding of how tools work depend on causal 
reasoning or other psychological processes? Only by conducting experiments 
using comparative methodology can we explain limits to such similarities and 
thus establish the convergent processes of cognitive evolution. 
 
Species with dramatically different life histories, morphologies, brain 
structures, and ecologies may perceive the world quite differently from one 
another. For this reason, it is important to consider the ecological validity of 
comparative tests. Attempts to make direct comparisons of psychological 
processes across phylogenetically distinct species may be marred by 
species-specific differences in perception, attention, and motivation 
(Bitterman, 1960, 1965). 
 
An organism‘s neuro-architecture is influenced by adaptations to specific 
environmental selection pressures. For instance, there may be differences in 
the environmental constraints imposed on brain size among aquatic species 
compared with aerial species. Moreover, species‘ life histories may also result 
in more subtle variations. For example, migratory birds that spend much of 
their life in flight may be subjected to tighter energetic constraints and, thus, 
tend to possess significantly smaller brains than those of sedentary or 
nomadic species (Burish et al., 2004). The occurrence of cognitive traits may 
also be more likely to evolve among certain species. For example, the 
manufacture and use of tools is more frequently observed in great apes than 
in birds. This may be because birds possess a multifunctional beak, thus 
rendering the manufacture of tools unnecessary in many of the foraging 
challenges that birds encounter. 
 
PREREQUISITES FOR INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOUR  
 
Cognition is thought to have arisen independently across distantly related 
species through processes of convergent evolution, driven by the need to 
solve comparable social and ecological problems (Emery and Clayton, 2004b, 
2004b, Marino, 2002, Seed et al., 2009a). Such environmental challenges 
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often require the ability to respond flexibly by generalising domain-specific 
behaviours (i.e., behaviours evolved to solve specific problems), and applying 
this knowledge to accommodate for more broad and variable interactions that 
species encounter in their environments. As a result, behavioural flexibility is 
often attributed as an indicator of intelligence. 
 
Corvids have consistently demonstrated cognitive skills that surpass those 
described in other birds, and in many cases they rival similar cognitive 
domains previously thought confined to monkeys and apes (Emery, 2004, 
Emery and Clayton, 2004a, 2004b, Seed et al., 2009a). Similarities among 
species‘ life history traits may, therefore, provide clues to cognitive aptitude. 
Corvids and parrots share with the great apes, many of the biological, 
ecological, behavioural, and psychological attributes thought fundamental to 
complex cognition. Each of these aspects will be discussed in the following 
sections outlining any similarities and discrepancies between groups. Both 
corvids and parrots, for example, possess forebrains that are relatively the 
same size as apes; experience a long developmental period before becoming 
independent from their parents; are long-lived, omnivorous extractive 
foragers; and live in complex social groups—all socio-ecological attributes 
that have long been suggested as prerequisites for intelligence in primates 
(Byrne and Whiten, 1988, Humphrey, 1976). 
 
It is likely that each of the socio-ecological attributes described later 
corresponds with differences in domain-specific cognitive abilities. That is, 
different species may reveal different adaptive responses in response to 
particular challenges in their environment. Chimpanzees, for example, use 
tools more frequently than their closely related cousins, bonobos, and hence, 
possess a more sophisticated understanding of physical causality or ―folk 
physics‖ (Herrmann et al., 2010). Yet, those species with the most advanced 
cognitive abilities are likely to incorporate a number of these socio-ecological 
attributes (Emery, 2006), although the question that remains to be answered 
is to what degree these socio-ecological pressures correlate with cognitive 
flexibility and how these pressures are reflected in the underlying cognitive 
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systems of animals, which we are still far from knowing. 
 
Biological Similarities  
 
In this section, we highlight a number of shared biological features found in 
corvids, parrots, and apes, however, we are aware that these are general 
claims and that some of the traits are shared with other animals. The function 
of this section is to highlight those features that are shared by these 
taxonomic groups and may contribute to the similarities in behaviour and 
cognition we will describe in later sections. 
 
Parenting Development and Lifespan 
 
Ontological differences among species reveal important trends in the 
evolution of relative brain size, particularly between altricial and precocial 
species. Altricial species are born into the world blind, helpless, and utterly 
dependent on parental care. Yet precocial species are immediately capable of 
surviving independently. Such stark differences in juvenile development may 
appear at odds with initial survival success, yet they foretell strategic 
differences in species‘ life histories. 
 
In birds, altricial hatchlings possess significantly smaller brains relative to their 
body size than precocial hatchlings (Bennett and Harvey, 1985). However, 
altricial adult birds possess significantly larger brains relative to their body 
size than precocial adult birds (Starck, 1993, Starck and Ricklefs, 1998). 
These findings suggest that the majority of neural development occurs in 
birds during an extended post-hatching period, rather than during incubatory 
periods. However, prolonged periods of development, whether during the 
incubatory period or post-hatching period, are, in fact, correlated with 
increases in relative brain size (Iwaniuk and Nelson, 2003). Thus, extended 
developmental periods and longer durations of parental care correlate 
positively with relative brain size (Ricklefs, 2004). A similar picture emerges 
for the great apes. Apes are also an altricial species, displaying a slow rate of 
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development, with substantial increases in brain size in the post-natal period. 
Indeed, there is also a clear relationship between length of juvenile period 
(and age at maturation) and relative brain size in primates (Ross, 2004). 
 
Relatively extended periods of juvenile development may serve to 
accommodate the acquisition of knowledge, either by social learning from 
adults to offspring or individual learning based on trial-and-error. Acquiring 
such information may be particularly useful when learning about how to 
survive in unpredictable environments. Although this hypothesis is attractive, 
there is little data to support such a claim. Indeed, there is no correlation 
between environmental complexity (social, physical, dietary, ecological, and 
climatic uncertainty) and brain size in primates when controlling for postnatal 
growth rates (Ross, 2004). While the developmental period of corvids and 
parrots is relatively long compared to other birds, it remains relatively short 
compared to apes (Iwaniuk et al., 2003, Iwaniuk and Nelson, 2003). Life 
experience may therefore also influence cognitive capacity, with long-lived 
individuals accumulating greater knowledge through experience, while using 
such knowledge to make better decisions and be better prepared to respond 
to future problems.  
 
Dexterity  
 
Species equipped with grasping or dexterous limbs (primates) or generalised 
all-purpose beaks (birds) may be better equipped to solve physical tasks than 
those species that cannot easily manipulate objects. Parrots, for example 
have particularly dexterous grasping feet, which they effectively use to 
manipulate food. Similarly, primates possess hands and feet that can be used 
to manipulate objects. Corvids tend to use their beaks as tools, suitable for 
prying open, digging, puncturing, and crushing a variety of food sources, as 
well as a number of fine manipulations. Such a number of flexible movements 
allow these groups to exploit objects in their environment unavailable to other 
groups, which in turn require additional levels of neural and cognitive 
processing power not seen in other species without such dexterity. 
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Visual Acuity 
 
Among primates, brain size is positively correlated with visual specialisation 
(Barton, 1998). In fact, the primate neocortex is comprised of about 50 
percent of visual areas, allowing for accurate and high-resolution processing 
(Van Essen et al., 1992). High visual acuity may be particularly beneficial to 
primates and birds because it may enhance their ability to detect ripe fruits 
and moving insects, as well as predators. The relatively large brains of 
frugivorous primates, as opposed to folivorous species (Clutton-Brock and 
Harvey, 1980), may thus have resulted from selection pressures acting to 
enhance the detection of edible fruits using specific visual cues such as color. 
In addition, visual acuity may allow for the detection of social information, 
such as facial expressions and the gaze direction of conspecifics (Barton, 
1996). Thus, it is not surprising that there is a strong relationship between the 
size of the visual system and socio-ecological variables such as diet and 
social group size in primates. 
 
Birds are also highly visual animals (Hodos, 1993), processing color 
information in a greater frequency range than mammals (including ultraviolet), 
as well as rapidly processing movement and environmental information 
(Martin, 2012). However, the eyes of birds and mammals are quite different, 
although the central neural systems are relatively similar (Husband and 
Shimizu, 2001). We may, therefore, predict a similar relationship between the 
visual system and socio-ecological variables in birds. Indeed, in the case of 
prey capture, there is a co-evolutionary relationship between eye size and 
brain size (Garamszegi et al., 2002). 
 
Brain Size 
 
The relative size of corvid, parrot, and ape brains are equivalent in terms of 
brain size to body size (i.e., are found on the same regression line; Emery 
and Clayton, 2004a). An enlarged brain is metabolically expensive (Aiello and 
Wheeler, 1995). Thus, it is generally accepted that there must be 
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correspondingly powerful adaptive benefits from brain enlargement. 
Understanding the origins of this specialisation, therefore, becomes a 
question of what selective pressure(s) favoured enlarged components of the 
brain during the course of evolution (Isler and Van Schaik, 2009). 
 
As discussed earlier, the relative size of specific components of an 
organism‘s brain can be used as a direct proxy to inferring higher cognitive 
facilities. However, it is important to recognise that any interpretations must 
be made with caution, because different assumptions and methodological 
approaches can easily distort species-wide comparisons (see Healy and 
Rowe, 2007). 
 
ECOLOGICAL SIMILARITIES 
 
Unpredictable Environments 
 
The most recently evolved genera of corvids (Corvus, Pyrrhocorax) and apes 
(Pan) appeared at roughly the same point in evolutionary time (5–10 million 
years ago) during the Late Miocene and Pliocene epochs (Emery, 2006, 
Potts, 2004). This period is characterised by dramatic environmental and 
climatic variability and instability as a result of numerous ice ages. Such 
environmental changes would have strongly influenced food availability and 
consequently species‘ foraging strategies. 
 
During evolutionary history, the abundance of resources may have fluctuated, 
becoming less reliable and irregularly distributed through time and space. 
Food scarcity may have been alleviated by the evolution of foraging 
techniques to exploit new resources. However, species that are governed by 
rigid stimulus-response action patterns or hardwired behaviours may not 
respond as well to such changes as those species that adopt flexible 
behaviours based on more abstract knowledge (Seed et al., 2009a). As such, 
extracting food hidden within encased substrates or procuring meat as an 
energy-rich food source may have become incorporated into species‘ foraging 
Chapter 1.3: Convergent Evolution of Cognition 
 
 51 
repertoires. Thus, environmental variability may have selected for certain 
species to adopt innovative, omnivorous, and generalist foraging techniques, 
powered by increases in relative brain size (Lefebvre et al., 2004). Such 
ecological variables have been suggested as important evolutionary drivers of 
great-ape cognition (Potts, 2004); similar conditions may also be responsible 
for the evolution of avian (corvid and parrot) cognition (Emery, 2006), as well 
as other species living in such changeable environments, such as cetaceans 
(Marino et al., 2007) and elephants (Byrne and Bates, 2009). 
 
One important feature of an unpredictable environment is the source of food. 
Foods that are ephemeral, that have to be hunted, that appear at certain 
times of the year, that are distributed in clumps or need to be extracted from 
casings, will require more cognitive abilities to obtain (e.g., spatial memory, 
planning, cooperation) than foods that are available all year, located in the 
same place, and which require little processing, such as foliage. 
 
Generalised Diet 
 
Many corvids, parrots, and primates are omnivorous, generalist foragers. 
Rooks, in particular, consume over 170 species of plants and animals, 
including many different parts of plants, insects, worms, seafood, birds‘ eggs, 
small vertebrates, and carrion (Cramp and Perrins, 1994). However, rooks 
acquire the majority of their diet through extractive foraging techniques; 
digging in the soil for grain, invertebrates, roots, and tubers (Lockie, 1955). 
Some corvids also use their beaks to hammer and pry open the hard cases of 
nuts such as walnuts and acorns, and drop mussels, limpets, and bone from 
the air until their encased contents are released. 
 
Parrots also consume a wide variety of seeds, fruits, and flowers (Juniper and 
Parr, 2003). Some species, such as the kaka frequently consume insects 
(Moorhouse, 1997), use their large, down-curved bills to tap sap from trees 
and excavate grubs from both live and dead wood (Beggs and Wilson, 1987). 
Another New Zealand parrot, the kea, renowned for its extreme neophilia and 
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advanced intellect (Huber and Gajdon, 2006), is also known to consume a 
varied diet, including over 40 plant species (Clark, 1970) as well as discarded 
fat, protein, and carbohydrate-rich foods found in human settlements 
(Diamond and Bond, 1999, Gajdon et al., 2006). The kea is also notable as 
the only carnivorous parrot known for attacking sheep and eating fat from the 
back of the animal (Benham, 1906, Diamond and Bond, 1999), as well as 
excavating sooty shearwater chicks from their underground nest burrows 
(Cuthbert, 2003). Utilising such a variety of food sources is a likely response 
to living in mountainous regions characterised by a harsh and unpredictable 
climate, resulting in an irregular food supply. It is not yet clear whether the 
seemingly more complex dietary habits of keas, when compared to other 
parrots, is reflected in their physical cognition (Liedtke et al., 2010). 
 
Seeds are a more common component of parrots‘ diets, but many seeds have 
a hard case, requiring dexterous manipulation to extract their contents, 
preventing most other arboreal foragers access. Some parrots, for example 
hyacinth macaws (Borsari and Ottoni, 2005) and black palm cockatoos 
(Wallace, 2000), proficiently open hard-cased seeds by using wedge-like 
pieces of wood or leaves as tools to better grip nuts with their upper 
mandible, and, while holding the nut in place with one foot, open the hard 
casing with their lower mandible. 
 
Primates also demonstrate skilful extractive foraging techniques, the most 
prominent example being termite fishing by wild chimpanzees (Goodall, 1963, 
van Lawick-Goodall, 1968). However, chimpanzees (Boesch and Boesch, 
1990) and capuchins (Fragaszy et al., 2004) also crack hard-cased nuts with 
hammers and anvils to extract their contents. Although such behaviours are 
commonly observed, termite fishing and nut cracking require sophisticated 
manipulation and dexterity to succeed. Chimpanzee infants require years of 
observation to learn how to make tools (Biro et al., 2003, Lonsdorf, 2006). 
Similarly, capuchins‘ success at nut cracking varies considerably between 
individuals and is likely to require years of practice to attain an efficient 
technique (Fragaszy et al., 2010). 
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Extractive foraging may have evolved in response to food scarcity. Species 
that evolve novel foraging techniques may exploit niches that are not readily 
available to others, often containing energy-rich foods that are high in nutritive 
value and available throughout the year. In addition, extracting encased foods 
often requires a variety of complex sensorimotor skills for locating and 
manipulating food items. Such processes have been suggested to provide 
support for the evolution of intelligence in apes (Parker and Gibson, 1977), 
although other studies on primates found no relationship between extractive 
foraging and neocortex ratio (Dunbar, 1995). 
 
Foraging in Space and Time 
 
The main foods consumed by corvids, parrots, and primates (fruits, seeds, 
and invertebrates) are often patchily distributed through space and vary in 
their temporal availability. Other species may also face similar challenges in 
locating food items, such as cetaceans‘ diet of fish, krill, and cephalopods, 
which may be equally variable in abundance and distribution (Marino, 2002). 
However, such temporal and spatial patchiness may be predictable; plants 
remain in the same place and fruits often ripen at predictable intervals. 
Likewise, regularities in ocean currents or seasonal spawning times may 
allow cetaceans to predict the location and timing of abundant food supplies. 
 
Yet closely related species can differ substantially in their dietary 
requirements and hence foraging strategies. Some primates rely on a varied 
diet of fruits, whereas others predominantly consume leaves. Leaves are, 
however, considerably more abundant than fruits, and their distribution is 
regular. Frugivorous primates are, therefore, faced with an additional 
challenge; locating an ephemeral and patchily distributed resource. However, 
primates that remember the locations and fruiting patterns of a variety of plant 
foods might improve their foraging efficiency (Janmaat et al., 2006). Selection 
pressures, favouring foraging efficiency, are, therefore, thought to enhance 
species‘ cognitive capacities for spatial and temporal memory (Milton, 1981). 
As such, cerebral expansion is more pronounced in frugivorous primates, 
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rather than folivorous species (Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1980). 
 
Some animals have evolved specialisations for remembering and predicting 
the location of resources that are irregularly distributed through time and 
space. The most extensively documented accounts of such behaviour come 
from experiments on spatial memory in food-caching animals (Vander Wall, 
1990). When an abundant food supply is available, many animals store food 
for consumption in later periods of food scarcity. However, to efficiently 
recover their caches, storers need to process information relating to the 
location of their cache sites, the type, and perishability of stored food items, 
and the social context of caching (Clayton et al., 2007, Clayton and 
Dickinson, 1999, van Horik and Burns, 2007). Some corvids, such as Clark‘s 
nutcrackers, can cache up to 30,000 pine seeds over large areas, recovering 
a majority of them up to six months later. Such behaviours suggest that these 
birds possess a proficient long-term spatial memory (Balda and Kamil, 1992). 
Conversely, other corvids, such as Western scrub jays, cache fewer but a 
wider variety of food items that differ in their rates of perishability. 
Consequently, Western scrub jays not only remember where they cached, but 
also what they cached and when, so that perishable food can be recovered 
when it is still edible (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998, 1999, Clayton et al., 2001, 
2003, de Kort et al., 2005). 
 
BEHAVIOURAL SIMILARITIES  
 
Tool Use and Manufacture 
 
Recently thought to be uniquely human, the first report of tool use outside of 
humans was in wild chimpanzees (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968). We now know 
that many species of insects, fish, birds, and mammals use tools in the wild 
(Beck, 1980, Emery and Clayton, 2009b). However, in the wild, only 
chimpanzees, orangutans, New Caledonian crows, and woodpecker finches 
habitually use and manufacture tools during their daily foraging activities 
(Hunt, 1996, Tebbich et al., 2002, Tomasello and Call, 1997, van Schaik et 
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al., 2003). Yet the extent to which these animals understand how tools work, 
that is, their physical properties and the unobservable forces that govern their 
function—so-called folk physics—remains controversial (Emery and Clayton, 
2009b, Povinelli, 2000). 
 
Tool use requires ―the use of physical objects other than the animal‘s own 
body or appendages as a means to extend the physical influence realised by 
the animal‖ (Jones and Kamil, 1973 p. 1076). Hence, Egyptian vultures 
(Neophron percnopterus) that crack open eggs by dropping them onto rocks 
do not demonstrate tool use, whereas vultures that throw stones (as a 
physical extension of their body) to open eggs fit these criteria. Likewise, the 
examples of corvids dropping mussels to crack open their hard shells, 
thrushes that open snail shells by smashing them onto stones (Gibson, 1986), 
or crows in Japan and California that open hard-shelled walnuts by dropping 
them from great heights onto hard-surfaced roads (Cristol and Switzer, 1999, 
Nikei, 1995) do not demonstrate tool use when discussed in terms of the 
earlier definition. However, manipulating encased food items to extract their 
contents (extractive foraging) requires certain forms of cognition, particularly 
when compared with nonextractive forms of foraging. 
 
Although most species of great apes make and use tools, the most proficient 
primate tool user in the animal kingdom is the chimpanzee (Tomasello and 
Call, 1997). Yet there have also been numerous reports of tool use in birds, 
especially corvids (Lefebvre et al., 2002). One of the most striking 
applications of tool use by any animal can be observed in wild New 
Caledonian crows. These birds routinely use and transport manufactured 
tools during daily foraging expeditions, and they use different types of tools 
depending on their functional requirements: stepped-cut Pandanus leaves are 
used in a rapid back and forth fashion to search for prey under leaf litter, 
whereas hooked twigs are used to extract insect larvae from within tree 
cavities using slow deliberate movements (Hunt, 1996). 
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Both New Caledonian crows and chimpanzees manufacture tools, either 
fashioning probing sticks by stripping off smaller twigs and leaves from larger 
twigs and then inserting them into termite mounds, making hook tools by 
removing a series of side twigs from a larger twig and then chiselling away at 
a breakage point to create a hook, or cutting steps into a Pandanus leaf to 
make a pointed and rigid tool for rooting out grubs living under the bark of 
dead trees (Hunt et al., 2006, Hunt and Gray, 2004, Sanz et al., 2004). In all 
these cases (and others not described here), the toolmaker starts to create a 
tool from raw material (twigs, leaves, etc.) by removing or sculpting parts of 
the raw material that is non-functional as a tool, into a functional tool. 
Although we know little about the psychology of tool-making, this ability 
suggests that the toolmaker may have an image of the final tool in mind 
before it is made.  
 
Sociality 
 
Observations of social interactions among captive chimpanzees first 
prompted the hypothesis that social living and, thus, the challenges that 
species face in their social environment play important roles in the evolution 
of a flexible and intelligent mind (Social Intelligence Hypothesis: Humphrey, 
1976). This hypothesis was later recognised as a key component of primate 
cognition, attributing social intelligence to the recognition and subsequent 
manipulation, coordination, and deception of individuals within a social group 
(Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis: Byrne and Whiten, 1988). Further 
support for these theories was later found in positive correlations between 
social-group size and neocortex size in primates (Social Brain Hypothesis: 
Dunbar, 1998), and cetaceans (Marino, 1996). The rationale behind these 
theories is that selection favours those animals that proficiently keep track of 
the identities and interactions of numerous individuals within large social 
groups. Over evolutionary time, this process resulted in the refinement of 
social cognition as an adaptive specialisation. 
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Although there appears to be a clear indication that group size has played a 
significant role in the evolution of brain size in primates, similar relationships 
are not shared among birds (Emery et al., 2007). Such differences may, 
therefore, be attributed to the structure of social groups. For example, 
primates form polygynous social groups, whereas birds are often 
monogamous, forming life-long pair bonds. Moreover, group size in primates 
may be relatively stable, yet there can be considerable seasonal variation in 
birds‘ flock size. Similar correlations between relative brain size and certain 
aspects of sociality have, however, been identified in some avian species 
such as corvids (Emery et al., 2007). Social intelligence in birds may have 
thus evolved in response to the requirements of maintaining relationships and 
coordinating cooperative behaviour within monogamous pairs, rather than 
having been driven by the need to manage competitive interactions imposed 
by group living as in primates. In other words, it may be the quality rather than 
the quantity of relationships that are important for birds (Emery et al., 2007). 
In socially monogamous birds, an increase in the quality of parental care may 
lead to increasing payoffs; more experienced pairs (those that have paired for 
more than one breeding season) may raise more chicks. As such, 
comparisons between brain size and mating system in birds have revealed 
that the largest relative brain sizes are found among long-term monogamous 
species and cooperative breeders (Emery et al., 2007). 
 
Species that live within fission-fusion societies are presented with the 
additional cognitive challenge of adjusting to dynamic social changes, 
resulting from the movement of numerous individuals into and out of groups 
at various times (Aureli et al., 2008). Rooks, for example, congregate in large 
colonies during the breeding season; then, after they have raised their 
offspring, each breeding pair will disperse to form smaller foraging groups. 
Similar social structures are exhibited across a number of distantly related 
species that demonstrate high levels of sociality and social complexity such 
as chimpanzees (Goodall, 1986), cetaceans (Connor et al., 1998, Marino, 
2002, Smolker et al., 1992), and possibly some corvids (Emery, 2004). 
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Relationships 
 
Many animals not only recognise individuals within a group but also 
understand intragroup relationships, such as kinship and the social status of 
individuals relative to other group members (e.g., dominance rank). Such 
interactions become particularly clear during disputes over food or mates. 
During disputes, animals may recruit support from bystanders or relatives to 
form alliances; however, supporting a loser may prove costly. Therefore, it 
pays to recruit and support high-ranking individuals as well as consider the 
strength of pre-existing intra-group alliances. Making such decisions relies on 
the possession of a detailed understanding of third-party relationships (Schino 
et al., 2006, Silk, 1999), however, heuristics such as ―always recruit the most 
dominant animal‖ may also explain behaviour consistent with that of third-
party recognition (Range and Noe, 2005). 
 
Until recently, third-party relationships were considered a unique attribute of 
primate cognition (Tomasello and Call, 1997). However, many mammals, 
such as elephants, whales, dolphins, and hyenas, form long-lasting groups 
that are comprised of similar kin and dominance networks to those of 
primates (Connor, 2007, de Waal and Tyack, 2003, Holekamp et al., 2007). 
Like primates, hyenas support conspecifics engaged in agonistic interactions. 
Engh and colleagues (2005) observed that in most disputes, the aggressor 
was the more dominant individual. As such, support from conspecifics was 
usually directed toward the more dominant individual, possibly confirming a 
―join the aggressor‖ rule of thumb, rather than specific knowledge of an 
individual‘s relative rank. However, in a minority of cases, when a subordinate 
attacked the dominant, joiners also supported the dominant, suggesting 
knowledge of the relative rank of each individual (Engh et al., 2005). 
 
After disputes, hyenas (Engh et al., 2005) and primates (Tomasello and Call, 
1997) are more likely to redirect their aggression toward relatives of a former 
opponent rather than other low-ranking individuals. This suggests a 
knowledge of kin ship, dominance, and third-party relationships. However, 
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these findings may be biased because of close proximity of relatives and 
hence increased interactions. To further test this, Holekamp and colleagues 
(2007) played back distress calls of hyena pups and found that both mothers 
and nearby relatives of the calling cubs were more likely to elicit a response 
than unrelated individuals. Moreover, the dominance rank of the mother also 
influenced the looking of others. Together, these results provide support for 
kin, dominance, and third-party recognition in hyenas. 
 
Captive rooks and jackdaws also form long-term alliances with other group 
members, sometimes irrespective of sex or kinship (Emery et al., 2007). 
Relationships in young rooks and jackdaws are thought to be initiated by food 
sharing, demonstrated by the unsolicited transfer of food from one individual 
to another (active giving; de Kort et al., 2003), which is considered an 
essential component of pair formation (von Bayern et al., 2007). Alliances in 
corvids and apes are maintained through the use of affiliative behaviours, 
such as allopreening and grooming, respectively (de Waal and Lutrell, 1988, 
Emery et al., 2007, Seyfarth and Cheney, 1984). 
 
Rooks that form pairs enhance their individual dominance rank compared to 
those that remain single (Emery et al., 2007). Enhanced dominance in turn 
provides associated benefits such as increased food acquisition. Emery, and 
colleagues (2007) also report that rooks are sensitive to third-party 
relationships, as they redirect aggression to the partner of an individual that 
they have received aggression from. Furthermore, rooks engage in third-party 
affiliation with their partner (i.e., bill twining) after conflicts with other group 
members, however, unlike primates, they do not reconcile with former 
opponents (Seed et al., 2007). Cooperative coalitions are often observed in 
many social species. Female primates and cetaceans for instance, 
demonstrate alloparental care— ―babysitting‖ or staying within close proximity 
to unrelated juveniles (Marino, 2002, Nicolson, 1986). Chimpanzees (Uehara, 
1997), bonobos (Hohmann and Fruth, 2008), whales (Hain et al., 1982, 
Jurasz and Jurasz, 1979), and dolphins (Leatherwood, 1975, Wursig and 
Wursig, 1980) all exhibit cooperative feeding strategies that require 
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coordinated efforts of individuals within a group to capture prey. Male 
chimpanzees (Watts, 1998, Wrangham, 1999) and bottlenose dolphins 
(Connor et al., 1992) also form cooperative alliances or coalitions for the 
purposes of intergroup aggression (―warfare‖) and mate guarding. Recently, 
brown-necked ravens have been shown to also use cooperative hunting, with 
individuals taking different roles when hunting large lizards (Yosef and Yosef, 
2009). 
 
Innovations 
 
To accommodate rapid changes in their environment, some animals may 
behave flexibly by adopting innovative techniques to solve novel problems. 
Overcoming such challenges may require species to possess advanced 
cognitive mechanisms to process and manipulate environmental information, 
resulting in enlarged components of the brain (Dunbar, 1992). Comparing 
relative brain size with measures of behavioural complexity across species 
has revealed some of the most compelling evidence linking the evolution of 
brain and cognition (Lefebvre et al., 2004, 1997). 
 
Ethologists have long observed the complex and flexible behaviours 
performed by animals in the wild, documenting the emergence of novel 
behaviours and publishing anecdotal reports as short notes in scientific 
journals. Reports of such innovations have been collated across numerous 
species and used to produce measures of species‘ behavioural plasticity 
(Lefebvre et al., 2004, 1997). Accounts of innovations, in terms of their 
relative frequencies of occurrence (innovation rates), have been compared 
across species and found to correlate positively with relative brain size in 
birds and primates (Lefebvre et al., 2004, 1997), with corvids, parrots, and 
apes at the forefront of innovative groups (Seed et al., 2009a). Similar 
relationships between the observed frequency of tool use in birds and relative 
brain size have also been identified (using the same method of collating 
anecdotes; Lefebvre et al., 2002). Likewise, the relative size of the ―executive 
brain‖ (neocortex and striatum) in primates has been found to correlate 
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positively with the number of reports of innovation and tool use in primates 
(Reader and Laland, 2002). 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SIMILARITIES 
 
Social Reasoning 
 
Sociality is thought to have played an important role in the evolution of 
intelligence (Byrne and Whiten, 1988, Dunbar, 1998, Humphrey, 1976, Jolly, 
1966). As such, individuals within a group may gain a competitive advantage 
(and fitness benefits) through the use of social cognition (Humphrey, 1976). It 
has, thus, been proposed that the recognition of other group members as 
intentional agents, which possess individual beliefs and desires, independent 
of one‘s own, provide the basis for complex social interactions (Tomasello 
and Call, 1997). 
 
Terms such as ―chimpanzee politics‖ have been used to describe the 
sophisticated social interactions of primates (de Waal, 1982), especially 
involving cooperation, alliance formation, social manoeuvring, manipulation, 
and deception. However, such complex ―political‖ interactions may not be 
restricted to primates, because similar behaviours have also been observed 
in numerous species such as corvids (Emery et al., 2007), cetaceans (Marino, 
2002), and hyenas (Holekamp et al., 2007). Evidence from such a wide 
variety of distantly related species further supports the theory of an 
evolutionary convergence of social cognition. 
 
One of the consequences of social living is that individuals within a group are 
likely to forage in the same areas for the same resources, thus resulting in 
direct competition. For instance, chimpanzees naturally compete over food 
(Tomasello and Call, 1997), although in certain circumstances food sharing 
does occur: from mother to infant, or when close associates share prey that 
cannot be monopolised by any one individual, such as a monkey killed during 
a cooperative hunt (Uehara, 1997). 
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Often resources may be irregularly distributed and found in aggregated 
patches. Hence, when foraging in a group, it may be advantageous for 
individuals to be vigilant of where other group members are successfully 
locating food. Likewise, competition may pose risks of food theft or 
displacement from abundant food supplies by more dominant individuals. 
Thus, animals that know what conspecifics can and cannot see may benefit 
by using this knowledge in food competition situations. 
 
Hare and colleagues (2000) tested this theory by presenting chimpanzees 
with two pieces of food placed in an arena; the subordinate chimp could see 
both pieces of food, whereas the dominant chimp could see only one. 
Because dominant chimpanzees monopolise resources, the only way for the 
subordinate to gain any of the food was to obtain the food that the dominant 
could not see. When released into the arena, subordinates typically adopted 
this strategy, however, there are some discrepancies in the interpretation of 
these results (see Karin-D‘Arcy and Povinelli, 2002). 
 
A series of controls that allowed subordinates a head start in retrieving the 
food further revealed that subordinates were not responding to the approach 
behaviour or gaze direction of the dominants (Hare et al., 2000). This 
suggests that the subordinate‘s decision about which piece of food to obtain 
was dictated by their understanding of what the dominant could or could not 
see. However, an alternative explanation is that the subordinates based their 
decision of where to forage on their memory of where the dominant was 
looking before the barrier was raised (i.e., where the dominant was looking 
before they made an approach movement; Povinelli and Vonk, 2004). 
 
In subsequent experiments, Hare and colleagues (Hare et al., 2001) further 
investigated what chimpanzees know about what others know (i.e., what 
others have and have not seen in the immediate past), by manipulating (1) 
whether a dominant individual could see where the food was hidden, (2) 
misinforming the dominant‘s knowledge, and (3) replacing informed 
dominants with uninformed dominants. The findings of this study suggest that 
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chimpanzees can recall what another conspecific had and had not seen in the 
immediate past, and attribute specific knowledge of events to particular 
individuals (Hare et al., 2001). Although widely cited, this study is not without 
its critics who suggest that the chimpanzees‘ behaviour does not have to be 
the result of mental attribution; rather, it only needs to be based on 
sophisticated behaviour-reading (Emery and Clayton, 2009a, Karin-D‘Arcy 
and Povinelli, 2002, Povinelli and Vonk, 2004). 
 
Other examples of conspecific perspective taking and knowledge attribution 
are illustrated in experiments on food-caching corvids. Many birds and 
mammals hide food for future consumption (Vander Wall, 1990). However, 
storing food poses the risk of theft, especially if the storer cannot defend their 
caches. In species that forage in social groups, theft from conspecifics may 
be particularly accentuated. Corvids, for example, have an excellent 
observational spatial memory and observe one another‘s caching behaviour 
to accurately locate others‘ stores and pilfer their contents at a later time 
(Bednekoff and Balda, 1996a, Bednekoff and Balda, 1996b, Bugnyar and 
Kotrschal, 2002, Clayton et al., 2001), even if caches were made from a 
completely different perspective (Watanabe and Clayton, 2007). As such, 
corvids have evolved numerous strategies to reduce the probability of their 
caches being stolen by others (Dally et al., 2006). Corvids readily cache in lab 
aviaries, basing their caching decisions on the presence or absence of 
conspecifics (Emery and Clayton, 2001). Under solitary conditions, birds do 
not apply cache-protection strategies. However, when conspecifics are 
present, birds attempt to reduce the amount of information available to 
observers by caching in places that are either difficult for the observer to see 
(i.e., further away or behind barriers; Dally et al., 2005) or where the 
information of cache location is visually degraded (i.e., in dark places; Dally et 
al., 2004). Storers also move their caches from locations observed by 
potential thieves to places unbeknown to thieves, and they appreciate that 
different individuals have seen different events. Whether these differences 
are based on different knowledge states (i.e., knowledgeable or ignorant) is 
debatable (Emery and Clayton, 2008). Similar studies have also revealed that 
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ravens can discriminate between human and conspecific competitors based 
on differences in the information they have been given access to (Bugnyar 
and Heinrich, 2005). Although studies on cache-protection strategies in 
corvids reveal similar findings to studies on food competition in chimpanzees, 
both groups, for example, appear to appreciate the perspectives of others, 
and it remains unclear whether such findings are based on reading the 
behaviour of others or reading their mental states. 
 
The strongest cue representing what others see and where others are looking 
is the direction of their eye gaze. Perceiving such a cue may be particularly 
valuable for social species with immediate adaptive benefits, such as locating 
food sources, predators, and mating partners. Although primatologists in the 
field have long suspected that primates respond to the presence of gaze cues 
in conspecifics (Emery, 2000), Emery and colleagues (1997) were the first to 
experimentally test this behaviour in the context of gaze following. They found 
that captive rhesus monkeys reliably followed the gaze direction of 
conspecifics toward target objects, ignoring distractors of the same object. 
The extent to which nonhuman species utilise gaze cues to locate food or 
infer mental states, rather than following gaze, is controversial (Emery and 
Clayton, 2009a). It is clear that both corvids and apes follow the gazes of a 
human experimenter, but they also reposition themselves to follow the 
experimenter‘s gaze around a visual barrier (Brauer et al., 2005, Bugnyar et 
al., 2004, Schloegl et al., 2007). 
 
Another common paradigm to test whether animals understand that gaze 
cues can refer to objects outside of view is the object-choice task. In this test, 
animals have to use experimenter-given social cues, such as pointing and 
gaze, to locate food hidden under one of two containers. Success varies 
across species; apes often perform inconsistently (Call et al., 2000, Call et al., 
1998), African grey parrots rapidly learn to attend to some experimenter cues, 
but in most cases they did not do so spontaneously (Giret et al., 2009), 
whereas jackdaws use cues that serve a communicative function in humans 
(von Bayern and Emery, 2009). Perhaps surprisingly, domesticated species, 
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such as goats and dogs, have had more success than primates (Hare et al., 
2002, Kaminski et al., 2005, Emery and Clayton, 2009abut see, Miklosi and 
Soproni, 2006). 
 
Tactical Deception 
 
Species that forage in social groups share direct competition over access to 
resources. Selection is, thus, thought to favour individuals that can mitigate 
these costs by using social knowledge as a means to employ socially 
manipulative tactics. Hence, the social intelligence, social brain, and 
Machiavellian intelligence hypotheses, link the cognitive demands of social 
living with the evolution of enhanced social skills and increases in brain size 
(Byrne and Whiten, 1988, Dunbar, 1998, Humphrey, 1976). 
 
Tactical deception (TD) has been used to describe how individuals 
psychologically manipulate the behaviour of others within a social group 
(Byrne and Whiten, 1985). Behaviours suggested to represent such 
psychological manipulations have been reported for numerous primate 
species, but they are anecdotal in nature and not replicable, so their utility as 
a source of information on social cognition is questionable (Whiten and Byrne, 
1988). Interestingly, however, the number of records of tactical deception 
correlates significantly with neocortex size in primates (Byrne and Corp, 
2004). This relationship remains when group size is accounted for, eliminating 
concerns that larger groups present more opportunities for deception. 
Furthermore, this relationship is also consistent with the idea that cognitive 
problem solving is constrained by neocortex size, supporting the link between 
the evolution of the neocortex and increased complexity of social living (Byrne 
and Whiten, 1988, Dunbar, 1998, Humphrey, 1976). However, it is not clear 
whether such behaviours, if they exist, are unique to primates; comparable 
studies on other species have not focused on their intelligence in the wild. 
Studies on birds, for example, far exceed those on primates (certainly in 
terms of the number of observation hours recorded and the number of 
species studied), but no field study has yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
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focused on questions of cognition (social or physical). It is, therefore, less 
likely that such reports of novel social behaviour would be reported for non-
primate species. 
 
This does not mean that we have no comparable data on tactical deception in 
birds. One potential example is the cache-protection behaviour of food-storing 
corvids. Strategies such as making false caches (stones, small objects; 
Clayton et al., 1996, Heinrich, 1999), as well as going through the actions of 
caching but without depositing any items (Heinrich, 1999) could be classified 
as examples of tactical deception as defined by Byrne and Whiten (1988). It 
has been suggested that corvids cache inedible objects in view of 
conspecifics, to learn about others‘ pilfering intentions or pilfering techniques. 
To test this, Bugnyar and colleagues (Bugnyar et al., 2007) allowed ravens to 
cache plastic objects in front of either a pilfering (P) bird or an onlooker (O) 
human. After caching, P always stole the ravens‘ caches, whereas O 
inspected the objects but never stole them. The ravens were then allowed to 
cache food; again in front of P or O. Ravens that had experienced the P 
condition cached food more quickly, hid food behind obstructions, and made 
more of an effort to conceal their stores than those in the O condition. 
However, this pattern was not repeated with objects, suggesting that the 
caching of inedible objects might be used as a deceptive tool to learn about 
an individual‘s propensity to steal food (Bugnyar et al., 2007). 
 
Another potential example of tactical deception is moving caches between 
cache sites in front of an observer (Emery and Clayton, 2008). If jays had 
cached items in specific locations in front of a specific observer and then 
retrieved these caches in front of the same or a different observer, they 
recovered only those items that the observer had seen being cached and left 
the other unknown caches alone. The caches that were recovered tended to 
be moved around multiple times and were not necessarily left in the last 
cache site that the jay made a bill probe into (Dally et al., 2006). This 
suggests that the caching jays may have been deceiving the observers about 
the final location of the cache. 
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Physical Reasoning  
 
It is a long-held assumption that species that employ the use of tools to aid in 
procuring food from inaccessible areas have greater intelligence, especially in 
terms of physical cognition, than those species that do not use tools (Emery 
and Clayton, 2009b). Although chimpanzees use a variety of tools in the wild, 
there is little evidence that they necessarily understand how the tools that 
they use work (Povinelli, 2000). Indeed, there is also good evidence that 
chimpanzees perform better on physical tasks when they do not have to use 
a tool, compared to versions of the same task requiring tool use (Seed et al., 
2009b). There is also substantial evidence that the physical cognition of non-
tool-using animals is not fundamentally different to that of tool-using animals 
(Emery and Clayton, 2009b). 
 
Although there does not appear to be a striking cognitive difference between 
tool users and non tool-users, there are differences between species. Studies 
on corvids and apes have found a shared aptitude for folk physics or 
understanding the functional properties of tools. Using similar test paradigms, 
corvids and apes both demonstrate the ability to select, modify, and 
manufacture tools according to the specific demands of a given problem. New 
Caledonian crows (NCC) and rooks spontaneously select tools of a certain 
size or length to access concealed food items (NC crows, Chappell and 
Kacelnik, 2002, 2004, rooks, Bird and Emery, 2009b) as well as manufacture 
tools with respect to the functional requirements of retrieval tasks (NC crows, 
Weir et al., 2002, rooks, Bird and Emery, 2009a). Similarly, gorillas and 
orangutans are capable of selecting tools with properties relevant to specific 
tasks (Mulcahy et al., 2005). 
 
New Caledonian crows (Taylor et al., 2007, 2010), rooks (Bird and Emery, 
2009a), gorillas, and orangutans (Mulcahy et al., 2005) are also capable of 
sequential tool use (i.e., using a small tool to acquire a larger tool suitable for 
accessing food). Such tasks are thought to present additional cognitive 
challenges to that of regular tool use, because they require hierarchical 
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forethought. Accordingly, the related metatool use or use of one tool to shape 
another into a better tool (e.g., stone-knapping) represents an important 
breakthrough in hominid evolution (St Amant and Horton, 2008). Although 
corvids and great apes rapidly accomplish sequential tool tasks, monkeys 
have had limited success, often persistently attempting to retrieve a food 
reward directly with an inadequate tool (Hihara et al., 2003, Santos et al., 
2005). Corvids and apes, however, demonstrate an advanced ability to 
manage their primary inhibitions and organise their behaviours in a 
hierarchical fashion (Taylor et al., 2007). 
 
Corvids and apes also demonstrate the ability to change the form of one 
object to manufacture a tool (such as break side twigs off a branch to make a 
straight stick) or shape and manipulate materials to make them into better 
tools (such as sculpting the end of a broken-off branch into a hook tool). One 
apparent difference between corvids and apes is the ability of both NCC and 
rooks to manipulate a seemingly non-functional (in the context of the 
experiment) novel material (metal wire) into a new functional tool (a hook), 
which could then be used to pull up a bucket containing food located in a 
vertical tube (Bird and Emery, 2009a, Weir et al., 2002). Such behaviours 
suggest that these two species of corvids understood that, to retrieve the 
food, they had to (1) pull the bucket upward to remove the food from the well, 
(2) recognise  the inadequacies of the available tool (straight wire instead of a 
hook), and (3) identify the malleable properties of the wire (which could be 
fashioned into a hook; Emery, 2006). What is perhaps most striking is that 
rooks do not use tools in the wild, so they must have formed a mental image 
of a successful hook tool (which they had used in a previous study and which 
was completely different in shape and structure to the available materials in 
the latter task) and modified the novel material into a hook based on this 
mental image. Rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009b) and orangutans (Mendes et 
al., 2007) have also demonstrated innovative flexibility when faced with a 
similar problem based on an Aesop‘s fable in which food was located inside a 
vertical tube without a bucket. Both species spontaneously solved the 
problem. In the case of the rooks, some water was contained inside the tube, 
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so the rooks dropped stones into the tube to raise the level of the water and 
thus bring the food into reach. In the case of the orangutans, the tube 
contained no water, so the apes spat water into the tube, so that the food 
could float to within reach. 
 
Extractive foraging and tool-using behaviour have thus been considered 
important mechanisms for driving the evolution of primate intelligence (Byrne, 
1996, 2004, van Schaik et al., 1999). Further support is also found in the 
relationship between relative brain size and the amount of reported tool use in 
primates (Reader and Laland, 2002) and birds (Lefebvre et al., 2002). 
However, the sophisticated understanding of the physical properties of tools 
demonstrated by non-tool-using species, such as rooks (Bird and Emery, 
2009a, 2009b), suggests the possibility of a domain-general cognitive toolkit, 
rather than domain-specific adaptive specialisations that have evolved to 
solve specific tool-related problems (Bird and Emery, 2009a, Emery and 
Clayton, 2009b). Such findings question previous accounts that correlate 
physical intelligence specifically with tool use. 
 
Mental Time Travel 
 
Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability to recall subjective experiences and 
project oneself into the past or future to re-experience or pre-experience 
specific events. However, the unique component of such an episodic form of 
cognition, be it episodic memory or future thinking, in contrast to semantic 
knowledge, is that its utility invokes individual perspectives that are detached 
from current mental states (Clayton and Russell, 2009). 
 
Although MTT is a feature of human cognition (Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2008), recent work has challenged the view that it is uniquely human (Raby et 
al., 2007, Raby and Clayton, 2009). To do so, one must develop criteria that 
tap the behavioural elements of episodic cognition, given that it is impossible 
to test the phenomenological aspects of re- and pre-experience in the 
absence of any agreed behavioural markers of consciousness in non-
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linguistic animals. Clayton and Dickinson (1998), therefore, suggested that 
one could test whether an animal could remember the what, where, and when 
of a specific event, and termed this ―episodic-like‖ memory. Hence 
descriptions of MTT in nonverbal animals are often referred to as episodic-like 
or what- where-when (WWW) memory. 
 
A number of studies have subsequently shown that this form of MTT, or 
WWW memory, is present in a variety of nonhuman animals, including 
corvids (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998, Zinkivskay et al., 2009), chickadees 
(Feeney et al., 2009), apes (Martin-Ordas et al., 2010) and rats (Babb and 
Crystal, 2006a, 2006b). Subsequently, it has also been found that animals 
can take action now for the future, suggesting that they also have the 
prospective component of MTT (for example, Correia et al., 2007, Mulcahy 
and Call, 2006, Osvath, 2009, Osvath and Osvath, 2008, Raby et al., 2007). 
 
Possibly the most convincing evidence for MTT in nonhuman animals has 
been documented for corvids and apes. Capitalizing on their natural 
propensity to cache food, detailed experiments on Western scrub jays have 
revealed that they understand what items of food they stored, where they 
stored them, and when these items were stored (Clayton and Dickinson, 
1998). Clayton and Dickinson (1998) presented jays with the opportunity to 
cache perishable wax worms and nonperishable peanuts. Following caching, 
the jays were subjected to two experimental conditions of either a short delay 
prior to retrieval (4 hrs) or a long delay (124 hrs). After a short delay, jays 
preferentially searched for wax worms, which were favoured over peanuts. 
However, after experiencing a long delay, in which the worms had decayed 
and become inedible, jays avoided searching for the worms and instead 
recovered peanuts. The preferential recovery of particular food items, 
depending on when they were cached, suggests that the jays used an 
episodic-like memory to recall past experiences about the degradation rates 
of different food types, as well as where and when each item of food was 
stored. 
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Further experiments have revealed that jays‘ caching decisions are 
constructed from anticipating their future needs, irrespective of their current 
motivational states (Correia et al., 2007, Raby et al., 2007). Raby and 
colleagues (2007) housed jays in one of two separate rooms over six 
alternate days. In one room, they were always given breakfast and in the 
other they were not. After this training period, the jays were unexpectedly 
given food to eat and cache in the evening. Raby and colleagues (2007) 
found that the jays stored more food in the non-breakfast room, where they 
could expect to be hungry the following morning, compared to the room 
where breakfast was provided. In a second ―breakfast-choice‖ experiment, 
Raby and colleagues (2007) controlled for any conditioning that may have 
influenced caching in places associated with hunger by always providing 
breakfast in each room. However, in this experiment, each room was 
associated with a particular type of food (i.e., dog kibble or peanuts). If the 
jays based their caching decisions on a conditioned response, formed from 
associating a particular room with a particular food, they would be predicted 
to cache dog kibble in the room previously associated with dog kibble and 
vice versa. However, jays in this experiment cached more of the different food 
rather than the same food in each room, suggesting that they preferred a 
choice of food at breakfast and were capable of forward planning (Raby et al., 
2007). 
 
Using a similar methodology to Clayton and Dickinson (1998), but with 
preferred perishable (because it was frozen and could melt) juice and less 
preferred, but nonperishable grapes, Martin-Ordas and colleagues (2010) 
recently found that chimpanzees, orangutans and bonobos were capable of 
distinguishing between different events in which the same food items were 
hidden in different places at different times, suggesting that the apes also 
remembered in an integrated fashion what, where and when certain events 
occurred (Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). 
 
Likewise, Mulcahy and Call (2006), found that apes are capable of selecting, 
transporting, and saving a suitable tool, not because they currently needed it, 
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but because they would need it in the future. Apes learned to use a tool to 
obtain a reward from an apparatus. In a separate testing room with no 
apparatus, the apes were then provided with a choice of one out of two 
suitable and six unsuitable tools. The subjects then experienced either a 1- or 
14-hour delay after which they were allowed to return to the test room, with 
their selected tool, to access the apparatus. The apes succeeded in selecting 
and retaining appropriate tools for future use (Mulcahy and Call, 2006). 
Similar results were also found in studies that increased the cognitive load of 
subjects by disassociating the locations of the tool and apparatus as well as 
increasing the delay period and housing subjects socially instead of 
individually (Osvath and Osvath, 2008). 
 
WELCOME TO THE CLEVER CLUB 
 
Although we have primarily restricted our arguments to corvids and apes, we 
have included examples from other animals where appropriate. Indeed, there 
is good evidence that cetaceans (whales and dolphins) also demonstrate 
convergent evolution of cognition with apes (Marino, 2002). We could extend 
the invitation to parrots; possibly other groups of birds with relatively large 
brains, behavioural flexibility, and a complex diet, such as hornbills and some 
birds of prey; elephants; and pack-hunting carnivores, such as hyenas (see 
Emery, 2006). We would not extend the invitation to domestic dogs because 
their cognitive abilities, impressive as they are (Miklosi, 2007) cannot be an 
example of convergence, because their cognitive evolution is likely the result 
of domestication by humans, rather than a response to socio-ecological 
selection pressures in their adaptive environment. Domestication thus seems 
to be the most appropriate hypothesis to explain dogs‘ intelligence, especially 
in the social realm. 
 
If our hypothesis is correct, that shared cognitive traits have arisen in distantly 
related groups such as corvids and apes because they have solved similar 
environmental problems, then we should expect groups that have faced 
similar problems to have evolved similar solutions to these problems. This 
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could be in the form of complex behavioural strategies or cognitive processes. 
Based on a simple analysis of such problems and similar life-history traits, 
Emery (2006) found that many animal groups displayed similar traits at the 
biological, ecological, behavioural and psychological levels (Figure 1.4). 
Underlying all of these similarities is behavioural flexibility as applied to the 
solution of problems faced by living in an unpredictable environment 
(Sterleny, 2003). As such, those species with a varied, ephemeral, and even 
unpredictable diet, that lived in a complex (but not necessarily large) society, 
that had a relatively large brain, went through a long developmental period, 
lived a long life, and lived in a fluctuating habitat, could all be considered 
candidates for convergent evolution.  
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Figure 1.4: Upper. Diagram displaying various biological (brain structure), 
ecological (diet), and behavioural (tool use [stick use by New Caledonian 
crows, wood-tool aid to opening palm nuts in hyacinth macaws, termite fishing 
in chimpanzees, sponge-tool use by dolphins, fly switching by elephants]), 
and social-system (black and white figures represent different individuals 
within a social group and so the variety of individuals suggest social 
complexity) traits in corvids, parrots, apes, cetaceans, and elephants. Despite 
very different brain structures, such as the lack of cortical folding in birds but 
extensive folding in apes, cetaceans, and elephants, there are striking 
similarities in the diet, use of tools, and social system, in these distantly 
related animal groups. Lower. Basic evolutionary tree displaying the 
relationships between these main animal groups. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is likely that there is no one particular mechanism that is responsible for 
driving the evolution of cognition across all species. Cognition is, instead, 
likely to have evolved as a result of the many challenges animals face in their 
environments. Group living may have provided a foundation for social 
cognition and, hence, social cooperation and manipulation, but qualitative 
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relationships in the form of monogamous pair bonds or the arms race 
between cachers and pilferers may have also been important. Similarly, 
methods for manipulating the environment, such as building a nest or 
extractive foraging (with or without tool use) may have provided the 
foundation for physical cognition. Although still not clear, it seems probable 
that neither the social or physical realm alone drove the evolution of 
intelligence. Rather, the ability to adapt to a changing environment, as 
encountered by the species under consideration here, is perhaps the best 
explanation we have for why some animals display the cognitive abilities they 
do and why such abilities have evolved convergently in very distantly related 
groups. 
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1.4: A Review and Analysis of Parrot Cognition 
 
Most people consider parrots intelligent animals; after all they are often prized 
as family pets for their communication skills and endearing behaviour. 
However, surprisingly little is known about the cognitive abilities of parrots. In 
a search of academic publications on the topics ‗Primates‘ and ‗Cognition‘ in 
early August 2013 on the ISI Web of Knowledge, 30,301 results were 
identified. Yet when replacing ‗Primates‘ with ‗Parrots‘ only 113 results were 
found (Figure 1.5). Furthermore, of those ‗Parrots‘ results, an overwhelming 
proportion of the research focused on only one species; African greys 
(Psittacus erithacus) by Irene Pepperberg. Of course, with further probing into 
the literature additional studies can be found, however the point remains that 
cognitive research, and hence our understanding of animal cognition remains 
predominantly primate-focused. From an anthropocentric point of view, an 
approach that focuses on species that are morphologically, socially and 
genetically similar to humans would appear justified. However, clues to the 
convergent evolution of cognition through similarities in socio-ecology can 
only be found by looking at a wider range of more distantly related species. 
This review will highlight and discuss recent research on the cognitive abilities 
of parrots and suggest that further investigation of this group is likely to yield 
promising breakthroughs in the field of comparative cognition and thus our 
understanding of the evolution of cognition. As such, it will introduce the areas 
of research investigated in this thesis. 
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Figure 1.5: The number of publications and citations of papers across the last 
20 years (1994-2013), as revealed from an ISI Web of Knowledge search on 
‗Parrot Cognition‘ in August 2013. Comparable figures for a search on 
‗Primate Cognition‘ was not available as the search contained more than 
10,000 records.  
 
 
Concepts, Number & Language; with a focus on African greys  
 
Irene Pepperberg‘s research on Alex, the African grey parrot, has made a 
substantial contribution to the literature on parrot cognition over the last three 
decades (Pepperberg, 1999). Throughout this period, Alex received 
considerable training on referential English labels and was habituated to a 
variety of cognitive tasks. As a result, Alex revealed cognitive abilities that 
rivalled those of nonhuman primates, marine mammals and young children up 
to the age of four (Pepperberg, 2006a). Alex showed a competent 
understanding of numerosity and could use English labels to add up to six 
novel items, including random patterns and subsets of mixed groups (e.g. 
number of blue blocks within blue and green blocks and balls; Pepperberg, 
1994). What‘s more, Alex‘s accuracy was unaffected by quantity, mass or 
contour (Pepperberg, 1994), and he also showed a spontaneous and 
untrained understanding of ‗none‘, or a ‗zero-like concept‘ with respect to the 
absence of items (Pepperberg, 2006b, Pepperberg and Gordon, 2005). An 
understanding of such abstract concepts is interesting as ‗zero‘ or ‗none‘ lack 
a concrete reality; yet still represent information through the absence of 
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objects. Such abilities require cognitively complex mental representations of 
objects and can confuse children under 4 years old (Bialystok and Codd, 
2000).  
 
Some non-human animals can sum small quantities, generally less than four 
(Pepperberg, 2006a, Boysen and Berntson, 1989, but see Hunt et al., 2008), 
while others are sensitive to ordinality, numerosity, number concept, and 
mass if not number (see Pepperberg and Gordon, 2005 for a more detailed 
review). Several researchers have thus considered advanced numerical 
abilities (counting of quantities of 4 or more) to be uniquely human and based 
on language skills (Spelke and Tsivkin, 2001). Pepperberg‘s studies however 
are the first to report advanced numerosity in a non-human, non-primate, non-
mammalian subject (Pepperberg, 2006b); with results comparable to the 
summation capacities of chimpanzees and children (Pepperberg, 2006a). 
Such pioneering research helped dissolve indoctrinated views that the great 
apes, including humans, are unique in their possession of complex cognition. 
 
Renowned for their intellect, African greys have also received attention from 
other research groups. Greys have demonstrated the ability to spontaneously 
categorise items according to their perceptual similarities using referential 
French and Czech labels (Giret et al., 2009c) and can possibly discriminate 
between conspecifics visually and acoustically (Giret et al., 2009b). Moreover, 
these birds have been tested on numerous tasks that have been performed 
on a variety of other species, suggesting that they possess similar cognitive 
capacities. When presented with varying amounts of food, African greys (Al 
Ain et al., 2009) like great apes (Hanus and Call, 2007), can discriminate 
between large and small quantities. Although African greys, unlike primates, 
show difficulty in performing delay gratification tasks (Vick et al., 2010), Goffin 
cockatoos have recently demonstrated an ability to inhibit the retrieval of a 
desirable food item for larger or better quality rewards (Auersperg et al., 
2013). One African grey has also demonstrated the ability to spontaneously 
use proximate experimenter pointing gestures to locate food items, while two 
others learned to respond to this cue after 15 trials. However, none of the 
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subjects spontaneously responded to experimenter eye-gaze cues. Although 
again, one subject rapidly learned after 15 trials (Giret et al., 2009a). Similar 
results have been found in other species; non-human primates (Tomasello et 
al., 1998), goats (Kaminski et al., 2005), dogs (Viranyi et al., 2008) and 
corvids (von Bayern and Emery, 2009).  
 
Many of these studies have revealed that African greys possess similar 
cognitive abilities to those of other large brained species, such as corvids and 
apes. However, interpretations of such results are often based on the 
performances of only one, if not a few individuals. A low sample size may due 
to the limited availability of birds, as well as the considerable amount of time 
and funds required to maintain such species. While these findings reveal that 
certain species are capable of sophisticated cognition, such results may only 
include individuals that are particularly motivated to engage in experiments or 
with an experimenter. Hence, it may be difficult to replicate such findings, or 
interpret results to make broad species-wide generalisation.  
 
Apart from African greys, the only other species of parrot that has received 
considerable cognitive investigation is the New Zealand kea. Renowned for 
its extreme neophillia and curious yet destructive behaviour (Diamond and 
Bond, 1999), the kea is considered a prime candidate for advanced cognitive 
capabilities (Schloegl et al., 2009) and has thus been the recent focus of 
many cognitive studies (Huber and Gajdon, 2006).  
 
Technical Intelligence & Social Learning 
 
Piaget and cognitive development 
 
Human cognitive research has focused on common processes associated 
with skill development in infants (Piaget, 1953, 1954). Such developments 
include a subject‘s initial understanding about interactions with their physical 
surroundings to a more complex insight into problem-solving and intellectual 
representation (see Uzgiris and Hunt, 1989). The Piagetian framework was 
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later adopted as a relevant method for testing comparative cognitive 
development across species and applied to our closely related ancestors the 
non-human great apes (Redshaw, 1978, Mathieu et al., 1980, Poti and 
Spinozzi, 1994) and other non-human primates (c.f. Tomasello and Call, 
1997). However, researchers have only recently used the Piagetian 
framework as a comparative approach to assess the convergent evolution of 
cognition amongst more evolutionarily disparate species (Auersperg et al., in 
press, Funk, 2002, 1996a, 1996b, Pepperberg, 2002b, Pepperberg and Funk, 
1990, Salwiczek et al., 2009, Zucca et al., 2007). 
 
Funk (1996a, 1996b) first used the Piagetian framework to test skill 
development in parrots (indeed the first to examine non-primates) by 
comparing the convergent features of early cognitive development in human 
infants with those of kakariki (Cyanoramphus auriceps). Notably, Funk (2002) 
adapted a battery of tasks designed for use on human infants (see Uzgiris 
and Hunt, 1989) to assess development of means-end problem solving skills 
in kakariki (i.e. means for obtaining desired events). This test battery 
documented the order of developing certain behaviours such as: attaining 
and playing with objects, retrieving rewards through the use of a stick or rake 
and pulling rewards attached to the ends of strings. While Funk (2002) 
revealed similarities between the cognitive development of human infants and 
birds on such tasks, the order in which kakariki completed certain tasks 
differed from those of human infants. The ability to use locomotion to obtain 
objects developed earlier in Funk‘s parakeets than in human infants. 
Moreover, unlike human infants, there was variation in the order in which a 
series of means-end pulling tasks were solved. Young kakariki also did not 
place items inside a container or stack objects on top of each other as 
observed in infants and non-human primates (Funk, 2002). 
 
Although similar means-end tasks, such as string-pulling (Figure 1.6), had 
previously been presented to a variety of bird species, such as budgerigars 
(Melopsittacus undulates), Indian starlings (Acridotheres tristis) and jackdaws 
(Coloeus monedula) (Ducker and Rensch, 1977), Funk‘s experiments (2002) 
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prompted a series of further investigations establishing string-pulling as a 
comparative hallmark of cognitive behaviour across a number of distantly 
related species (for a more in-depth review of string pulling in birds see 
Chapter 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
String-pulling and means-end tasks 
 
Parrots have received long-standing recognition for possessing attributes that 
are characteristic of a folk intelligence (Boehrer, 2004, Carter, 2006). 
Although there are over 350 species of parrots (Juniper and Parr, 2003), and 
they are generally considered to possess advanced cognitive capacities 
(Emery, 2006), our understanding of parrot cognition is still limited to a few 
species (Schuck-Paim et al., 2009). Of those species investigated, string-
pulling behaviour has become a common method for assessing and 
comparing cognitive capacities. Most parrots tested on this paradigm 
efficiently solve simple food-retrieval tasks without training on their first trial 
(Schuck-Paim et al., 2009, Werdenich and Huber, 2006, Magat and Brown, 
2009, Pepperberg, 2004, Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Krasheninnikova and 
Figure 1.6: Example of 
a typical sequence of 
acts employed by 
hyacinth macaws during 
a string-pulling task 
(drawing by Wladimir J. 
Alonso); from Schuck-
Paim and colleagues 
(2009). 
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Wanker, 2010), if not after a few trials (Funk, 2002). Of those parrots tested, 
kea, Nestor notabilis, (Werdenich and Huber, 2006), African greys, Psittacus 
erithacus, (Pepperberg, 2004), three Neotropical species; hyacinth macaws 
(Anodorhynchus hiacynthinus), Lear‘s macaws (Anodorhynchus leari) and 
blue-fronted Amazons, Amazona aestiva, (Schuck-Paim et al., 2009) as well 
as spectacled parrotlets, Forpus conspicillatus, (Krasheninnikova et al., 2013) 
appear to show the most convincing evidence of a causal understanding of 
means-end problem solving; initially adopting their most efficient method of 
retrieval and showing no further improvement in performance throughout 
subsequent trials.  
 
Overall, string-pulling results suggest that parrots can discriminate between 
strings baited with rewards and those without (Funk, 2002, Krasheninnikova 
et al., 2013, Pepperberg, 2004, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009, Werdenich and 
Huber, 2006), with some macaws capable of determining connectedness 
through physical continuity i.e. no gaps in string (Krasheninnikova et al., 
2013, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009). However, most parrots fail to recognise the 
functional connection between crossed rewarded and non-rewarded strings. 
Even when different colours were used to help visually track the course of the 
reward, parrots generally have difficulty succeeding in this task 
(Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009). Although 
Werdenich and Huber‘s kea (2006) performed extremely well on the 
discrimination tasks, only one kea out of seven chose the correct crossed 
string in the first 30 trials. Three birds learned quickly after failure in the first 
trial, one bird after a number of failures and two birds remained at chance. 
However, after an additional 30 trials, all birds‘ choices were overwhelmingly 
correct (91%). Yet, when provided with the same colour strings, on 
subsequent trials, only three birds performed above chance (Werdenich and 
Huber, 2006).  
 
The ability to solve string-pulling tasks may also be influenced by differences 
between species‘ life histories. In a recent study that compared eight different 
species of Australian parrots, Magat and Brown (2009) found that only those 
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parrots that used their feet while foraging were capable of solving the string-
pulling problem. In addition, strongly lateralised parrots (i.e. species that 
preferentially process information in one hemisphere of the brain) also solved 
string-pulling problems more successfully than non-lateralised parrots. 
Species that use their feet while foraging may possess more advanced motor 
coordination than those that do not, thus enabling them to more readily solve 
such tasks. Differences in foraging methods are also likely to promote 
different anatomical specialisations in parrots. As such, a necessity to 
manipulate objects while foraging may correspond with differences in 
dexterity and visual acuity (Demery et al., 2011). The question then remains 
whether causal reasoning corresponds with motor flexibility or whether 
comparisons of species that possess different capabilities on tasks that 
require such coordination provide ecologically valid results.  
 
In another experiment, two African greys with considerable training in 
referential English in Pepperberg‘s experiments (2004) made no attempt to 
retrieve the reward but instead attempted to manipulate their trainer by 
making verbal requests for the reward. Conversely, two African greys with 
limited vocabularies immediately performed the correct physical actions to 
obtain the reward. Engaging in communication as a problem solving strategy 
may thus suggest that a more advanced stage of cognitive development can 
be acquired through enculturation. Those species of parrots with capacities to 
learn human language are also likely to possess an advantage over other 
species that lack such abilities. Enculturation may also facilitate cognitive 
development and thus explain why hand-raised birds often outperform wild 
birds on cognitive tasks (Gajdon et al., 2004, Gajdon et al., 2006, Funk, 2002, 
Pepperberg, 2002b). Such effects are further discussed below. 
 
Although string-pulling discrimination tasks are often successful, researchers 
frequently observe the retrieval of strings with no rewards attached, 
suggesting that string pulling itself may be a self-rewarding process 
(Pepperberg, 2004, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009). It is thus difficult to 
disentangle whether subjects demonstrate a causal understanding of why and 
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how their actions cause certain effects. In addition, it is difficult to infer causal 
reasoning when solutions to string-pulling tasks are provided by tangible cues 
in the experimental design (i.e. connectivity and weight).  
 
Another method used to assess Means-End causal reasoning, which 
addresses some of the aforementioned limitations of the string-pulling 
paradigm, is the Physical Support problem (Auersperg et al., 2009, Hauser et 
al., 1999, Piaget, 1953). In this test, subjects are presented with two 
horizontal supports (spatulas), one with a reward resting on the top and the 
other with the reward resting next to it. If the subject chooses the correct 
‗connected‘ spatula i.e. that with the reward placed on top, the subject will be 
able to retrieve the reward and thus causal reasoning is inferred (see Chapter 
5). Hence, subjects must make decisions based on visual cues alone, without 
experiencing external cues, such as differences in weight for example. 
Auersperg and colleagues (2009) found that one of six kea showed a 
spontaneous comprehension of means-end relationships by selecting the 
correct spatula based on the connections between supports and rewards. 
Such results rival those found in other species on similar Support Problems, 
such as cotton-topped tamarins (Hauser et al., 1999), chimpanzees (Spinozzi 
and Poti, 1993) and a blue-fronted Amazon (de Mendonca-Furtado and 
Ottoni, 2008). The poor performance but eventual success of the blue-fronted 
Amazon in de Mendonca-Furtado and Ottoni‘s (2008) study suggests the 
possibility that their subject alternatively memorised the connected-reward 
solutions, rather than showing a causal understanding of the problem. 
 
Another popular paradigm to test causal reasoning is the Trap-Tube task 
(Seed et al., 2006, Seed et al., 2009b). This task is similarly designed to 
assess whether non-tool-using corvids and apes can comprehend the 
outcome of their actions. To solve this task, subjects are required to attend to 
the functional and non-functional differences between trapping holes. 
Success on this task is therefore considered to indicate a causal 
understanding of the functional properties of traps. However, while results 
from this paradigm provide some evidence that rooks understand the causal 
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principles underlying this task (Seed et al., 2006), kea, red-and-green 
macaws (Ara chloroptera) and sulphur-crested cockatoos (Cacatua 
sulphurea) failed to succeed (Liedtke et al., 2010) 
 
Exclusion  
 
Exclusion Performance tasks are another Piagetian method used to assess 
causal reasoning between species. In this test, for example, subjects are 
provided with a choice between two cups that potentially contain concealed 
rewards. However, unbeknown to the subject, only one cup is rewarded. Prior 
to choosing, the subject is then informed that one of the cups does not 
contain a reward. The contents of the baited cup, or the un-baited cup may be 
revealed. Subject‘s are then considered to possess a causal understanding of 
the task if they can infer the correct option via an ‗exclusion- driven‘ decision.  
 
Schloegl and colleagues (2009) presented kea and ravens (Corvus corax) 
with a choice task that required subjects to search for food in either straight or 
bent tubes. When provided with partial information about the content of one of 
the tubes, kea inferred the location of hidden food by choosing the baited 
tube more often than ravens. However, ravens applied a more efficient 
strategy i.e. their first look was usually sufficient to make their choice and, in 
contrast to the kea, ravens looked into both sides of the tubes infrequently. It 
is thus thought that ravens made their decisions based on exclusion, whereas 
the kea showed more exploratory behaviour, by making redundant search 
efforts i.e. looking into both sides of a straight tube, did not understand the 
causality of the task. Such differences may be attributed to peculiarities in 
each species‘ natural history and thus provide insight to the adaptive 
pressures that drive the evolution of certain cognitive processes. For 
example, one explanation to account for the more efficient behaviour of 
ravens in the above study is that ravens typically forage in a more competitive 
environment than kea (Schloegl et al., 2009). Conversely, kea are highly 
neophillic extractive foragers and are often required to explore their 
environment to again access to unreliable resources. Hence, both behaviours 
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may be adaptive within their respective environmental contexts. As a result, 
selection pressures that favour foraging efficiency may influence the evolution 
of cognition, yet ecologically valid interpretations of such behaviours are 
necessary.  
 
More recently, parrots have demonstrated performances on more 
complicated inferential reasoning tasks that have only previously been 
demonstrated in chimpanzees and children (Premack and Premack, 1994). 
Mikolasch and colleagues (2011) visibly baited two cups with two different 
rewards. An experimenter then secretly removed one food type and showed it 
to the subject. After receiving such information, one in seven African greys 
successfully selected the baited cup (Mikolasch et al., 2011). Pepperberg (in 
press) successfully replicated these findings, with three of four African greys 
solving the problem. Furthermore, Schloegl and colleagues (2012) found that 
African greys could successfully solve similar inference tasks based on 
auditory cues. However, surprisingly, parrots were only successful when the 
containers were shaken horizontally, but vertically (Schloegl et al., 2012). 
Spontaneous success on this task had only previously been demonstrated in 
apes, which were also capable of using the absence of noise to infer the 
location of the reward (Call, 2004). 
 
Tool-use in parrots  
 
Many animals use tools to extend their physical influence on their surrounding 
world. However, tool-use requires dexterity and a certain understanding of 
cause and effect or means-end reasoning. Hence, tool-use has been 
considered a useful correlate of intelligence (Lefebvre et al., 2002). Although 
many parrots manipulate food with their feet and are extractive foragers, 
surprisingly few observations of tool-use have been documented. Most 
notably, Borsari and Ottoni (2005) observed captive hyacinth macaws 
(Anodorhynchus hyacinthinus) using tools, wedge-like pieces of wood, which 
were positioned beneath the birds‘ upper mandible and used to more 
efficiently grip nuts. Whilst holding the nut in place with the foot, birds then 
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opened the hard casing with their lower mandible. Similar behaviours have 
also been observed in the black palm cockatoo (Probosciger aterrimus) by 
Wallace (2000) in 1869.  
 
While parrots may not regularly be challenged with a necessity to use tools in 
their natural environment, captive species of parrots show convincing 
capacities for tool related behaviours. Captive kea have been reported to 
show tool-using behaviours that are comparable to those of regular tool using 
New Caledonian crows (Auersperg et al., 2011). Moreover, a captive Goffin‘s 
cockatoo (Cacatua goffini) was recently observed to spontaneously employ a 
number of techniques and materials to successfully manufacture stick tools to 
retrieve otherwise out-of-reach cashew nuts (Auersperg et al., 2012). These 
observations suggest that parrots possess sophisticated tool-related 
behaviours, yet the paucity of such accounts may also suggest that these 
species do not need to regularly use tools because they possess dexterous 
feet and a multipurpose bill (for a more in-depth review of tool-use see 
Chapter 5).  
 
Social learning, attention and emulation  
 
Extractive foragers are often faced with the difficult task of manipulating food 
items for consumption. Techniques can often take years to perfect, resulting 
in variable success rates within a group. For example, wild bearded 
capuchins (Cebus libidinosus) crack palm nuts, yet individual success rates 
vary from 6.6-75 strikes per nut (Fragaszy et al., 2010). As such, learning the 
affordances of tasks by observing skilled conspecifics may enhance the 
performance of inexperienced individuals. However, a novice still requires an 
ability to understand the causal relationships of extractive processes such as 
connectivity or the construction of a chain of responses that lead to a goal.  
 
The spread of innovative behaviour through observational learning is a useful 
tool when comparing and assessing social cognition between species (kea: 
Gajdon et al., 2004, 2006, kea, dogs and children: Range et al., 2009). Huber 
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and colleagues (2001), for example, found that captive kea opened a 
complex food container more efficiently after observing a skilled conspecific 
successfully perform the task. This study suggests that kea learnt something 
about the functionality of the container and the actions of the demonstrator 
during observation, suggesting that they were attentive to possess of social 
learning. Heyes and Saggerson (2002) have also shown that observer 
budgerigars adopt the same behaviour as demonstrators through motor 
imitation.  
 
However, behaviours revealed among captive populations may not 
necessarily reflect those observed in the wild. Wild and captive animals are 
often confronted by different socio-ecological challenges. For example, wild 
animals might spend more time foraging and defending territories from rival 
groups, whereas captive animals may interact more with their peers or 
humans, showing little concern for the availability of food. Through extensive 
exposure to humans and human paraphernalia, captive animals might also 
become less neophobic and more habituated than wild animals (van de Waal 
and Bshary, 2010). Indeed, Gajdon and colleagues (2004) found that captive 
kea outperformed wild kea in a social learning task that required subjects to 
remove a tube from an upright pole to retrieve a reward. When presented with 
novel foraging problems, captive kea may therefore experience 
disproportionately high levels of social information in contrast to wild kea, 
possibly because captive individuals are confined within a limited area. Wild 
kea, by comparison, may rarely encounter such abundant, clumped resources 
in their natural alpine environments. Hence, the transmission of foraging 
innovations observed among individual wild kea, such as the opening of 
rubbish-bin lids, does not readily spread through a population (Gajdon et al., 
2006). Importantly, both studies confirm that wild and captive birds were 
equally motivated to solve each task, suggesting differences in social 
attention and social learning between captive and wild populations. 
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Conclusion 
 
There are many reasons why parrots are not well represented in comparative 
cognition literature, despite their reputation for intelligence and their popularity 
as pets. One is that until very recently, primates were the focus on studies of 
cognition because of their close evolutionary relatedness to humans and 
studies of birds, with the possible exception of pigeons, were uncommon. 
This has now changed with studies on corvids and with a modern 
understanding of the organisation of the avian brain and its analogous 
structures to those of mammalian brains (Emery and Clayton, 2004a, 2005). 
Another is that despite their popularity as pets, few long-term laboratory 
studies have been performed on parrots; probably because of their difficulty 
and expense, but also because parrots can be extremely long-lived. Alex, an 
African grey, for example, lived to 31 years in captivity, while some of the 
larger macaws may live up to 100 years in captivity (Brouwer et al., 2000). 
Parrots also form strong pair-bonded relationships with specific individuals 
(Forshaw, 1989, Juniper and Parr, 2003), which is likely to make working with 
a group of researchers complicated. Finally, very little is known about the 
natural behaviour of parrots because of difficulties in studying them in the 
wild. Many species of parrots live in closed canopy tropical forests. Parrots 
may also be well camouflaged and can fly long distances, making it difficult 
for researchers to monitor their behaviours. As such, comparatively little 
information is known about the socio-ecology of parrots, which makes 
studying their cognition and the relationships between their natural behaviour, 
ecology and cognition, fraught with problems. One possible method for 
increasing the study of parrot cognition may be to follow the example of 
recent domestic dog research and test those species of parrots that are 
available as pets or test captive parrots that are housed in zoos or bird parks.  
 
Despite these issues, parrots share many of the biological, ecological and 
sociological traits that are thought responsible for advanced cognition in 
primates. Although our current understanding of parrot cognition is limited to 
only a few species, predominantly African greys and kea, researchers have 
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recently recognised that parrots possess similar cognitive capacities to other 
large brained animals such as corvids and the great apes (Auersperg et al., 
2009, 2011, 2012, Pepperberg, 1999). As a result, there is much potential for 
advancing our understanding of both the physical and social domains of 
parrot cognition. In addition, further investigation into the cognitive capacities 
of more distantly related species may illuminate ecologically relevant drivers 
of cognition that are not so easily identified by studying closely related 
species such as the great apes. 
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1.5: General Methods 
 
1.5.1: Subjects and Housing 
  
Four red-shouldered macaws (Diopsittaca nobilis): No.2, No.4, No.5, No.8, 
and four black-headed caiques (Pionites melanocephala): Green, Gold, 
Purple, Red, participated in this study (hereafter macaws and caiques). All 
subjects were male, with the exception of one female macaw (No.4). Subjects 
hatched between June and July 2010, were hand-reared and introduced to 
the lab in September 2010 at three months old. Subjects were identifiable by 
colour-coded leg bands, and housed according to species in large indoor 
aviaries (2m3). Each aviary was enriched with rope swings and a variety of 
branches, perches and toys, which were frequently changed. Subjects were 
regularly allowed out of their enclosures to fly freely within the lab, although 
they remained in their respective cages during testing and evenings. Both 
species were raised under identical conditions and provided with equal 
experiences. Subjects were kept on a 12:12 h light:dark cycle, with abundant 
natural light, and maintained on a diet of ad libitum dried fruit and nuts, mixed 
seeds, and fresh fruit. Food and water were provided ad libitum and subjects‘ 
participation in experiments was voluntary. 
 
Subjects were selected to participate in these experiments, as they were of a 
suitable size to house in captivity and readily available from registered 
breeders in the UK. These particular species were also chosen based on 
anecdotal reports from breeders and pet owners that suggest characteristics 
ideal for investigating questions relating to social and physical cognition. 
These species were also chosen, as their cognitive capacities had not 
previously assessed.  
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1.5.2: Ethical Approval  
 
All research undertaken was non-invasive and therefore fell outside of the 
Animal (Scientific Procedures) Act, and hence did not require Home Office 
UK approval. Subjects were however housed in accordance with these 
regulations and the local ethical committee were consulted and agreed to all 
aspects of this research. Home Office Inspectors and veterinarians regularly 
visited the lab to ensure these procedures were maintained.   
 
1.5.3: Natural History 
 
For a more detailed description of each species see Juniper and Parr (2003), 
Schulenberg and colleagues (2007) and Forshaw (1989). 
 
Habitat 
 
Macaws and caiques inhabit overlapping regions in northern Neotropical 
regions of South America, but occupy contrasting habitats. Red-shouldered 
macaws are found in stable, open wooded habitats and savannahs, with 
scattered bushes and various palm groves, and avoid large tracts of closed-
canopy forest. Black-headed caiques prefer more heterogeneous, and hence 
potentially more complex habitats comprised of closed canopy forest and 
forest edges (Juniper and Parr, 2003).  
 
Morphology  
 
Macaws are slightly larger (30cm) than caiques (23cm), and have longer tail 
and primary flight feathers. Caiques are much stouter in appearance and are 
relatively poor long-distance fliers. Macaws, in contrast to caiques, also have 
much larger down-curved beaks, enabling them to open hard-cased nuts; 
suggesting that their foraging behaviours may be more specialised than 
caiques. Both species, however, possess a similar relative brain size 
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(macaws: brain 5.84ml, body 136g; caiques: brain 5.18ml, body 136.4g); 
which is comparable to corvids and other parrots (Iwaniuk et al., 2005).  
 
Sociality 
 
Although little is known about the precise social dynamics of these species, 
parrots generally form long-term pair bonds, roost communally outside of the 
breeding season and forage in extended family or small social groups 
(Juniper and Parr, 2003). Both species form pairs in the breeding season, 
however there is some indication that macaws form larger flocks outside of 
the breeding season whereas caiques form smaller groups of around 10-30 
individuals (Juniper and Parr, 2003).   
 
1.5.4: General Statistical Procedures  
 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to keep planned, post-hoc 
comparisons of independent or uncorrelated information to a minimum (i.e. no 
more than the df of groups). However, in some cases multiple, planned or 
unplanned comparisons were necessary, given that little preliminary 
information is available for these species to form hypothesis driven questions. 
On such occasions I present data where I have not corrected α (0.05) for 
multiple post-hoc tests (reported as an ―uncorrected‖ test). When multiple 
tests or comparisons are conducted (i.e. post-hoc t-tests after a significant 
ANOVA), the probability of at least one Type I error among a family of tests 
increases (i.e., rejecting Ho, the null hypothesis, when Ho is true). For 
example, in 3 tests the family-wise probability of at least one Type I error is 
0.14, at 19 tests its 0.40, at 45 tests its 0.90 (Quinn and Keough, 2010p. 49). 
Bonferroni corrections may therefore be used to control for Type I errors. To 
do this, the nominated significance level, α (0.05), is divided by the number of 
comparisons in the family. However, a problem associated with this 
procedure is that multiple comparisons become increasingly conservative and 
suffer from low statistical power (Quinn and Keough, 2010 p. 49). There is 
however some evidence in favor of not adjusting significance levels, at least 
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for multiple planned comparisons, particularly for sample sizes of less than 30 
individuals (Nakagawa, 2004). Quinn and Keough (2010p. 197) provide the 
following advice ―our broad recommendation is that the default position 
should be no adjustment for multiple testing if the tests represent clearly 
defined and separate hypotheses‖; with the following conditions ―… that the 
number of comparisons is small so that the increase in family-wise Type I 
error rate will also be small and each comparison is of specific interest so 
power considerations are particularly important.‖  
 
Multiple unplanned comparisons, which do not represent clearly defined and 
separate hypotheses, may however, warrant some control over Type I error 
rates. A preferred method, over that of Bonferroni corrections, is Tukey‘s HSD 
test. While I report Tukey‘s post-hoc tests following a significant ANOVA 
when planned comparisons between more than two groups were required 
(i.e. Chapter 3; 3.1), such tests are not generated in SPSS (SPSS for Mac OS 
X, 2007) when making between-species comparisons of only two groups. 
Hence, due to the limitations outlined above, I report uncorrected post-hoc 
tests for multiple unplanned between-species comparisons, rather than 
adjusting α according to Bonferroni corrections. However, as all unplanned 
comparisons in this thesis report non-significant findings, this approach may 
be justified because any post-hoc Bonferroni corrections would not change 
any interpretations of the results.   
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2.0.1 Abstract 
 
Behavioural observations of macaws and caiques were undertaken when 
subjects were 4 months old and again when subjects were 24 months old. At 
four months old, instantaneous scan-sampling procedures were used to 
assess between-species propensities for social interactions, such as play and 
preening behaviours, and preferred social clique size. Foraging behaviours 
and inedible object manipulation were also assessed for each species during 
this period. At 24 months old, the structures of social relationships were 
quantified using continuous focal-sampling procedures. Agonistic interactions 
between individuals were used to calculate David‘s scores and determine 
dominance ranks for individuals of each species. Affiliative interactions 
between dyads were also used to determine the strength of pair-bonded 
relationships. At four months old, pronounced between-species differences in 
social behaviours were observed. Caiques engaged in social play more 
frequently than macaws. Macaws, however, participated in social preening 
more often than caiques. There were no between-species differences in 
frequencies of inedible object manipulation. Macaws were generally observed 
in larger social units, whereas caiques often remained solitary. Few between-
species differences in foraging behaviours were observed. At 24 months, 
agonistic interactions revealed a clear linear dominance hierarchy within each 
species. Affiliative interactions also revealed some directionality, suggesting 
that the strength of pair-bonded relationships differed between individuals. 
While affiliative relationships appeared to have stabilised between the two 
sampling periods (i.e. as the birds matured into adults), macaws spent a 
greater amount of time engaging in affiliative behaviours than caiques. 
Overall, these findings reveal differences in the social behaviours of macaws 
and caiques. Although macaws may be particularly social in comparison to 
caiques, such relationships may also be developed and maintained through 
different types of affiliative interactions. Such results, however, need to be 
interpreted with a significant degree of caution as they are based on very 
small samples sizes that were available for each species. 
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2.0.2: General Introduction 
 
While parrots are popular pets, and there is growing interest in maintaining 
captive populations of parrots for research in comparative psychology labs, 
relatively little is known about the socio-ecology of wild parrots (Forshaw, 
1989, Juniper and Parr, 2003); particularly the Neotropical species 
(Kroodsma and Miller, 1996). Approximately 350 parrot species are 
distributed throughout the world, with roughly 145 species found in tropical 
and sub tropical lowland forests in Neotropical regions of South America 
(Forshaw, 1989, Juniper and Parr, 2003). Although a number of studies 
provide detailed accounts of the behaviours of wild Neotropical parrots, many 
of these studies tend to be restricted to conspicuous species that inhabit 
relatively accessible locations, such as open savannah, farmlands and dry 
forest (Galetti and Rodrigues, 1992, Martuscelli, 1995, Waltman and 
Beissinger, 1992) or exposed clay-licks, where parrots regularly visit to 
consume soil (Burger and Gochfeld, 2003, Gilardi and Munn, 1998). In 
contrast to open and dry habitats, where birds can be clearly and more easily 
observed, lowland habitats are often characterised by closed canopies with 
dense vegetation, and may therefore preclude more detailed behavioural 
observations. Hence, many Neotropical species remain largely unstudied 
(Gilardi and Munn, 1998, Kroodsma and Miller, 1996). Behavioural 
observations of captive populations of Neotropical parrots may therefore 
provide valuable insights into the behaviour and ecology of these species. 
Species raised in the wild, however, are likely to be exposed to vastly 
different experiences than species raised in captivity. While such experiences 
may make direct comparisons between captive and wild species difficult to 
interpret, comparisons between different species that are raised under 
identical conditions in captivity may alleviate some of these concerns. It may 
however be possible that the direction of between-species differences also 
vary from captivity to the wild.  
 
The current study aims to quantify both social and foraging behaviours of 
captive red-shouldered macaws (Diopsittaca nobilis) and black-headed 
caiques (Pionites melanocephala), as well as assess within-species 
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relationship dynamics. To do this, two different sampling techniques were 
used at two different time periods; following procedures outlined by Altman 
(1974) and Martin and Bateson (1996). When subjects were four months old, 
instantaneous scan sampling (fixed interval time point sampling) procedures 
were used to quantify a broad variety of conspicuous behavioural states, such 
as foraging, playing and preening behaviours, particularly for between-
species comparisons of behaviours. When subjects were 24 months old, 
continuous focal sampling procedures were used to quantify particularly 
discrete behavioural events, such as which individuals were instigating and 
receiving agonistic and affiliative interactions, as well as the durations of 
these behaviours. These interactions were then used to determine dominance 
hierarchies and whether pair-bonded relationships had formed. It was unclear 
whether pair-bonded relationships would develop due to the sex ratio of the 
birds that were present in our colony (which were skewed towards males). 
 
 
2.1: Instantaneous Sampling 
 
2.1.1: Methods 
 
Procedure 
 
Behavioural observations were conducted in subjects‘ home cages from 06 
October 2010 - 08 April 2011. Subjects were approximately four months old 
when observations began and were housed in species-specific enclosures. 
The behaviours of all subjects from both species were recorded during a daily 
one-hour focal session, between 9-11am, using instantaneous sampling 
methods (Altmann, 1974). Observations comprised of 66 one-hour sessions 
(across 66 days). During each session, the behaviours of all individuals were 
recorded at five-minute intervals, equating to 12 sample points for each 
subject per hour, totalling 792 observations per bird. For each sample point, 
the experimenter recorded whether individuals engaged in certain 
predetermined behaviours, as described in the behavioural ethogram (see 
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Table 2.1). Individuals that were not engaged in any of the predetermined 
behaviours were classed as ‗other‘ and not further assessed. Focal 
observations and recordings were counterbalanced within and between 
species. Individuals within direct proximity of one another (i.e. within a 
comparable reaching distance of 30cm for both species), that were jointly 
engaged in the same behaviours, were also recorded for between-species 
comparisons of social group sizes. Individuals that were within 30cm, but 
were not interacting with each other, were considered to be engaged in 
independent behaviours. The availability of different foods and objects were 
held constant between species.  
 
Statistical analysis 
 
All statistical analyses were two-tailed and performed in SPSS (SPSS for Mac 
OS X, 2007) with alpha set at 0.05. Data were summed across observational 
periods for analysis and checked with Shapiro-Wilk and Levene‘s tests for 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance for parametric 
analysis. When data failed to meet these assumptions, non-parametric tests 
were used. Independent t-tests were used to assess species differences in 
frequencies of social play behaviours and the manipulation of inedible 
objects. Repeated measures ANOVA were used to assess preening 
behaviours. Independent t-tests were used to compare species foraging 
behaviours. Independent t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests were used to assess 
social behaviours. Exact tests were reported for non-parametric analyses, 
following the procedures outlined by Mundry and Fischer (1998). Unplanned 
post-hoc tests were not corrected for multiple pairwise comparisons.   
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Table 2.2: Descriptive behavioural ethogram  
 
 
Behavioural States 
 
Description  
 
Social play 
 
 
Manipulation of inedible 
objects 
 
Preening 
 
Drink water 
 
Fruit and nut forage 
 
 
 
 
 
Soak-seed forage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fresh fruit forage 
 
 
Ground  
 
 
Non-aggressive social interactions involving 
chasing, acrobatic swinging and wrestling 
 
Grasping of detached objects with claws or 
beak, and destruction of inedible materials 
 
Grooming of self or others (allopreening) 
 
Ingesting water from dispenser 
 
Ingesting foraging mixture containing dried 
fruits and nuts. This food was contained in a 
separate bowl that was positioned on a 
feeding tray, adjacent to the soak-seed bowl 
at the front of the cage. 
 
Ingesting foraging mixture containing seeds 
previously softened in water by animal 
keepers. This food was contained in a 
separate bowl that was positioned on a 
feeding tray, adjacent to the fresh fruit bowl at 
the front of the cage. 
 
Ingesting a variety of fresh fruits placed 
throughout the cage, but not on the ground 
 
Ingesting previously discarded food items 
from the floor of the enclosure 
Chapter 2: Behavioural Observations 
 
 101 
2.1.2: Results 
 
(1) Social play: While both species were often observed to engage in play 
behaviours, the type and frequency of these behaviours were remarkably 
different between species. Caiques participated in social play significantly 
more frequently than macaws (caiques mean: 252.75 ± 15.90 SEM; macaws 
mean: 123.00 ± 12.62 SEM); Independent t-test, t = 6.987, df = 6, p < 0.001 
(Figure 2.1). The intensity and complexity of play behaviours, although not 
assessed in this study, also appeared to be more rigorous in caiques. For 
example, caiques would often run along the ground chasing each other, and 
then one bird would pounce on top of another bird; pinning it to the ground. 
Both birds would also wrestle on the ground by rolling over each other. 
Caiques would also solicit play by lying upside down on the ground. These 
behaviours were never observed in macaws, which instead engaged in 
relatively moderate play behaviours, such as grasping each other‘s feet while 
climbing up the cage wall.      
 
(2) Manipulation of inedible objects: Both macaws and caiques showed 
similar tendencies towards manipulating inedible objects (macaws mean: 
97.25 ± 6.90 SEM; caiques mean: 115.50 ± 15.79 SEM); Independent t-test, t 
= 1.059, df = 6, p = 0.33 (Figure 2.2). 
 
(3) Preening behaviours: The overall frequencies and direction of 
preening behaviours were remarkably different between macaws and 
caiques.  Macaws engaged in preening behaviours more frequently than 
caiques (macaws mean: 137.25 ± 4.99 SEM; caiques mean: 27.50 ± 3.74 
SEM), revealing a significant between subjects effect of species on the 
frequency of preening behaviours; Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 
99.491, p < 0.001 (Figure 2.3).  
 
A significant within subjects effect of the type of preening behaviours; 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 7.946, p = 0.03, revealed that 
allopreening behaviours (mean = 53.75 ± 18.98 SEM) were observed more 
frequently than self-preening behaviours (mean = 28.63 ± 4.90 SEM). 
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However, a significant within subjects interaction between species and the 
type of preening behaviours was also observed; Repeated measures 
ANOVA, F1,6 = 18.430 p = 0.005, suggesting that frequencies of self preening 
and allopreening behaviours differed between species (Figure 2.3). Planned, 
uncorrected, post-hoc tests revealed no between-species differences in 
frequencies of self-preening behaviours (macaws mean = 34.25 ± 8.86 SEM; 
caiques mean = 23.00 ± 3.51 SEM); independent t-test, t = 1.131, df = 6, p = 
0.301, however, macaws preened others significantly more frequently than 
caiques preened others (macaws mean = 103 ± 7.96 SEM; caiques mean = 
4.5 ± 1.04 SEM); independent t-test, t = 12.273, df = 6, p < 0.001. No 
differences between self and allopreening behaviours were observed for 
caiques; paired t-test, t = 1.329, df = 3, p = 0.276, although, macaws preened 
others significantly more frequently than themselves; paired t-test, t = 4.273, 
df = 3, p = 0.024.  
 
(4) Foraging behaviours: As depicted in Figure 2.4, macaws were 
observed at the water dispenser more frequently than caiques (macaws: 
mean = 30.5 ± 3.95 SEM; caiques: mean = 14.75 ± 2.21 SEM); Independent 
T-test, t = 3.48, p = 0.013, while caiques visited the Soak Seed feeder more 
frequently than macaws (macaws: mean = 52 ± 7.71 SEM; caiques: mean = 
132.5 ± 23.66 SEM); Independent T-test, t = 3.235, p = 0.018. However, there 
were no between-species differences in frequencies of visits to the Fruit and 
Nut feeder (macaws: mean = 106.5 ± 8.46 SEM; caiques: mean = 81 ± 25.68 
SEM); Independent T-test, t = 0.943, p = 0.382, Fresh Fruit (macaws mean = 
106.5 ± 10.21 SEM; caiques mean = 99.5 ± 14.68 SEM); Independent T-test, 
t = 0.392, p = 0.709, or Ground foraging (macaws mean = 19.5 ± 4.03 SEM; 
caiques mean = 18.25 ± 3.20 SEM); Independent T-test, t = 0.243, p = 0.816. 
 
(5) Sociality: As depicted in Figure 2.5, caiques engaged in solitary 
activities significantly more frequently than macaws (macaws mean = 348.3 ± 
20.03 SEM; caiques mean = 457.25 ± 7.44 SEM); independent t-test, t = 
5.101, df = 6, p = 0.002, whereas macaws were observed in pairs significantly 
more than caiques (macaws mean = 326 ± 13.34 SEM; caiques mean = 
281.5 ± 3.86 SEM); Mann-Whitney Test, U = 2.337, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.029. 
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However, no between-species differences for groups of three individuals were 
revealed (macaws mean = 111.75 ± 7.42 SEM; caiques mean = 95.25 ± 4.09 
SEM); independent t-test, t = 1.947, df = 6, p = 0.099. Although, macaws 
were observed in groups of four more frequently than caiques (macaws = 73; 
caiques = 21).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Behavioural Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 2.1: Frequencies of play behaviours for macaws and caiques; 2.2: Frequencies of inedible object manipulation for macaws 
and caiques; 2.3: Frequencies of preening behaviours of macaws and caiques; 2.4: Frequencies of foraging behaviours of macaws 
and caiques. 
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Figure 2.5: Box & whisker plot depicting median and 25-75% interquartile 
range of frequencies of social interactions in macaws and caiques. 
Frequencies of social interactions for macaws are always presented on the 
left hand side to those of caiques. 
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2.1.3: Discussion 
 
Observations revealed general similarities in the foraging behaviours of 
macaws and caiques, but pronounced differences in their social behaviours. 
While both species showed similar propensities for inedible object 
manipulation, and their dietary preferences were largely equivalent, caiques 
consumed Soak Seed more frequently than macaws; suggesting that captive 
macaws and caiques may have particular dietary preferences. Macaws also 
visited the water dispenser more frequently than caiques. However, it is likely 
that caiques supplemented their water intake by consuming a relatively 
greater quantity of Soak Seed mixture, and hence both species may share 
similar requirements for water. Caiques also engaged in social play 
behaviours more frequently than macaws. Macaws, on the other hand, 
engaged in allopreening behaviours more frequently than caiques; while no 
between-species differences were observed in the frequencies of self-
preening behaviours. Hence, macaws preened others more than they 
preened themselves, whereas caiques preened others as frequently as they 
preened themselves. Between-species differences in social group size were 
also observed. Caiques engaged in solitary behaviours more frequently than 
macaws. Macaws, in contrast, were observed in pairs more frequently than 
caiques. There were however no between-species differences for groups of 
three individuals, although it appears that macaws may also spend more time 
together as a group of four individuals than compared to caiques.     
 
While macaws and caiques show few between-species differences in their 
dietary preferences, differences in their social behaviours appear more 
fundamental. Both species engage in affiliative social interactions through 
preening and playing behaviours. Such behaviours may help stabilise the 
social dynamics of a group by reinforcing social bonds between individuals, 
and therefore play an important role in the development and maintenance of 
social hierarchies (Diamond et al., 2006). However, both playing and preening 
behaviours are distinctly different in their expression. Play behaviour is 
vigorous and may be comprised of complex motor actions. As such, play 
behaviours may help refine coordination and dexterity and hence aid in the 
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manipulation of objects or extractive foraging techniques (Bekoff and Byers, 
1998). However, the play behaviours observed in this study were generally 
socially oriented and did not frequently involve objects. Preening behaviours, 
by contrast, consist of gentle and delicate actions, often directed towards 
sensitive and vulnerable areas such as around the eyes or under the wings 
(personal observation). Hence preening may invoke elements of ‗trust‘ or 
companionship that may not be reinforced by play behaviour. Although the 
greater intensity of play behaviours observed in caiques does not appear to 
correspond with greater propensities to manipulate inedible objects, caiques 
may instead use play behaviours to reinforce their social relationships; in lieu 
of their relatively limited allopreening behaviours. In contrast, high frequencies 
of allopreening and sociality suggest that macaws may form stronger social 
relationships than caiques. Alternatively, social development rates may also 
differ between these two species. As play behaviours are often characteristic 
of juveniles rather than adults (Bekoff and Byers, 1998), macaws may have 
developed their social behaviours earlier than caiques. Hence, this 
observational period may have missed a critical developmental period where 
play behaviours were more common in the behavioural repertoire of macaws. 
However, this explanation may be unlikely as parrots generally have 
prolonged developmental periods as a result of their relatively large brain size 
(Iwaniuk and Nelson, 2003). Moreover, parrots do not generally fledge (leave 
their nest), until they are at least three months of age. Hence, at four months 
old both species are likely to retain their juvenile characteristics.  
 
Social play in macaws and caiques, however, appears typical of the complex 
range of behaviours demonstrated by other large brained species of birds. 
Both macaws and caiques were observed to participate in rigorous play 
chases and complex reciprocal object play (Diamond et al., 2006, Fagen, 
1981, Ortega and Bekoff, 1987). While this study recorded the frequencies 
and play bouts, further investigations into the complex motor actions of typical 
play behaviours among parrots may reveal whether their play behaviours are 
comparable to other large-brained mammalian species (Iwaniuk et al., 2001). 
Further investigation may also reveal whether certain socio-ecological 
precursors, such as the need to manipulate objects to extract food, or 
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differences in sociality, select for particularly pronounced play behaviours 
(Diamond and Bond, 2003, Diamond et al., 2006). Overall, such differences in 
the types of affiliative interactions between macaws and caiques may reveal 
differences in how social relationships are established and maintained 
between these two species.  
 
Instantaneous, scan sampling procedures provide an appropriate approach to 
measuring a variety of conspicuous behavioural states, such as feeding, 
playing or preening behaviours, in which subjects may undertake for 
extended periods of time. Hence, this approach was useful to determine 
broad between-species differences. However, one limitation to this approach 
is that such procedures may miss some of the more subtle interactions 
between individuals, such as the direction of instigated or received aggressive 
displacements, which may only last for brief durations. In the following section 
I use a more appropriate method for assessing particularly discrete 
behavioural events. Continuous focal sampling procedures were therefore 
used to quantify affilliative and agonistic behaviours between individuals, as 
well as the durations of these behaviours (Altman, 1974, Martin and Bateson, 
1996). These interactions were then used to determine the dominance ranks 
of individuals of each species. Observations were undertaken when subjects 
were 24 months old in an attempt to reveal how individual relationships had 
stabilised over time. 
 
 
2.2: Continuous Sampling 
 
2.2.1: Methods 
 
Procedure  
 
Observations of macaws and caiques were conducted at regular intervals 
between July and September 2012. Subjects were approximately 24 months 
old when observations began. The behaviours of each individual for each 
Chapter 2: Behavioural Observations 
 
 109 
species were continuously recorded with a digital video camera (JVC Everio, 
Model No. GZ-MG645BEK, Malaysia), between 13:00-15:00 hours, for 30 
five-minute sessions (150 minutes per bird). Sampling orders were 
randomised across sessions. Colour-coded leg bands were used to identify 
individuals. Prior to data collection, subjects were first habituated to the 
presence of the observer. To do this, 15 preliminary observational sessions 
were first conducted which were not included in the analysis. Hence, the data 
collection period only began after the birds had been exposed to the 
presence of an experimenter for 15 sessions. Each subsequent observational 
session began after a 5-minute delay period, beginning after the arrival of the 
observer. The aim of this procedure was to provide detailed accounts of 
interactions between individuals and also allow broad comparisons of 
subjects between four months and 24 months of age.  
 
Social Interactions  
 
For each observational session, interactions with the focal bird, the direction 
of behaviours, i.e. whether the focal bird was the initiator or recipient, and 
whether these interactions were of an agonistic, affiliative or neutral nature 
were recorded. Interactions were considered agonistic if a bird was displaced 
due to aggression. Agonistic behaviours included beak lunging, biting of a 
conspecifics feet and foot grasping of wing or tail feathers. Distress 
vocalisations were typically given in response to agonistic interactions. 
Interactions were considered affiliative when birds engaged in social activities 
such as allopreening and play. Affiliative interactions never invoked distress 
vocalisations or immediate displacement. Behaviours were coded as neutral 
when birds were in close proximity of one another (i.e. within 30cm), but did 
not interact directly, i.e. perching, self-preening or feeding. Interactions 
between birds were only recorded when initial behaviours from one bird 
elicited a response in another bird. Hence, only mutually acknowledged 
interactions were used in analyses (Vervaecke et al., 2000). Frequencies of 
agonistic interactions between each dyad were used to determine dominance 
hierarchies. The duration and frequencies of affiliative behaviours between 
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dyads were used to quantify the strength of affiliative relationships, such as 
pair-bonds.  
 
Statistical analysis 
 
Agonistic Interactions: Frequencies of agonistic interactions that resulted in 
displacements or submission were used to determine agonistic dominance 
ranks among group members. To do this, David‘s Scores were calculated for 
each individual by assessing the proportion of wins or losses among all 
dyadic interactions (David, 1987, Gammell et al., 2003).  
 
More specifically, according to Gammell (2003 pp 602): David‘s scores are 
based on ―the proportion of wins by individual i in his interactions with another 
individual j (Pij) is the number of times that i defeats j (Sij) divided by the total 
number of interactions between i and j (nij), i.e. Pij= Sij/nij. The proportion of 
losses by i in its interactions with j (Pji) equals 1 – Pij. If nij = 0 then Pij = 0 and 
Pji = 0. David‘s scores for each member, i, of a group are then calculated with 
the formula: DS = w + w2 – l – l2, where w represents the sum of i‘s Pij values, 
w2 represents the summed w values (weighted by the appropriate Pij values) 
of those individuals with which i interacted, l represents the sum of i‘s Pji 
values and l2 represents the summed l values (weighted by the appropriate Pji 
values) of those individuals with which i interacted‖. Hence, David‘s scores 
are based on the unweighted and a weighted sum of an individual‘s dyadic 
proportions of wins, combined with an unweighted and a weighted sum of its 
dyadic proportions of losses (de Vries et al., 2006). de Vries and colleagues 
(2006) subsequently developed a correction to Pij, termed Dij, which was also 
adopted here: Dij = (Sij – 0.5)/(nij + 1).  
 
David‘s Scores were used over other dominance indices, as they are 
particularly robust to data where interacting pairs show reversals in the 
direction of dominance; as was the case with this data (Bang et al., 2010). 
 
Affiliative Interactions: Counts and durations of affiliative interactions were 
checked with Shapiro-Wilk and Levene‘s tests and met assumptions of 
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normality and homogeneity of variance for parametric analysis. Independent 
t-tests were used to compare between-species differences in the number and 
total duration of instigated affiliative interactions. All statistical analyses were 
conducted in SPSS (SPSS for Mac OS X, 2007).  
 
Sociograms: To compare the development of affiliative relationships and pair-
bond strength, the total frequencies of affiliative interactions between dyads 
were quantified for each species at approximately (a) four and (b) 24 months 
of age. Instantaneous sampling procedures were used to quantify affiliative 
interactions for subjects at four months of age, totalling 792 sample points per 
individual across 66 one-hour sessions. Continuous sampling procedures, 
totalling 150 minutes of observation time for each individual, were used to 
quantify the affiliative interactions of subjects at 24 months of age using the 
sampling procedures outlined above. As different sampling techniques and 
sampling durations were used to quantify social relationships between these 
two time periods, interpretations of any comparisons should be made with 
caution, as the data sets are not directly equivalent. To allow for more 
accurate comparisons between the two observational periods, the number of 
interactions within each observational period were transformed into 
percentages, and hence relative differences may be compared. The weight of 
the arrows, depicting the strength of pair-bonded relationships, were 
calculated to reflect the proportional strength of each relationship.   
 
 
2.2.2: Results 
 
Agonistic Interactions  
 
There were no between-species differences in the number of instigated 
agonistic interactions (macaws mean = 35.5 ± 11.41 SEM; caiques mean = 
41.25 ± 11.21 SEM; Table 1); Independent t-test, t = 0.359, df = 6, p = 0.732. 
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David‘s Scores indicate a linear agonistic rank order for both species (Table 
2.2): Macaws (high to low dominance); No.8>No.5>No.2>No.4, Caiques: 
Gold>Red>Purple>Green. 
 
Affiliative Interactions  
 
There were no between-species differences in the number of instigated 
affiliative interactions (macaws mean = 129.5 ± 18.46 SEM; caiques mean = 
98.75 ± 5.9 SEM; Table 2.3); Independent t-test, t = 1.586, df = 6, p = 0.164. 
However, macaws were observed to spend a significantly greater duration 
(sec) instigating affiliative behaviours than caiques (macaws mean = 2530 ± 
384.40 SEM; caiques mean = 1455 ± 72.24 SEM; Figure 2.6); Independent t-
test, t = 2.748, df = 6, p = 0.033. 
 
Sociograms 
 
Frequencies of affiliative interactions between each potential dyad were 
presented as sociograms across the two time periods. No pronounced dyadic 
relationships were revealed for macaws at four months old (Table 2.4), 
although the most frequently observed affiliative behaviours were recorded 
between No.4 x No.8. Macaws at 24 months old (Table 2.3), however, 
showed more clearly defined dyadic relationships, with the most frequent 
accounts of affiliative behaviours shared between No.2 x No.4, and No.5 x 
No.8. Still, at 24 months old, these relationships were not exclusive, as there 
were frequent accounts of affiliative behaviours between individuals outside 
these pairs (Figure 2.7).  
 
For caiques, at four months old the most frequent affiliative interactions were 
between Gold x Red and Green x Purple. At 24 months, affiliative interactions 
between Gold x Red remained strong. However, the second most frequent 
occurrence of affiliative behaviours were between Red x Green, followed by 
Green x Purple (Figure 2.7).    
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Table 2.2: Frequencies of agonistic behaviours resulting in displacements, 
observed during 30 x 5-minute sessions per individual. David‘s Scores (DS), 
indicating agonistic dominance ranks. Rank: 1 = most dominant; 4 = least 
dominant.   
Macaws  Receiver      
Instigator No.2 No.4 No.5 No.8 Total DS Rank 
No.2 X 6 11 9 26 0 3 
No.4 5 X 1 2 8 -3.27 4 
No.5 8 13 X 29 50 1.59 2 
No.8 15 22 21 X 58 1.68 1 
Total 28 41 33 40 142   
 
Caiques  Receiver      
Instigator Green Gold Purple Red Total DS Rank 
Green X 4 2 11 17 -3.07 4 
Gold 10 X 13 8 31 2.75 1 
Purple 23 3 X 22 48 -0.12 3 
Red 25 3 41 X 69 0.45 2 
Total 58 10 56 41 165   
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Table 2.3: Durations (seconds) and frequency (in parentheses) of affiliative 
interactions. Summed across 30 x 5 minute continuous observational 
sessions per individual at 24 months of age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macaws  Receiver    
Instigator No.2 No.4 No.5 No.8 Total 
No.2 
X 
828 
(n=39) 
464 
(n=24) 
541 
(n=39) 
1833 
(n=102) 
No.4 1173 
(n=67) X 
322 
(n=15) 
615 
(n=34) 
2110 
(n=116) 
No.5 736 
(n=36) 
428 
(n=12) X 
1431 
(n=68) 
2595 
(n=116) 
No.8 1089 
(n=61) 
1153 
(n=46) 
1340 
(n=77) X 
3582 
(n=184) 
Total 2998 
(n=164) 
2409 
(n=97) 
2126 
(n=116) 
2587 
(n=141) 
10120 
(n=518) 
Caiques  Receiver    
Instigator Green Gold Purple Red Total 
Green 
X 
332 
(n=20) 
296 
(n=28) 
638 
(n=48) 
1266 
(n=96) 
Gold 402 
(n=21) X 
198 
(n=18) 
1002 
(n=50) 
1602 
(n=89) 
Purple 870 
(n=43) 
283 
(n=18) X 
370 
(n=33) 
1523 
(n=94) 
Red 645 
(n=48) 
531 
(n=45) 
253 
(n=23) X 
1429 
(n=116) 
Total 1917 
(n=112) 
1146 
(n=83) 
747 
(n=69) 
2010 
(n=131) 
5820 
(n=395) 
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Figure 2.6: Mean duration (± SEM) of cumulated affiliative interactions 
(sec), for 30 x 5-minute observational sessions 
Chapter 2: Behavioural Observations 
 
 116 
Table 2.4: Frequencies of affiliative interactions observed at four months of 
age from 792 sample points per individual across 66 one-hour sessions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macaws No.2 No.4 No.5 No.8 
No.2 X 233 267 259 
No.4 - X 192 324 
No.5 - - X 262 
No.8 - - - X 
Caiques Green Gold Purple Red 
Green X 154 197 167 
Gold - X 153 231 
Purple - - X 168 
Red - - - X 
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Figure 2.7: Sociograms depicting the development of affiliative relationships 
and pair bonds, of affiliative interactions between dyads for four macaws; 
No.2, No.4, No.5 and No.8 and four caiques; Green, Gold, Red and Purple 
at approximately (a) four months of age (instantaneous sampling 
procedures totaling 792 sample points for each individual) and (b) 24 
months of age (continuous sampling procedures totaling 150 minutes of 
observations for each individual). The thickness of the arrows, and the 
corresponding percentage values, represent the total frequency of affiliative 
behaviours, and therefore pair-bond strength for each respective time 
period. 
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2.2.4: Discussion 
 
By quantifying the affiliative and agonistic interactions of individuals for each 
species, broad insights into the social structure and relationship dynamics of 
macaws and caiques were revealed. Agonistic interactions between dyads 
revealed a clear linear dominance hierarchy for individuals of both species. 
Affiliative interactions, presented as sociograms (Figure 2.7) when subjects 
were four months old and again when subjects were 24 months old, show 
some stabilisation between early and late observational sessions, although 
these relationships were not exclusive. While it was not clear whether pair-
bonded relationships would establish, due to the skewed sex ratio of the birds 
in our colony, high frequencies of affiliative interactions were generally 
observed between particular pairs, whereas other pairs showed lower 
frequencies of affiliative interactions. These relationships, however, were not 
necessarily exclusive, with some individuals, such as Red, showing strong 
affiliative relationships across multiple partners. Moreover, affiliative 
relationships also appear to have established irrespective of sex, as all 
subjects, with the exception of No.4, were male. Notably, the overall duration 
of affiliative interactions was greater for macaws than caiques, suggesting 
that macaws may be more socially attentive than caiques.  
 
Dominance hierarchies may also correspond with the distribution of affiliative 
behaviours. For macaws, the most dominant individuals (No.8 & No.5) spent 
the most time instigating affiliative interactions, whereas the least dominant 
macaws (No.2 & No.4) spent the least time instigating affiliative interactions. 
The relationship between the durations of received affiliative interactions was 
however less clear. Interestingly, No.2 received the greatest amount of 
affiliative interactions, but spent the least amount of time instigating affiliative 
interactions. Caiques also shared some similarities in the structure of their 
affiliative interactions with macaws. Like macaws, the most dominant caique 
(Gold) also spent the most time instigating affiliative interactions. Moreover, 
the least dominant caique (Green) also spent the least time instigating 
affiliative interactions, but received a relatively high proportion of affiliative 
interactions. Interestingly, Purple spent the second longest time instigating 
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affiliative interactions but received a considerably lower duration of affiliative 
interactions than all of the other group members. 
 
For caiques, at four months old the majority of affiliative interactions were 
shared between the two most dominant (Gold & Red), and the two least 
dominant individuals (Purple & Green). At 24 months, however, these 
relationships were less clear. While the majority of affiliative interactions 
remained stable between the two most dominant individuals, the second most 
dominant bird (Red) also showed a strong affiliative relationship with the least 
dominant bird (Green). A strong affiliative relationship, however, also 
remained between the two least dominant birds (Purple & Green). For 
macaws, at four months old the strongest affiliative relationship was between 
the most dominant individual (No.8) and the least dominant individual (No.4). 
The frequencies of affiliative interactions between all other dyads were 
generally similar. At 24 months however, dyadic affiliative interactions were 
more pronounced and predominantly occurred between the two most 
dominant individuals (No.8 & No.5) and the two least dominant individuals 
(No.2 & No.4). Such findings may however suggest that these relationships 
are still stabilising. Further observations taken in 6-12 months time, or more 
frequent sampling periods, may therefore make these relationships easier to 
interpret. 
 
Overall, it appears that the most dominant macaws spent more time 
instigating affiliative behaviours than receiving them. Subordinate macaws, in 
contrast, received greater durations of affiliative interactions in proportion to 
the affiliative interactions that they instigated. This relationship is also 
observed in the most dominant (Gold) and least dominant (Green) caiques; 
but not for Purple, which spent a much greater proportion of its time 
instigating, rather than receiving, affiliative interactions, or Red, which 
received, rather than instigated, greater durations of affiliative interactions.       
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2.3: General Discussion 
 
Observations of the study subjects were undertaken to provide a baseline of 
information on the social dynamics behaviours of these species. The purpose 
of undertaking these observations was not to present a detailed analysis of 
the social networks within and between these groups, but instead to provide a 
framework to base the following experiments. Although these observations 
have revealed between-species differences in particular behaviours, which 
may influence their propensities to interact with objects or their performances 
on social or physical cognitive tasks, it remains difficult to extrapolate the 
significance of these findings to each species‘ natural environment.   
 
At four months old, individuals of each species showed no evidence of pair 
bonded relationships. At 24 months, however, pair-bonded relationships 
appeared to have stabilised, although in some individuals (Red and Green) 
frequent affiliative interactions were shared across multiple birds. While all 
caiques were male, the strength of particular homosocial relationships 
appeared to have developed over time. These findings suggest that, 
irrespective of sex, particular individuals preferred to socialise with one 
another, suggesting that there may have been some benefit in doing so. 
Homosocial relationships have been observed in captive rooks and jackdaws. 
Rooks that form pairs enhance their individual dominance rank compared to 
those that remain single (Emery et al., 2007). Bonded homosocial 
relationships between individuals also develop to enhance agonistic or 
affiliative support from a third party, as observed in some other social species 
of corvids (Seed et al., 2007), primates (Silk, 1999) and hyenas (Engh et al., 
2005). The pair bonded relationships observed in macaws and caiques may 
serve similar functions. Pair bonds appeared to have developed between the 
two most dominant (No.8 & No.5) and the two least dominant (No.2 & No.4) 
macaws. Yet the relationship between dominance rank and pair bonds were 
inconsistent for caiques. There was, however, one female among the macaws 
(No.4). Although there was no evidence at 24 months that No.4 had yet 
reached sexual maturity, the different sex ratios between macaws and 
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caiques may make direct comparisons of bonded relationships social 
dominance ranks difficult to interpret. 
 
The frequency of specific types of social interactions also differed between 
macaws and caiques. At four months, social interactions were predominantly 
comprised of allopreening in macaws and social play in caiques. Such 
findings may therefore reveal differences in how the development of social 
relationships establish between these species. In corvids, the unsolicited 
sharing of a highly valuable food form one individual to another is particularly 
important in the early stages of pair formation (de Kort et al., 2003, 2006). 
Although similar behaviours were not observed in macaws or caiques, there 
were infrequent occasions when two individuals engaged in mock crop 
feeding, a behaviour that would generally be observed between a parent and 
their offspring. While these behaviours were observed in macaws and 
caiques there was never any transfer of food between individuals. As 
relationships develop over time, corvids increase their allopreening 
behaviours, suggesting that allopreening may be used to maintain pair bonds 
(Emery et al., 2007). At 24 months, macaws still invested more time in 
affiliative behaviours than caiques. Macaws were also observed to engage in 
joint activities more frequently than caiques. The strength of affiliative 
relationships may therefore be particularly important for macaws, rather than 
caiques, as such relationships may serve to reduce agonistic conflicts when 
in a group situation, for example when foraging on a clumped distribution of 
resources. Such problems may however be avoided by caiques as they 
spend most of their time engaging in solitary behaviours. The greater strength 
of affiliative behaviours observed in macaws may also enhance their breeding 
success or defence of a nest cavity through cooperation and coordination 
between pairs (Emery et al., 2007). However, as little is known about the 
natural behaviours of these species, such speculation must be interpreted  
with caution.  
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3.1: Object Neophobia  
 
A species‘ natural foraging ecology may be revealed through adaptive 
specialisations that either promote or constrain explorative interactions with 
their environment. Species that inhabit environments characterised by a 
fluctuating supply of resources may benefit from adopting a generalised 
foraging repertoire. Such requirements may therefore correspond with 
particular behavioural traits, such as low neophobia towards objects. 
Conversely, high neophobia may conserve foraging specialisations, and 
therefore enhance foraging efficiency, in species that inhabit relatively stable 
environments. Intrinsic differences in object neophobia were therefore 
investigated in two species of parrots that possess a similar relative brain 
size, but naturally inhabit contrasting environments. Subjects‘ baseline 
foraging latencies, in the absence of novel objects, were compared with their 
latencies to retrieve food in close proximity to a series of novel objects. 
Subjects were tested in isolation and experienced 20 trials, each with a novel 
object. Foraging latencies for both species were greater in the presence of 
novel objects, yet red-shouldered macaws, which occur in relatively stable 
habitats, showed higher levels of object neophobia than black-headed 
caiques, which inhabit more complex environments. A wide variety of objects 
were used to determine whether subjects‘ neophobic responses could be 
generalised across novel objects and whether particular object characteristics 
influenced fear responses. While macaws became more neophobic with 
subsequent experience of novel objects, caiques showed some evidence for 
habituation to novelty, suggesting that repeated exposure to novelty during 
development plays an important role in how species interact with their 
environment. These findings suggest that the adaptive benefits of neophobia 
may be to conserve foraging specialisations in species that occur in habitats 
characterised by a predictable supply of resources.   
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3.1.1: Introduction 
 
What is neophobia & how is it measured? 
 
Neophobia is an aversion towards novel foods, objects, or places, and is 
generated by an uncertainty of the potential costs or benefits associated with 
pursuing such interactions (Greenberg, 2003). In animals, neophobia typically 
evokes fear responses, which may be revealed through arousal and 
displacement (Greenberg, 2003). The intensity of neophobia is considered to 
be influenced by the complexity of a stimulus, such as irregularities in shape, 
and its discontinuity from a familiar background (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006, 
Thorpe, 1956).  
 
While neophobic responses towards novel places (spatial neophobia) have 
been assessed by comparing species‘ latencies to enter a novel room (Katzir, 
1982, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2009), object neophobia is generally assessed 
by comparing a subject‘s baseline retrieval latencies of a familiar food item, 
with retrieval latencies of the same food while in the presence of a novel 
object (Greenberg, 1983, 1984). These procedures can be applied across a 
variety of animals, both in the wild and in captivity, as well as in solitary or 
social settings, and may reveal consistent individual differences in neophobia. 
For example, mid or low ranking individuals have been found to be less 
neophobic than dominant individuals, which is considered a result of their 
relatively restricted access to resources (Katzir, 1982, 1983). Comparisons 
between related species that inhabit contrasting ecologies may also help 
broaden our understanding of the ecological mechanisms that promote 
adaptive differences in neophobia. As such, dietary generalists appear less 
neophobic than specialists, possibly because they encounter, and are 
required to process, a greater variety of food types while foraging (Greenberg, 
1983, 1984).  
 
While the antithesis of neophobia may be considered neophilia, an attraction 
towards novelty, the relationship between neophobia and neophilia remain 
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unclear (Greenberg, 2003). Approach and avoidance reactions may occur 
simultaneously, resulting in investigations that are punctuated by curiosity and 
fear, as observed in ravens (Heinrich, 1988) and chimpanzees (Menzel, 
1963). Yet, these responses appear to vary independently from one another 
and hence, each response may stem from different selection pressures that 
may be associated with either the necessity to interact with a variety of 
stimuli, or a necessity to avoid potentially dangerous interactions (Greenberg 
and Mettke-Hofmann, 2001).  
 
Is neophobia an ecologically adaptive trait? 
  
Neophobia is a widespread trait, occurring across many vertebrate species, 
including primates, rodents, fish, reptiles and birds (Corey, 1978, Greenberg, 
2003). Yet the extent of neophobia may vary considerably between closely 
related species with different life histories (Greenberg, 1984, 1992, Mettke-
Hofmann et al., 2005, 2009, 2013), different populations of the same species 
(Martin and Fitzgerald, 2005), or even throughout the lifespan of individuals 
(Biondi et al., 2010, Heinrich, 1995b,). An individual‘s response to novelty 
may also vary according to their current social context (Coleman and 
Mellgren, 1994, Stöwe et al., 2006a,b), including the presence or absence of 
experienced (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006, Voelkl et al., 2006), or more 
dominant (Katzir, 1982, 1983, Soma and Hasegawa, 2004) individuals. 
Hence, social facilitation is also likely to influence neophobia. Approach and 
avoidance behaviours have also been found to have a heritable component, 
for example in great tits (Drent et al., 2003, van Oers et al., 2004), suggesting 
that neophobia serves a general ecological function, which may be genetically 
determined and subject to natural selection (Bolivar and Flaherty, 2004, 
Greenberg, 1992).  
 
Two main hypotheses have been proposed to account for the selective 
advantages of neophobia: (1) the Neophobia Threshold Hypothesis, hereafter 
NTH, (Greenberg, 1990) and (2) the Dangerous Niche Hypothesis, hereafter 
DNH, (Barnett, 1958, Heinrich, 1988, but see Greenberg, 2003). The NTH 
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posits a link between neophobia and ecological plasticity. For example, 
species that are dietary generalists, or reside in heterogeneous environments 
may regularly encounter novel objects or places. Hence, the degree of their 
aversion towards such novelty will influence whether new resources are 
explored and exploited. Conversely, the DNH proposes that neophobia 
promotes caution when exploring novel objects, thus protecting animals from 
the unknown, or potential dangers of new things.  
 
Although both hypotheses provide plausible explanations for the adaptive 
advantages of neophobia, there is currently greater empirical support for a 
relationship between neophobia and reduced behavioural flexibility, and 
hence the NTH (Greenberg, 2003). Mettke-Hoffman and colleagues (2002), 
for instance, found that parrot species, which inhabit stable, predictable 
habitats, were more neophobic than parrot species that inhabit more diverse 
and variable environments. Generalist species of warblers and sparrows also 
tend to be less neophobic than closely related specialists (Greenberg, 1983, 
1984, 1990), and migratory garden warblers are faster, and more likely to 
explore novel environments than resident Sardinian warblers (Mettke-
Hofmann et al., 2009). In primates, dietary generalists that rely on 
manipulative and explorative foraging, but which lack anatomical adaptations 
for such behaviours, also have relatively low levels of neophobia (Clarke and 
Lindburg, 1993, Day et al., 2003, Vitale et al., 1991). As such, neophobia 
appears to be linked to species foraging ecologies. Reliance on an 
ephemeral, and hence unpredictable, distribution of resources may therefore 
promote selection pressures that favour explorative foraging behaviours and, 
as a result, low neophobia. Conversely, exploration may not be necessary for 
survival in environments characterised by predictable or abundant resources. 
Hence, habitat stability may promote high levels of neophobia to conserve 
foraging specialisations and maintain a more efficient foraging repertoire. The 
extent of neophobia therefore appears to be determined by the ecological 
plasticity of a species (Greenberg, 2003). 
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Support for the NTH is however far from conclusive. In contrast to the NTH, 
the DNH predicts that generalist species should show high levels of 
neophobia as a protection mechanism to avoid the unknown dangers of new 
things (Greenberg, 2003). Recent studies in the wild have found that 
migratory New World blackbirds (Icterids) show higher object neophobia than 
closely related resident Icterids (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2013). Moreover, 
numerous dietary generalists such as adult ravens, Corvus corax (Heinrich, 
1988) and rats, Rattus norvegicus (Barnett, 1958), as well as habitat 
generalists such as house sparrows (Passer domesticus) and the shiny 
cowbird, Molothrus bonariensis (Echeverria et al., 2006), also show high 
levels of neophobia. However, the extent to which a species displays 
neophobia has also been found to vary between captive populations of 
resident and migratory species depending on the type of novelty experienced. 
While resident Sardinian warblers showed lower levels of object neophobia 
than migratory garden warblers (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2005), migratory 
garden warblers were both faster and more likely to explore novel 
environments than resident Sardinian warblers (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2009).  
 
Neophobia also appears to be associated with developmental experience. As 
such, conflicting results have been reported between captive-reared and wild-
reared populations of generalist (Melospiza melodia) and specialist (M. 
georgiana) sparrows; while wild reared specialists, tested in captivity, were 
more neophobic than wild reared generalists (Greenberg, 1990), captive 
reared specialists were less neophobic than captive reared generalists 
(Greenberg, 1992). Young Orange-winged Amazon parrots (Amazona 
amazonica) exposed to enriched, rather than impoverished, environments 
show reduced neophobia (Meehan and Mench, 2002), and the frequent 
rotation of objects (i.e. removal and replacement), also reduces neophobia; 
although, highly fearful individuals showed greater neophobic reactions when 
objects were more frequently rotated (Fox and Millam, 2007). The experience 
of novelty during the developmental period of animals in the wild may 
therefore play a crucial role in the extent of neophobic reactions experienced 
in adulthood (Biondi et al., 2010, Fox and Millam, 2004, Greenberg, 2003, 
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Heinrich, 1995b, Meehan and Mench, 2002). Hence, juveniles reared in 
simple and predictable habitats may have less to fear in their daily 
interactions with their environment, and therefore not develop an adaptive 
aversion to novelty. High neophobia may however initially protect juvenile 
generalists from the wide variety of potential dangers encountered during 
foraging, but diminish into adulthood as a result of experience (Greenberg, 
1992). Conclusive support for a relationship between neophobia, ecological 
flexibility, and developmental experience therefore remains to be established 
and hence requires further investigation.    
 
Neophobia and cognitive adaptations 
 
The propensity to explore and flexibly adapt to novelty may also have 
important implications on the evolution of certain morphological and 
physiological traits (Mayr, 1963). Animals that avoid unfamiliar situations are 
unlikely to benefit from the affordances of such interactions, which may only 
be revealed through exploration. Such affordances may also present 
important selective advantages to individuals, and hence promote the 
evolution of certain cognitive adaptations that, for example, may enhance 
foraging success (Byrne, 1997). In times of food scarcity, less neophobic 
individuals may be more likely to incorporate novel food sources into their 
foraging repertoire. These individuals may, as a result, outcompete more 
neophobic individuals, hence promoting selection pressures that favour low 
neophobia. As such, neophobia has been observed to impede innovative 
problem-solving behaviours across a range of species, including; monkeys 
(Day et al., 2003), birds (Biondi et al., 2010, Bouchard et al., 2007, Seferta et 
al., 2001, Webster and Lefebvre, 200) and hyenas, Crocuta crocuta (Benson-
Amram and Holekamp, 2012, 2013). However, the relationship between 
neophobia and innovative problem solving remains unclear. Innovative 
foraging behaviours correspond positively with enhanced brain size in birds 
and primates (Lefebvre et al., 1997, 2004, Reader and Laland, 2001, 2002). 
Mammals and birds with relatively larger brains are also more ecologically 
flexible, and demonstrate enhanced success when introduced to novel 
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environments (Sol et al., 2002, 2005, 2007 2008, Sol and Lefebvre, 2000). 
Yet there are also highly neophobic species within the corvid (Heinrich, 1988), 
and parrot families (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002) that possess particularly 
large brains (Iwaniuk et al., 2005), and generate innovative behaviours 
(Lefebvre et al., 2004, 1997). Consequently, fear may diminish substantially 
after animals are repeatedly exposed to stimuli that were initially novel, but 
become familiar through exploration, possibly because the potential for any 
dangerous consequences are dismissed (Heinrich et al., 1995, Menzel, 
1963). Neophobia may therefore only prolong the acquisition of object 
interactions, and hence have no ultimate impact on the production of 
innovative behaviours or cognitive evolution (Greenberg, 2003).  
 
The current study attempts to reveal behavioural adaptations that may be 
associated with the contrasting ecologies of red-shouldered macaws and 
black-headed caiques. To do this, intrinsic between-species differences in 
neophobia were assessed. As the rearing environment, and hence 
developmental experience, of both species were identical, it was possible to 
measure intrinsic levels of neophobia (Greenberg, 2003). Any between-
species differences in neophobia may therefore suggest that such differences 
are genetically based, subject to natural selection and have some adaptive 
value (Greenberg, 1992).  
 
Species that inhabit complex habitats may adopt more generalised foraging 
techniques to accommodate for the greater diversity of interactions that are 
required to process a variety of food types. Conversely, foraging efficiency 
may be enhanced in stable and predictable environments by adopting more 
specialised foraging techniques. Such contrasting ecologies have been found 
to correspond with differences in neophobia among parrots; with habitat 
stability resulting in higher levels of object neophobia (Mettke-Hoffman, 2002). 
This study, however, differs from that of Mettke-Hoffman and colleagues 
(2002) in a number of aspects; subjects here were raised under identical 
conditions, were all juveniles of a similar age group that possess a similar 
relative brain size, and were tested in isolation with a greater variety of novel 
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objects. Moreover, while Mettke-Hoffman and colleagues (2002) tested 
neophobia in 51 parrot species, they only assessed one red-shouldered 
macaw on one object, a cotton mop, and did not include black-headed 
caiques in their study.   
 
Between-species differences in neophobia were assessed by comparing 
foraging latencies of solitary individuals in the presence and absence of novel 
objects (following Greenberg, 1883, 1984). Findings from this study are 
discussed in light of the prevailing hypotheses that attempt to explain the 
adaptive benefits of neophobia in birds. According to the NTH, caiques, which 
naturally inhabit more diverse environments than macaws, were predicted to 
show relatively lower levels of object neophobia. As such, caiques were 
expected to show shorter latencies to approach novel objects than macaws.  
 
 
3.1.2: Methods 
 
Subjects and Housing 
 
Subjects were approximately 10 months old when tested.   
 
Novel Objects 
 
Subjects were individually presented with one of 20 novel objects in the 
following order: fluorescent box, mop-head, stone, toy mouse, cat photo, pink 
cup, yellow cup, roll of tape, glass jar, Ping-Pong ball, Postits (small yellow 
pad of paper notes), yellow pen, cable tie, green lid, white tube, black square, 
clear container, long container, wool, rubber band (Table 3.1, Figure 3.1). 
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Procedure  
 
Subjects were tested individually between 9-11am in a visually isolated but 
familiar enclosure. After subjects entered the enclosure they were provided a 
period of five-minutes to acclimatise to the arena. A preferred piece of food of 
standardised size was then placed on the feeding tray inside the subject‘s 
enclosure and the subject‘s baseline feeding latency in the absence of novel 
objects was recorded (baseline control trial). If the subject did not retrieve the 
food within 10 min, the trial was terminated and the subject was retested the 
following day. Once the subject consumed the food item, the experimenter 
then removed any remaining food debris from the enclosure, and allowed 
another two-minute delay to allow the subject to settle. The experimenter then 
placed another preferred food item on the subject‘s feeding tray at 5cm to the 
right of a novel object (novel object trial) and recorded the subjects‘ latency to 
either retrieve the food item or interact with the novel object (following 
Greenberg, 1983, 1984). After 10min the novel object was removed, along 
with any remaining food debris. Subjects were again presented with a two-
minute delay period, after which a third food item was placed on the food tray 
for 10 min to control for any effects of satiation from the novel object trial 
(second control trial). Subjects that did not retrieve the food during the novel 
object trial of the second control trial were allocated ceiling values of 601s. 
Each subject was presented with one novel object trial per day, in the above 
order. All trials were recorded with a digital camcorder (JVC Everio, Model 
No. GZ-MG645BEK, Malaysia) and subsequently scored for analysis.  
 
Statistical Analysis  
 
All statistical analyses were two-tailed, and performed in SPSS, with alpha set 
at 0.05 (SPSS for Mac OS X, 2007). Data were checked with Shapiro-Wilk 
and Levene‘s tests and log transformed prior to analysis to meet assumptions 
of normality and homogeneity of variance for parametric analysis. 
Comparisons of both between and within-species response latencies were 
made using Repeated measures ANOVA. To determine whether the 
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presence of novel objects influenced foraging latencies, control trial latencies 
(baseline control trials and second control trials) were compared with 
latencies in novel object trials, across all objects for each species. Bonferroni 
corrections were applied to planned post hoc tests that required multiple 
pairwise comparisons.   
 
To control for any species-specific preferences for the particular food 
rewards, or differences in movement time (i.e. walking rather than flying), 
baseline control latencies were also subtracted from the novel object trial 
latencies where subjects retrieved food, to determine relative response 
latencies for between-species comparisons. To determine whether subjects 
habituated to novelty, comparisons between the first and last 10 objects were 
assessed with Repeated measures ANOVA. To do this, the relative response 
latencies for the first and last 10 novel object trials were averaged across 
subjects. The number of trials where individuals from each species retrieved 
the food/interacted with novel objects (classed as ―Response‖) were also 
compared with trials where there was no interaction (classed as ―No 
Response‖), using a binomial test with a probability of responding or not 
responding set to 0.5. To do this, individual responses were averaged across 
trials to avoid pseudoreplication for species comparisons.  
 
 
3.1.3: Results 
 
Latencies to retrieve a familiar food item were compared across three 
conditions: (1) baseline control trials, (2) novel object trials, and (3) second 
control trials.  
 
Mean retrieval latencies (log transformed seconds) were greater for macaws 
than caiques across all conditions (Figure 3.2): baseline control trials; 
macaws: mean = 1.13 ± 0.15 SEM, caiques: mean = 0.68 ± 0.08 SEM; novel 
object trials, macaws: mean = 2.57 ± 0.09 SEM, caiques: mean = 1.50 ± 0.19 
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SEM; second control trials, macaws: mean = 1.98 ± 0.35 SEM, caiques: 
mean = 1.17 ± 0.12 SEM. These findings are confirmed by a significant main 
effect of species on retrieval latencies; Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 
12.457, p = 0.012. 
 
A significant main effect of condition (Figure 3.2); Repeated measures 
ANOVA, F2,12 = 38.389, p < 0.001, and no significant interaction between 
species and condition; Repeated measures ANOVA, F2,12 = 2.875, p = 0.095, 
suggests that subjects‘ response latencies differed depending on condition, 
but that each species showed similar responses to each condition. Planned 
comparisons revealed that subjects‘ response latencies were significantly 
greater during the novel object trials (mean = 2.04 ± 0.22 SEM) than 
compared to the baseline control trials (mean = 0.90 ± 0.12 SEM); Tukey test, 
p < 0.001. However latencies for novel object trials did not differ significantly 
from the second control trials (mean = 1.58 ± 0.23 SEM); Tukey test, p = 
0.069. Response latencies for the second control trials were also significantly 
higher than baseline control latencies; Tukey test, p = 0.007. Subjects 
therefore appear to become less motivated to retrieve food over the course of 
the experiment. However, subjects often retrieved the food and did not 
appear satiated. The greater latencies in the second control trials may instead 
be due to a residual negative association from the previous novel object trials.  
 
As latencies for caiques were generally shorter than those of macaws, a 
relative measure of neophobia was therefore required to control for any 
between-species differences in responses, which may be associated with 
food preferences or movement speed (i.e. flying as opposed to walking) 
rather than neophobia. To do this, subjects‘ baseline control trials were 
subtracted from their corresponding novel object trials across objects where 
subjects retrieved the food, and hence made a response. Relative latencies to 
acquire food in the presence of novel objects were greater for macaws (mean 
= 2.37 ± 0.13 SEM) than caiques (mean = 1.10 ± 0.19 SEM). These findings 
are confirmed by a significant between-species effect of relative novel object 
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response latencies (Figure 3.3); Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 30.253, 
p = 0.002. 
 
However, a significant within subjects effect of novel object trial; Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F19,114 = 7.849, p < 0.001, and a significant within subjects 
novel object trial x species interaction; Repeated measures ANOVA, F19,114 = 
3.125, p < 0.001, suggests that each species showed different responses to 
the presence of novel objects throughout the course of the experiment (Fig. 
3.4). Response latencies between the first 10 and last 10 novel object trials 
(Fig. 3.5) increased for macaws (first 10 objects: mean = 2.24 ± 0.01 SEM; 
last 10 objects: mean = 2.51 ± 0.16 SEM). A planned, uncorrected 
comparison between the first and last 10 objects revealed a significant 
increase in response latencies for macaws; Paired t-test, t = 3.773, df = 3, p = 
0.033. A decrease in response latencies between the first and last 10 objects 
was however observed for caiques (first 10 objects: mean = 1.45 ± 0.15 SEM; 
last 10 objects: mean = 0.74 ± 0.28 SEM), yet a planned, uncorrected 
pairwise comparison revealed no significant differences; Paired t-test, t = 
2.99, df = 3, p = 0.058.  
 
Overall, macaws were more likely to remain stationary (mean = 16 ± 1.15 
SEM), rather than approach food (mean = 4 ± 1.15 SEM), in the presence of 
novel objects; Binomial test, p = 0.012. Caiques on the other hand were more 
likely to approach food (mean = 14.75 ± 1.44 SEM), rather than remain 
stationary (mean = 5.25 ± 1.44 SEM), in the presence of novel objects; 
Binomial test, p = 0.041 (Figure 3.6). 
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Table 3.1: Description of novel objects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OBJECTS DESCRIPTION DIMENSIONS (mm) 
(1) Fluorescent box 
Bright orange with a 
regular pattern of black 
numbers on the top 
surface. 
100 x 100 
(2) Mop-head White and blue 250 x 80 
(3) Stone Grey 170 x 90  
(4) Toy mouse White 80 x 30 
(5) Cat photo Black and white 160 x 110  
(6) Pink cup Pink Ø 50 x 80 
(7) Yellow cup Yellow Ø 50 x 80 
(8) Roll of tape White Ø 100 x 20  
(9) Glass jar Clear Ø 80 mm x 70 
(10) Ping-Pong ball White Ø 35 
(11) Postits Yellow paper notes 75 x 75  
(12) Yellow pen Yellow 130 x 10 
(13) Cable tie Black 200 
(14) Green lid Green and white Ø 90 x 10 
(15) White tube White  Ø 25 x 70 
(16) Black square Black 20 x 20  
(17) Clear container Clear with opaque lid Ø 20 x 60  
(18) Long container Clear with white side 100  
(19) Wool White 150  
(20) Rubber band Brown 130 x 10  
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Figure 3.1: Twenty novel objects that were individually presented to subjects. 
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Figure 3.2: Mean log transformed latencies (±SEM) to retrieve food across 20 trials.  
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Figure 3.3: Mean log transformed relative feeding latencies (±SEM) of individuals in the presence of 20 novel objects. 
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Figure 3.4: Mean log transformed latencies (±SEM) to retrieve a familiar food item in the presence of 20 novel objects. 
Baseline control latencies were subtracted from novel object trials in which subjects retrieved the food. A value of 2.78 is a 
result of subjects showing no response i.e., not retrieving the food during a novel object trial.   
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Figure 3.5: Mean log transformed relative feeding latencies (±SEM) for the 
first and last 10 novel objects.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Proportion of responses to 20 novel objects.  
 
 
 
 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
No.2 No.4 No.5 No.8 Green Gold Purple Red 
Macaws Caiques 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
n
o
v
el
 o
b
je
ct
 t
ri
a
ls
 
No Response Response 
Chapter 3: Object Interactions   
 
 141 
3.1.4: Discussion 
 
Results revealed that latencies to retrieve a familiar food item were greater for 
both species when food items were presented alongside novel objects, than 
compared to baseline foraging rates without novel objects. Moreover, 
between-species differences in object neophobia were also revealed. When 
raised under identical conditions, red-shouldered macaws, showed relatively 
high levels of object neophobia compared to black-headed caiques, These 
results may support previous findings, where species‘ neophobic responses 
coincide with adaptive response to their natural foraging behaviours, such as 
the need to actively search for food, or avoid dangerous encounters 
(Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002).  
 
Findings from the current study may therefore provide further support for the 
Neophobia Threshold Hypothesis (NTH), suggesting that the adaptive 
function of object neophobia is associated with the ecological plasticity of a 
species. Macaws, which inhabit environments characterised by a stable 
distribution of resources show higher levels of neophobia than caiques, which 
inhabit more variable environments. The ultimate function of neophobia may 
therefore be to conserve foraging specialisations, and hence maintain 
efficient foraging mechanisms, in species that inhabit stable environments. 
Species that inhabit environments characterised by greater complexity, on the 
other hand, may benefit from relatively low levels of neophobia, as they are 
required to use more generalised and flexible foraging techniques to 
accommodate for a greater variety and fluctuating availability of resources.  
 
Greenberg (1992) however, revealed contrasting differences in neophobia 
between captive and wild reared sparrows. When raised in the wild, species 
that inhabit more specialised environments, such as marshes, showed higher 
neophobia than related species that inhabit more diverse environments. 
Surprisingly however, when raised in captivity, the generalist species showed 
higher levels of neophobia than the more specialised species. Consequently, 
Greenberg (1992) suggests that differences in neophobia may be due to 
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complex interactions with the environment, with post-fledging experience 
playing an important role in reducing neophobia in more diverse 
environments. For example, juvenile ravens (Corvus corax) have been 
observed to be more curious and neophilic than their adult counterparts 
(Heinrich, 1995b). While Greenberg‘s (1992) subjects were tested when they 
were approximately two months old, subjects in this study were tested at 10 
months of age. However, in the current study, macaws and caiques were both 
reared under identical conditions in captivity, yet macaws, in comparison to 
caiques, showed relatively high levels of neophobia. Post-fledging experience 
may have reduced neophobia in caiques, whereas such experiences do not 
appear to have had the same influence on macaws. Evidence to support 
these claims may be revealed by comparing how each species‘ response 
latencies changed after successive exposure to novel objects. While 
habituation to novelty is generally restricted to the repeated presentation of 
the same object in the same location (Heinrich, 1995, Menzel, 1963), the 
neophobic responses of caiques appeared to decrease, albeit not 
significantly, as they were subsequently exposed to a greater variety of novel 
objects, suggesting some evidence of habituation, irrespective of object 
familiarity. Macaws, on the other hand, became more neophobic after 
experiencing an increasing variety of novel objects.  
 
Although subjects did not experience any adverse effects associated with 
approaching novel objects, macaws did not learn, even after repeated 
experience, that novel objects were benign. Caiques on the other hand may 
have learned, after exploring a variety of novel objects, that novelty was not 
associated with adverse risk. Caiques also appear to have a greater intrinsic 
motivation to explore and manipulate objects than macaws (see chapter 3.2), 
which may contribute to lowering their levels of neophobia at 10 months of 
age. Hence, repeated exposure to novelty may reduce neophobia in some 
species, but not others. These findings provide further support for 
Greenberg‘s (1992) studies on captive-reared sparrows, as well as wild-
reared warblers (Greenberg, 1983,1984) and sparrows (Greenberg, 1990), 
and numerous species of parrots (Fox and Millam, 2007, Meehan and Mench, 
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2002, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002), suggesting that neophobia may diminish 
as animals experience a variety of novel interactions in their environment, 
which in turn may contribute to the low levels of neophobia found in more 
generalist species.  
 
While the intensity of subjects‘ neophobic responses appeared to be 
influenced by particular novel objects, only two objects were clearly avoided 
by both species; the neon box and the cat photo. Although the square shape 
of the neon box was regular and hence may not be considered complex 
(Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006), it is likely that its fluorescent orange colour 
and pattern of numbers stood out from the background and was hence 
viewed as particularly novel (Thorpe, 1956). Similar findings have been 
revealed in warblers, which avoid brightly coloured objects in comparison to 
dull coloured objects (Greenberg, 1983). Moreover, the neon box was 
relatively large in comparison to other objects, and may therefore be 
approached more hesitantly than smaller objects due to its potential to 
conceal dangerous information; as observed in ravens (Heinrich et al., 1995), 
and warblers (Greenberg, 1983, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006). Macaws and 
caiques also avoided a black and white photo of a cat‘s face, with prominent 
eyes, even though they had not encountered such an animal before. These 
responses suggest that macaws and caiques may possess innate 
adaptations to help avoid dangerous encounters in their natural environment. 
Although some birds, such as ravens, approach fuzzy objects more cautiously 
than smooth objects (Heinrich et al., 1995), caiques showed little fear of 
objects that shared other mammalian features, such as the fake mouse, mop-
head or wool. Moreover, caiques also avoided inanimate objects that had no 
resemblance to a mammalian predator, such as a smooth stone or roll of 
tape. Further investigation into which components of the cat image are 
particularly fear inducing, such as the presence or absence of large eyes, 
may be useful to confirm such interpretations. Like ravens (Heinrich et al., 
1995), macaws appeared to be less fearful of small, round objects, such as 
the pink and yellow cups and Ping-Pong ball, in contrast to brightly coloured 
or fuzzy objects. However, this study revealed no obvious object relationships 
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as particularly fear inducing or attractive, with the exception of the fluorescent 
box and cat photo.  
 
As both subjects were raised under identical conditions, such differences in 
neophobic reactions between macaws and caiques may therefore be 
considered innate, and possibly the result of contrasting selection pressures 
that each species face in their particular natural habitats. Such findings may 
also have important implications for the behavioural flexibility of these 
species. As brain size correlates positively with certain types of flexible 
behaviours, such as innovative foraging (Lefebvre et al., 2004, 1997), and 
neophobia has been observed to impair innovative foraging behaviours 
(Biondi et al., 2010, Bouchard et al., 2007, Day et al., 2003, Webster and 
Lefebvre, 2001), investigations that assess behavioural flexibility in macaws 
and caiques, which possess a similar relative brain size but show marked 
differences in object neophobia, may yield further support for the NTH.   
 
The overall findings from this study reveal that red-shouldered macaws and 
black-headed caiques show pronounced intrinsic differences in their reactions 
towards novel objects. Such findings correspond with the complexity of each 
species‘ natural habitat, suggesting that the adaptive benefits of neophobia 
may be to maintain foraging specialisations, and hence foraging efficiency, in 
habitats that are characterised by an abundant and predictable supply of 
resources.    
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3.2: Familiar Object Exploration   
 
Object exploration was investigated to determine whether any between-
species differences in behaviours reveal particular adaptive specialisations 
that may be associated with the contrasting ecologies of each species. Forty-
eight wooden objects of different sizes, shapes and colours were repeatedly 
presented to each species in their home cages. Solitary object exploration 
was then quantified for each individual. Social aspects of object interactions 
were also recorded, including the order of within-group first-touch object 
interactions, as well as affiliative and aggressive object interactions. Caiques 
required fewer sessions than macaws to first interact with the objects, 
suggesting reduced neophobia in caiques compared to macaws. Overall, 
caiques also interacted with a greater number and diversity of objects than 
macaws, possibly revealing that caiques are more neophilic than macaws. 
Both species showed preferences for certain colours, shapes and sizes, of 
objects. While there were no individual differences in frequencies of first-
touch object interactions among macaws, individual differences were more 
pronounced among caiques. That is, for caiques, but not macaws, certain 
individuals were more frequently observed to initiate object exploration. The 
majority of object interactions for both species were of an affiliative, rather 
than aggressive, nature, revealing that parrots engaged in joint object 
exploration more frequently than they usurped objects from one another. 
Differences in the extent of object exploration between macaws and caiques 
may suggest that each species has evolved particular adaptive responses to 
accommodate for ecological challenges that are associated with their natural 
habitats. 
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3.2.1: Introduction 
 
Animals that inhabit environments characterised by a fluctuating supply of 
resources may benefit from a diet that consists of a wide variety of food types. 
Conversely, in environments that are characterised by a stable and abundant 
distribution of resources, animals may enhance their foraging efficiency by 
specialising on a restricted variety of food types that can be easily located 
and processed (Cockburn, 1991). Hence, different foraging ecologies may 
require animals to seek out different information about their environment, 
which may in turn correspond with certain behavioural or cognitive 
adaptations (Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Platt et al., 1996). As a result, the 
necessity to process numerous types of food may promote enhanced 
exploratory behaviours in species that are dietary generalists, rather than 
specialists (Day et al., 2003, Tebbich et al., 2009, Webster and Lefebvre, 
2000), or species that inhabit relatively complex, rather than predictable, 
habitats (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002) 
 
A species‘ foraging ecology may therefore result in particular cognitive 
adaptations that have evolved to enhance their foraging efficiency. Species 
that depend on spatially demanding foraging behaviours, such as those in the 
food-caching family Corvidae for example may enhance their foraging 
success by accurately remembering the location of particular food items, 
across both time and space (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). The adaptive 
value of these specialisations in spatio-temporal memory may then be 
revealed experimentally. For example, specialised food-storing corvids show 
more accurate performances on spatial memory tasks than less specialised 
food-storing corvids (Balda and Kamil, 1989). Cognitive specialisations may 
also allow species to respond flexibly to environmental changes, such as a 
variable climate and hence ephemeral food supply. As such, food storing 
mountain chickadees (Poecile gambeli) that inhabit regions with relatively 
demanding foraging conditions are more accurate at retrieving their caches 
than those individuals that inhabit more stable environments (Pravosudov and 
Clayton, 2001). Moreover, neuroanatomical adaptations for enhanced spatial 
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memory, such as an enlarged hippocampus in food-storing passerines in 
contrast to non-food-storing species, may also support such findings (Krebs 
et al., 1989). 
 
Exploratory behaviours have been found to be consistent among individuals 
(Cole et al., 2011, Dingemanse et al., 2002, Morand-Ferron et al., 2011a, 
Verbeek et al., 1994), and heritable (Dingemanse et al., 2002, Drent et al., 
2003) in species such as great tits (Parus major), suggesting a selective 
advantage to individuals under certain ecological conditions (see also 
Pravosudov and Clayton, 2001). Exploratory behaviours may help animals 
locate ephemerally distributed or concealed familiar foods, or provide useful 
information about changes in the abundance of essential resources, such as 
nesting materials. Exploration may also be used to gather information about 
novel resources, which may be particularly beneficial in times of resource 
scarcity. However, the affordances of novelty may only be revealed after 
approaching and possibly engaging in a potentially dangerous interaction. 
While exploratory behaviours may be driven by a necessity to discover new 
resources, new locations of familiar resources, or even new methods for 
obtaining familiar resources, these behaviours appear to be regulated by an 
interaction between certain psychological mechanisms, such as an attraction 
to, or fear of novelty; neophilia and neophobia respectively (Greenberg, 
2003). Hence, neophobia may be associated with the costs of exploration, 
e.g. risk of predation or ingesting toxic foods, whereas neophilia may be 
driven by the adaptive benefits of exploration (Greenberg and Mettke-
Hofmann, 2001). While object neophobia is generally assessed by comparing 
an animal‘s latency to retrieve a familiar food item in the presence and 
absence of a novel object (Greenberg, 1983, 1984), neophilia, on the other 
hand, is assessed by measuring the extent of object exploration independent 
of the presence of food (Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Heinrich, 1995b, 
Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002, Tebbich et al., 2009).  
 
Comparisons of object exploration may therefore be systematically quantified 
across a variety of species with contrasting ecologies to reveal whether 
Chapter 3: Object Interactions   
 
 148 
exploration has developed under adaptive selection pressures in response to 
particular environmental challenges. Consequently, foraging behaviours that 
require extensive manipulation of the environment appear to favour the 
development of sustained investigatory activities, whereas readily available 
foods, requiring minimal effort for acquisition do not (Day et al., 2003, 
Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002, Tebbich et al., 
2009). 
 
In the current study, propensities for object exploration are compared 
between two species of Neotropical parrots, which naturally inhabit 
environments of contrasting complexity. As such, environmental complexity is 
considered a measure of the diversity of habitats used by each species, 
which may also include a wider variety, and fluctuating availability, of food 
types (Godfrey-Smith, 2002). However, little is known about the foraging 
ecologies of these species. Red-shouldered macaws (hereafter macaws) 
occur in stable, open wooded habitats and savannahs, whereas black-headed 
caiques (hereafter caiques) prefer more complex, heterogeneous habitats 
comprised of closed canopy and forest edges (Juniper and Parr, 2003); see 
Chapter 1.4 for a more detailed description of each species known natural 
history.  
 
Species that inhabit complex habitats may therefore adopt more generalised 
foraging techniques to accommodate for variation in the availability of 
resources, therefore showing relatively high levels of object exploration and 
hence neophilia. Conversely, foraging efficiency may be enhanced in stable 
and predictable environments by adopting more specialised foraging 
techniques. Such species may therefore show low levels of object exploration 
and hence low neophilia and high neophobia. The contrasting ecologies of 
macaws and caiques therefore predict that caiques will be more explorative, 
and hence interact with a greater abundance and diversity of objects than 
macaws, as they may be required to adopt such strategies to accommodate a 
greater diversity of challenges in their natural foraging environment. 
Conversely, macaws may be less explorative than caiques as their natural 
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habitats appear more predictable and stable, and therefore may require 
relatively fewer exploratory behaviours.   
 
 
3.2.2: Methods 
 
Experimental Procedure 
 
Subjects were tested in social groups in their home cages, and presented 
with objects every 2-3 days to maintain high levels of motivation. Sessions 
began with the presentation of 48 objects (Figure 3.7), comprised of yellow, 
blue and red wooden balls (4 sizes), rings (3 sizes), sticks (5 sizes) and 
cubes (3 sizes). Objects were randomly assorted and presented on the cage 
floor.  
 
I recorded the characteristics of each object that the subjects explored, as 
well as the frequency of all object interactions. For both species, the: (1) 
number, (2) diversity, (3) colour, (4) shape and (5) size of objects that each 
subject interacted with were recorded. Social aspects of object exploration, 
such as the: (6) ranked order of objects first touched, and (7) type of social 
object interactions, such as the number of times an object was stolen from 
another bird (negative) and the number of times subjects participated in 
shared object manipulations (positive) were also recorded for each individual. 
To ensure a more intrinsic measure of individual object exploration, only 
solitary object interactions were analysed, rather than social object 
manipulations. That is (with the exception of 7 above), if one bird began 
interacting with an object, and then another bird joined in, only the first bird‘s 
interaction was recorded. 
 
In an attempt to control for between-species differences in object neophobia, 
trials commenced for each species after a respective individual first interacted 
with any of the objects. Each species was then presented with 15 x 30minute 
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sessions. Sessions were video recorded (JVC Everio, Model No. GZ-
MG645BEK, Malaysia). Recordings were taken from outside the subjects‘ 
cage and were supplemented by verbal annotations of behaviours by the 
observer. Recordings were subsequently coded for analysis.   
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
All statistical analyses were two tailed and conducted using SPSS (SPSS for 
Mac OS X, 2007). Data were checked with Shapiro-Wilk and Levene‘s tests 
prior to analysis for assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance for 
parametric analysis. Data that failed to meet these assumptions were 
analysed with non-parametric tests. Repeated measures ANOVA were used 
to assess between-species differences in frequencies of object interactions, 
the diversity of objects manipulated and social object interactions, i.e. shared 
(positive) and stolen (negative) object interactions. Within-species object 
interactions were compared using non-parametric Friedman Tests. Post-hoc 
tests were made using paired t-tests and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests. 
Subjects‘ interactions with different colours, shapes and sizes, as well as 
social object-interactions, were averaged across the 15 sessions prior to 
analysis. Ranked orders of individuals‘ first touch object interactions for each 
session were not included in statistical analyses, but interpretations of 
descriptive statistics are discussed. Between-species comparisons of the 
number of sessions where subjects showed no response to the objects were 
made with independent t-tests. Exact tests are reported for all non-parametric 
analyses, following the procedures of Mundry and Fischer (1998). 
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3.2.3: Results 
 
Caiques first began interacting with objects during their second 30-minute 
presentation. Purple and then Red were the first individuals to interact with 
objects. Gold and Green first interacted with objects on the third and fourth 
presentations respectively. All of the macaws began interacting with the 
objects on their ninth 30-minute presentation in the following order: No.4, 
No.2, No.5, No.8. To simplify the information presented in this section 
selected means and SEM are only reported with their associated figures and 
not the text.  
 
(1) Frequency of object interactions (Figure 3.8a,b): Caiques interacted 
with a greater number of objects per session than macaws (caiques: mean = 
17.08 ± 3.62 SEM; macaws: mean = 2.42 ± 0.26 SEM), revealing a significant 
between subjects effect of species; Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 
16.299, p = 0.007. A significant within subjects effect of session; Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F14,84 = 1.928, p = 0.034, and a significant within subjects 
interaction between session x species; Repeated measures ANOVA, F14,84 = 
1.99, p = 0.028, suggests that a greater number of objects were explored 
during later rather than earlier sessions and that frequencies of object 
exploration in later sessions varied according to species (Figure 3.8a). A 
planned post-hoc test however revealed no significant differences in 
frequencies of object interactions between early (sessions 1-5 averaged, 
mean = 9.80 ± 6.96 SEM) and late sessions (sessions 10-15 averaged, mean 
= 22.5 ± 1.60 SEM) for caiques; paired t-test, t = 2.299, df = 3, p = 0.105. 
However, as the variation across subjects was quite high, these findings 
suffer from low power (Observed Power = 0.36). A significant effect may 
therefore be revealed with a larger sample size. Post-hoc tests on the 
frequency of object interactions for macaws were not conducted, as subjects‘ 
interactions appeared to remain consistently low across sessions (Figure 
3.8a). 
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(2)  Diversity of object interactions (Figures 3.9ab): A significant 
between subjects effect of species on the diversity of object interactions; 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 12.042, p = 0.013, reveals that caiques 
interacted with a greater diversity of objects per session than macaws 
(caiques: mean = 8.35 ± 1.95 SEM; macaws: mean = 1.53 ± 0.19 SEM; 
Figure 3.9a). A significant within subjects effect of session; Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F14,84 = 3.025, p = 0.001, and a significant within subjects 
session x species interaction; Repeated measures ANOVA, F14,84 = 2.63, p = 
0.003, suggests that a greater diversity of objects were explored during later 
rather than earlier sessions, and that frequencies of object exploration in latter 
sessions varied according to species. A planned post-hoc test supports these 
interpretations, revealing that caiques explored a greater diversity of objects 
in latter sessions (sessions 11-15 averaged, mean = 11.90 ± 1.09 SEM) than 
compared to earlier sessions (sessions 1-5 averaged, mean = 4.30 ± 3.12 
SEM); paired t-test, t = 3.241, df = 3, p = 0.048. Post-hoc tests on the 
diversity of object interactions for macaws were not conducted, as subjects‘ 
interactions appeared to remain consistently low across sessions (Figure 
3.9b).  
 
(3)  Colour (Figure 3.10): Macaws showed no significant preferences for 
certain colours of objects; Friedman Test; χ² (2, N = 4) = 6.00, p = 0.69. 
Caiques also showed no significant preferences for particular colours of 
objects; Friedman Test; χ² (2, N = 4) = 1.714, p = 0.519. 
 
(4)  Shape (Figure 3.11): Macaws showed no significant preferences for 
certain shapes of objects; Friedman Test; χ² (3, N = 4) = 5.40, p = 0.158. 
 
Caiques however, showed a significant preference for particular shapes of 
objects; Friedman Test; χ² (3, N = 4) = 11.100, p = 0.001. However, an 
unplanned, uncorrected post-hoc test, based on descriptive statistics, 
revealed no significant differences in frequencies to interact with Rings and 
Cubes; Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, z = 1.826, N – Ties = 4, p = 0.125, 
Chapter 3: Object Interactions   
 
 153 
suggesting that any further comparisons would also yield non-significant 
results.  
 
(5) Size (Figure 3.12): Macaws showed significant within subjects‘ 
preferences for Rings; Friedman Test; χ² (2, N = 4) = 6.50, p = 0.04; Sticks; 
Friedman Test; χ² (4, N = 4) = 14.60, p < 0.001; and Balls; Friedman Test; χ² 
(3, N = 4) = 10.543, p = 0.002. Unplanned, uncorrected Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks post-hoc tests, however, revealed no significant size preferences for 
any of the above objects. No significant within subjects size preferences were 
observed for Cubes; Friedman Test; χ² (2, N = 4) = 1.714, p = 0.519.  
 
Caiques showed significant within subjects‘ preferences for the size of: Sticks; 
Friedman Test; χ² (4, N = 4) = 11.494, p = 0.006; and Balls; Friedman Test; χ² 
(3, N = 4) = 8.289, p = 0.021. Unplanned, uncorrected Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks post-hoc tests, however, revealed no significant size preferences any 
of the above objects. No significant within subjects‘ size preferences were 
observed for Rings; Friedman Test; χ² (2, N = 4) = 2.00, p = 0.431; or Cubes; 
Friedman Test; χ² (2, N = 4) = 4.933, p = 0.102.  
 
(6) First touch interactions (Figure 3.13): The ranked order of first touch 
object-interactions among macaws appears to be more evenly distributed 
across individuals than compared to caiques. That is, for macaws, all 
individuals showed similar tendencies for first touch object interactions. 
Caiques, on the other hand, showed more consistent individual differences in 
the ranked order of their first touch interactions with the same individual 
tending to interact first with any given object. Across the 15 sessions, Purple 
and then Green were frequently the first individuals to interact with objects 
(Purple on 7 occasions; Green on 6 occasions). Gold initiated object 
interactions on two occasions, whereas Red was never the first bird interact 
with objects. Instead, Red was more often ranked as the second (4 
occasions) or third (7 occasions) bird to interact with objects. The number of 
sessions where subjects showed no response to any of the objects was 
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significantly higher for macaws (mean = 5.75 ± 0.63 SEM) than caiques 
(mean = 2.25 ± 0.85 SEM); Paired t-test, t = 3.30, df = 6, p = 0.016.     
 
(7) Social Object Interactions (Figure 3.14a,b,c): No significant between 
subjects effect of species on social object interactions (shared versus stolen 
interactions) was observed; Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 0.482, p = 
0.513.  
 
The majority of social interactions, for both species, were shared, rather than 
stolen, revealing an overall within subjects effect of social object interactions; 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 69.506, p < 0.001. No within subjects 
interaction of social object interactions x species; Repeated measures 
ANOVA, F1,6 = 0.185, p = 0.882, however, suggests that macaws and caiques 
showed similar social behaviours, as revealed from the descriptive statistics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Schematic of wooden objects presented for exploration 
(dimensions in mm); Sticks: S1-S5; Cubes: C1-C4; Balls: B1-B4; Rings: R1-
R3. Sticks were 80mm long. 
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Figure 3.8a: Mean (±SEM) number of solitary item interactions (Y-axis) across 15 x 30min trials for Macaws and Caiques. 
Observations were recorded for 15 consecutive sessions after the onset of object exploration.      
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Figure 3.8b: Mean (±SEM) number of solitary object interactions per session 
for Macaws and Caiques.    
 
 
Figure 3.9a: Mean (±SEM) diversity of objects that were interacted with per 
session for Macaws and Caiques.    
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Figure 3.9b: Mean (±SEM) diversity of object interactions averaged across 
the first and last five sessions. 
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Figure 3.10: Mean (±SEM) number of coloured items that were explored per 
session for Macaws and Caiques.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Mean (±SEM) number of different shapes of items that were 
explored per session for Macaws and Caiques.    
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Figure 3.12: Mean (±SEM) overall frequencies of object interactions for the 
different sizes of items that were explored each session for Macaws and 
Caiques (size: 1 = largest, 5 = smallest).  
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Figure 3.13: The ranked frequency of first touch interactions for each 
individual for 15 sessions. Rank 1 shows the number of sessions where 
subjects were the first in their group to touch an object. Rank 4 shows the 
number of sessions where subjects were the last in their group to touch an 
object.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14a: Mean (±SEM) number of social object interactions per 30-
minute session  
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Figure 3.14b: Mean (±SEM) number of instigated object interactions in which 
an object was stolen from a conspecific (negative) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14c: Mean (±SEM) number of instigated object interactions in which 
an object was shared with a conspecific (positive) 
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3.2.4: Discussion 
 
In this study, pronounced between-species differences in the frequency and 
diversity of object interactions were revealed. Caiques required fewer 
sessions than macaws to first explore objects and also explored a greater 
number, and diversity of objects than macaws.  
 
In contrast to caiques, macaws showed relatively limited object exploration 
throughout the 15 observational sessions. While caiques showed a general 
non-significant trend to interact with a greater number of objects in later, 
rather than earlier, sessions, caiques interacted with a significantly greater 
diversity of objects in latter sessions. Macaws not only interacted with a 
restricted diversity of objects, but they also appeared to direct the majority of 
their interactions towards objects of particular colours; however these results 
failed to reach statistical significance. While the colour of an object may have 
little relevance to its functional properties, i.e. how it can be held or 
manipulated, macaws were more frequently observed to interact with yellow 
objects than objects of other colours. Macaws may therefore seek out yellow 
as a preferred colour. However such colour ―preferences‖ are more likely to 
reflect the conservative exploratory behaviours of macaws. Hence, an initial 
decision to interact with yellow objects may have arisen haphazardly, but 
persisted as yellow became more familiar than other colours. Caiques, on the 
other hand, showed more generalised exploratory behaviours and interacted 
with all colours equally. 
 
Both species also appeared to show preferences to manipulate certain 
shapes and sizes of objects. Macaws and caiques both showed a general 
trend to interact with rings and sticks more frequently than balls and cubes. 
Rings and sticks may therefore be preferred over balls and cubes, as they are 
easier to grasp and manipulate due to their relatively thin dimensions. 
Subjects were often observed to retrieve an object from the cage floor and 
then transport the item, using either their bill or foot, to a perch for subsequent 
investigation. Hence, rings and sticks were likely to be favoured as they could 
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be removed from the cage floor, whereas balls and cubes may be less easy 
to transport.         
 
While both species showed clear preferences for the sizes of particular 
objects, no consistent between or within-species size relationships were 
observed. Macaws appeared to prefer to interact with large rings, which may 
have been more conspicuous to locate than small objects. However, large 
rings are also likely to be more challenging to manipulate than smaller rings. 
Hence, macaws may prefer to investigate objects that can be easily 
transported to a preferred location, but which also require an advanced 
degree of dexterity to manipulate. Caiques, on the other hand, appeared to be 
particularly attracted to size 3 balls. While such preferences are difficult to 
interpret, it may suggest that these specific items were favoured over others 
because they were small enough to transport, but large enough to grasp and 
manipulate.  
 
Comparisons of the orders of individuals to initiate object exploration across 
sessions may also reveal differences between species. For macaws, all 
subjects displayed similar propensities to instigate object exploration. 
Individual differences in the distribution of first-touch interactions for caiques, 
however, were more pronounced. Purple and then Green were more 
frequently observed to instigate object exploration, than compared to Gold or 
Red. All of the macaws also began exploring together during their ninth 
presentation of the objects. Conversely, only two caiques (Purple and then 
Red) approached objects during their second presentation while Gold 
interacted with objects on the third, and Green on his fourth presentation of 
objects. Together, these findings suggest that macaws may be more attentive 
and motivated by the exploratory behaviours of conspecifics, whereas 
exploratory behaviours of caiques, on the other hand, appear to be more 
individually oriented. Interestingly (with the exception of Red), the order of first 
touch object interactions corresponds with the social dominance hierarchies 
of each species (see Chapter 2), with low ranked individuals the first to 
explore objects. The two lowest ranking caiques also showed the greatest 
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amount of exploration. Such findings may suggest that low ranking individuals 
are more explorative than more dominant individuals as, out of necessity, 
they may search out new resources to avoid displacement from dominants 
that can defend more regularly distributed or clumped food sources (Thornton 
and Samson, 2012). 
 
Macaws and caiques, however, show some similarities in the social aspects 
of their object exploration. Both species engage more in shared (positive), 
rather than stolen (negative), social object interactions. While the frequency of 
shared object interactions appear to be evenly distributed across individuals 
of both species, stolen object interactions appear to be instigated by more 
dominant individuals in caiques, but not macaws (see chapter 2). Considering 
that parrots generally forage in social groups, and that their diets often consist 
of a clumped distribution of foods, such as nuts, seeds, leaves and flowers 
(Juniper and Parr, 2003), parrots may generally experience little aggression 
or displacement from conspecifics as there may be little competition over 
such abundant resources. However, objects were also frequently stolen from 
one another, suggesting that competition and displacement for limited 
resources, such as nesting sites or mates, may also coincide with a hierarchal 
dominance structure.     
 
While findings from this study reveal pronounced between-species 
differences in object exploration, it may be difficult, without comparing a 
greater diversity of species, to extrapolate such findings to the wild. It is 
possible that such differences reflect species-specific adaptations to particular 
foraging strategies that each species may adopt in their natural environment 
(Day et al., 2003, Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002, 
Tebbich et al., 2009). However, little is known about the natural history and 
ecology of these species. Yet, red-shouldered macaws tend to prefer open 
wooded habitats and savannahs, whereas black-headed caiques are 
generally found in closed canopy forest (Juniper and Parr, 2003). The diverse 
exploratory behaviours of caiques, in contrast to macaws, may therefore 
correspond with requirements to process a greater variety of food types that 
Chapter 3: Object Interactions   
 
 165 
may be typically encountered within habitats characterised by a dense and 
diverse closed jungle canopy. The exploratory behaviour of caiques may 
therefore appear typical of dietary generalists. Alternatively, the limited extent 
of object exploration observed in macaws may suggest that macaws possess 
a relatively more specialised foraging repertoire.  
 
 
3.3: General Discussion 
 
Findings from these experiments reveal striking differences in the 
propensities of macaws and caiques to interact with objects. When presented 
with a series of novel objects, while individually isolated, macaws showed 
relatively high levels of object neophobia in comparison to caiques. While 
subsequent exposure to novelty resulted in higher levels of neophobia in 
macaws, there was some indication that caiques habituated to novelty. 
Similar findings were also observed when subjects were repeatedly presented 
with a variety of familiar objects in a group setting. Caiques began interacting 
with familiar objects earlier than macaws, a likely reflection of their relatively 
low levels of object neophobia. Caiques also interacted with familiar objects 
more frequently than macaws and explored a greater diversity of objects than 
macaws. Subsequent exposure to these objects did not facilitate exploration 
in macaws, suggesting that their interactions were not inhibited by neophobia 
but instead reflected their naturally low propensities to interact with objects. 
By contrast, caiques interacted with a greater diversity of objects in later 
sessions, and also showed a general tendency towards interacting with 
objects more frequently in later sessions. Together, these findings suggest 
that propensities for object exploration differ substantially between these two 
species, which might reflect differences in their natural foraging repertoires 
and habitats.  
 
In a comparative study on a variety of captive animals, Glickman and Sroges 
(1966) observed that certain species were more explorative of objects than 
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others. The authors attributed this variation to certain environmental factors 
that species experience in their natural habitat, such as the need to actively 
search for food, and avoid danger from predators. Hence, the extent of object 
manipulation was a likely result of adaptive selection pressures that each 
species experienced in their particular habitats (Glickman and Sroges 1966). 
Similar conclusions have been made to account for between-species 
differences in object neophobia. Mettke-Hofmann and colleagues (2002) 
found that species of parrots which inhabit relatively stable environments are 
more neophobic and less explorative than those species that inhabit more 
complex, variable environments. As such, highly neophobic species were 
considered to have a relatively more specialised diet than species that inhabit 
more diverse and variable environments. The adaptive value of neophobia 
was therefore considered to conserve foraging specialisations and as a result, 
enhance foraging efficiency (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002).   
 
Little is known about the natural foraging behaviours of red-shouldered 
macaws and black-headed caiques, yet differences in their propensities to 
interact with objects may allow certain predictions, in support of previous 
findings from earlier studies. High levels of object neophobia, coupled with 
low exploration of familiar objects may suggest that macaws have a more 
specialised diet than caiques. Morphological evidence may also support such 
claims, as macaws possess a large beak that is particularly suitable for 
cracking open hard-cased nuts. Conversely, caiques demonstrated relatively 
low levels of object neophobia and were also highly explorative of familiar 
objects. Such findings suggest that caiques may have a more generalised 
diet, as their highly explorative behaviours may be a necessary adaptation to 
process a variety of different food types. Caiques also possess a more 
generic bill that appears better adapted for more generalised foraging 
techniques, such as prying, ripping and scraping open food items that are 
embedded in bark or other substrates.   
 
Enhanced object exploration may also provide species with more experience 
of object relationships and therefore promote an advanced understanding of 
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the physical properties of objects. However, there is mixed support for such 
claims. While non tool-using primates (Hauser et al., 2002b), and corvids 
(Bird and Emery, 2009a) may demonstrate an advanced understanding of 
object relationships, tool naïve primates, that do not naturally use tools, have 
also been observed to show no appreciation for the physical properties of 
tools (Spaulding and Hauser, 2005).  
 
Generalised foraging behaviours or different propensities to interact with 
objects may also promote differences in innovative foraging rates. Generalist 
species have been observed to show low neophobia and are more likely to 
approach and interact with novel food sources (Webster and Lefebvre, 2000). 
Species dependent on manipulative and explorative foraging have also been 
found to be more innovative than specialists (Day et al., 2003). Although rates 
of foraging innovations correspond positively with brain size in birds (Lefebvre 
et al., 1997) and primates (Reader and Laland, 2002), it is unclear whether 
innovative behaviours should differ between species that possess a 
comparable brain size but have contrasting propensities to interact with 
objects. The following chapters attempt to addresses some of these issues. 
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4.1: Abstract  
 
Propensities for innovative foraging behaviours correlate positively with brain 
size in birds and mammals, but are typically constrained by high neophobia 
and low rates of object exploration. Innovative problem solving behaviours 
between two species of parrots with a similar relative brain size, but which 
contrast in their intrinsic levels of attraction towards objects, were therefore 
assessed. Neophobic red-shouldered macaws and explorative black-headed 
caiques were individually presented with four innovative foraging tasks. Each 
task required subjects to inhibit non-functional actions directed towards a 
clearly visible food reward that was rendered inaccessible by a Plexiglas 
barrier. Instead, subjects were required to manipulate functional peripheral 
components of each task to retrieve the reward. The location of subjects‘ 
initial interactions with each apparatus, as well as the durations and counts of 
functional and non-functional manipulations required to obtain the rewards 
were assessed. All birds from both species solved each task, demonstrating 
comparable performances. Both species directed the majority of their 
behaviours towards functional, rather than non-functional, components of the 
tasks. Subjects however showed no initial preferences for functional 
components. These findings suggest that subjects learned to inhibit 
ineffective prepotent responses towards the food rewards, although they did 
not appear to extract general rules that may have allowed them to solve 
subsequent tasks more efficiently. Overall, red-shouldered macaws and 
black-headed caiques share broad propensities for innovative problem-
solving behaviours, irrespective of their intrinsic differences in neophobia and 
object exploration.  
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4.2: Introduction 
 
Innovations arise from the invention and modification of individually generated 
behaviours (Ramsey et al., 2007, Reader and Laland, 2003). That is, 
innovative behaviours may include the exploitation of a novel resource or 
food, the development of a new food-processing technique, use of an 
established behaviour in a novel context, or learning to use novel tools or 
technologies (Reader and Laland, 2003). As such, the capacity to produce 
innovative behaviours may provide a selective advantage to individuals by 
enhancing their foraging efficiency (Byrne, 1997), and in turn be introduced 
into a population‘s behavioural repertoire through social learning (Laland, 
2004). Consequently, behavioural innovations are considered to have broad 
socio-ecological and evolutionary implications, particularly relevant to animal 
culture (Whiten et al., 1999), cognition (Reader and Laland, 2003), and 
species richness (Nicolakakis et al., 2003).  
 
Rates of innovative behaviours, the taxonomic distribution of tool use, and 
interspecific differences in social learning, have therefore been found to 
correspond positively with brain size in birds and primates; as revealed from 
anecdotal records of novel behaviours regressed against brain size and 
controlled for phylogeny and research effort (Lefebvre et al., 1997, 2004, 
Reader and Laland, 2001, 2002). Foraging innovations and brain size also 
correspond positively with the successful invasion of novel habitats in birds 
(Sol et al., 2005), and mammals (Sol et al., 2008), as well as with an ability to 
tolerate climatically unstable habitats, both on a temporal and spatial scale 
among Neotropical parrots (Schuck-Paim et al., 2008), and British birds 
(Shultz et al., 2005). Together, these findings suggest that large brains allow 
animals to better respond to unpredictable variation in their environment, by 
flexibly adapting their foraging repertoires to suit locally available foods and 
by exploiting novel resources through innovative techniques. 
 
While such findings may reveal broad-based between-species relationships, 
individual propensities for innovative behaviours are also likely to be 
influenced by a number of environmental or psychological processes, such as 
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attraction to, and avoidance of, novelty (neophilia and neophobia 
respectively), the necessity to innovate, and the perseverance of object 
exploration (Reader and Laland, 2003). Yet the mechanisms that underlie 
variation in innovative behaviours remain unclear (Thornton and Samson, 
2012), and hence require further investigation. Neophobia and low rates of 
object exploration are adaptive traits that may be particularly pronounced in 
species that inhabit environments that require little manipulation to obtain 
sufficient resources (Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 
2002). Hence, a negative relationship between neophobia and innovative 
foraging behaviours has been observed across a range of species, including 
monkeys (Day et al., 2003), birds (Bouchard et al., 2007, Seferta et al., 2001, 
Webster and Lefebvre, 2001, 2000) and hyenas, Crocuta crocuta (Benson-
Amram and Holekamp, 2012). However, neophobia is also a widespread trait, 
occurring across many species of mammals and birds (Corey, 1978, 
Greenberg, 2003) and can even vary considerably between different 
populations of the same species (Martin and Fitzgerald, 2005). Such 
prevalence suggests that neophobia serves a general ecological function, 
which is genetically determined and subject to natural selection (Bolivar and 
Flaherty, 2004, Minvielle et al., 2002). Most notably, neophobia appears to be 
linked with the plasticity of species‘ foraging ecologies (Greenberg, 2003). 
Generalist species of warblers and sparrows, for example, are less neophobic 
than congeneric specialists (Greenberg, 1983, 1984, 1990). Likewise, 
migratory garden warblers (Sylvia borin) are faster, and more likely to explore 
a novel environment than resident Sardinian warblers, Sylvia melanocephala 
(Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2009). Mettke-Hoffman and colleagues (2002) also 
found that parrots, which inhabit stable, predictable habitats, such as open 
savannahs, were more neophobic than species that inhabit more diverse and 
variable environments. Hence, ephemerally distributed resources may impose 
selection pressures that favour the exploration of novelty, whereas such 
behaviours may be unrewarded in more stable environments. Intra and inter-
specific differences in neophobia may therefore impede innovative behaviours 
irrespective of brain size (Greenberg, 2003).  
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Reliable access to resources may also vary consistently among individuals 
that forage within social groups. For instance, dominant individuals may 
regularly gain priority access to resources by displacing subordinates. 
Resource acquisition may therefore be relatively stable for dominants, 
whereas subordinates may experience greater fluctuations in food availability. 
Hence, in species such as great tits (Parus major), individual differences in 
exploratory behaviours have been found to be consistent across multiple 
tasks and time periods (Cole and Quinn, 2012, Cole et al., 2011, Dingemanse 
et al., 2002, Morand-Ferron et al., 2011b, Verbeek et al., 1994), and heritable 
(Dingemanse et al., 2002, Drent et al., 2003). Moreover, Cole and Quinn 
(2012) found, in male great tits, that competitive ability—the ability to displace 
conspecifics from a localised food source—corresponds positively with 
exploration behaviour; measured as the number of hops, the number and 
duration of flights, and the areas visited, in a novel room. However, a negative 
relationship, irrespective of sex, was observed between competitive ability 
and problem solving performance; considered as the ability to remove a lever 
to access a food reward from a Perspex tube. Likewise, competitive ability 
has been observed to be inversely correlated with foraging innovations in 
male, but not female fish (Laland and Reader, 1999b). Hence, subordinates 
that are unable to outcompete dominants may be more likely to expose 
themselves to risks, such as potentially wasted time and energy, predation, or 
the consumption of hazardous foods, that may be associated with 
approaching and interacting with novel objects (Reader and Laland, 2003). As 
such, through necessity, young or low-ranking individuals often show high 
innovatory propensities and attraction towards novelty; as observed in fish 
(Laland and Reader, 1999a, 1999b), birds (Biondi et al., 2010, Cole and 
Quinn, 2012, Katzir, 1982, 1983, Morand-Ferron et al., 2011a), meerkats, 
Suricata suricatta (Thornton and Samson, 2012), hyenas, C. crocuta 
(Benson-Amram and Holekamp, 2012), and chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes 
(Reader and Laland, 2001). However, conflicting results have also been 
reported for some species of birds (Boogert et al., 2006, Bouchard et al., 
2007, Gajdon et al., 2006) and primates (Kendal et al., 2005, Reader and 
Laland, 2001), suggesting that problem-solving efficiency may also improve 
with experience. For instance, when presented with a series of novel 
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extractive foraging tasks, adult callitrichid monkeys produced more successful 
than unsuccessful task manipulations, whereas the inverse was observed in 
younger individuals (Kendal et al., 2005). The intensity of individual 
explorative behaviours have therefore been considered as personality traits 
that correspond with alternative behavioural strategies (Cole and Quinn, 
2012). While social status may influence an individual‘s necessity to innovate, 
such behaviours are likely to become refined through selection pressures that 
favour efficient foraging behaviours, which may, in turn, also result in 
enhanced reproductive fitness (Cole et al., 2012). Comparisons of problem-
solving behaviours among individuals with established social hierarchies may 
therefore provide important insights to the psychological mechanisms 
responsible for driving individual differences in innovative behaviours.  
 
The perseverance of object exploration may also influence whether  
innovative behaviours develop and become incorporated into an individuals 
foraging repertoire. Object exploration may allow animals to gather useful 
information, through trial and error learning, about the affordances of novel 
stimuli (Heinrich, 1995b). However, animal‘s that continue to perseverate on a 
task, irrespective of whether or not their behaviours result in positive 
feedback, may, at times, haphazardly solve a problem. Hence, solutions to 
problems may also be revealed through persistence of exploration, which 
may therefore play a key role in solving novel tasks (Thornton and Samson, 
2012). Persistence of object exploration may also be linked to developmental 
experiences and current motivational states. Exposure to enriched rather than 
impoverished environments, for instance, promotes more complex and 
diverse exploration of novel objects in rats, Rattus norvegicus (Renner, 1987), 
enhanced problem-solving abilities in primates (Schneider et al., 1991), and 
low neophobia in parrots (Fox and Millam, 2007, Meehan and Mench, 2002).  
 
In this study, the behavioural innovations of two species of parrots that 
contrast in their intrinsic motivation to interact with objects were assessed. 
Parrots are a particularly relevant family for investigating such behaviours due 
to their large relative brain size and propensities for innovative behaviours. 
Findings from previous studies suggest that macaws, in contrast to caiques, 
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show high levels of neophobia (Chapter 3.1) and relatively low propensities 
for object exploration (Chapter 3.2). Consequently, if low neophobia and high 
object exploration are responsible for driving innovative behaviours, we may 
predict caiques to solve innovative foraging tasks faster, and make more 
functional rather than non-functional manipulations than macaws. Subjects 
were individually presented with four innovative foraging tasks. Each task 
contained an indirectly accessible food reward that was clearly visible but 
positioned behind a Perspex barrier. To retrieve the reward, subjects had to 
inhibit direct, non-functional actions towards the reward and instead 
manipulate functional, peripheral components of each apparatus. As a 
measure of perseverance, the duration and frequencies of functional and non-
functional manipulations were recorded for both species until each task was 
solved.  
 
 
4.3: Methods 
 
Subjects and Housing  
 
Subjects were approximately 1.5 years old when tested. None of the subjects 
had prior experience with innovative problem-solving tasks.  
 
Apparatus 
 
Subjects were presented with one of four novel innovative foraging tasks in 
the following order (Figure 4.1): (1) Petri Lid; a green plastic lid with a white 
base, covered by a transparent petri dish lid (Ø 9cm x 1cm), (2) Jam Jar; a 
transparent glass jar with blue tissue paper covering its opening (Ø 8cm x 
7cm high), (3) String Pulling; a transparent Plexiglas rectangular ‗tube‘ with 
one end open and the other end closed, containing an item of food attached 
to a string which was tied to a perch 15cm above the apparatus (20cm x 3cm 
x 3cm), and (4) Extraction Tube; a transparent vinyl tube with blue tissue 
stuffed into both ends, (Ø 2.5cm x 7cm long). Each apparatus contained a 
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preferred food reward (Lafeber Nutri-Berry) that was clearly visible. To 
retrieve the reward, subjects were required to inhibit any actions directed 
towards the reward and instead manipulate peripheral components of the 
apparatus. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Innovative foraging tasks: (1) Petri Lid (2) Jam Jar (3) String 
Pulling (4) Extraction Tube. 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects were transferred and tested individually in a visually isolated but 
familiar enclosure. Subjects were presented with each of the above tasks, in 
the above order. Each subject was presented with one 30 min session per 
day prior to their daily feeding schedule. During trials where subjects showed 
little motivation to retrieve rewards, the experimenter attempted to engage the 
subject‘s attention by tapping his fingers on various parts, such as the 
Plexiglas face (in Task 1) or glass wall (in Task 2) of an apparatus. However, 
during this procedure the experimenter revealed no clues as to how the task 
could be solved. Subjects were presented with one task per session and were 
required to solve each task before proceeding to the next. All trials were 
recorded on a digital camcorder for subsequent analysis (JVC Everio, Model 
No. GZ-MG645BEK, Malaysia). 
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Durations and frequencies of functional and non-functional manipulations 
required to obtain the rewards from each apparatus were recorded for each 
individual. The location of each subject‘s first-touch interactions with each 
apparatus were also recorded to determine whether initial interactions were 
directed towards functional or non-functional components. Functional 
manipulations involved an exploration of peripheral components related to the 
procurement of the reward. Non-functional manipulations involved actions 
directed towards the visible reward (i.e. pecking through glass or Perspex). 
For instance in Task 1 (Petri Lid), subjects‘ attempts to lever the Petri lid off 
the green lid were considered functional, whereas attempts to peck directly at 
the food in the centre of the apparatus were considered non-functional.      
Interactions involving manipulations of less than one second in duration, such 
as pecks, were coded as one second. The duration and type of each subject‘s 
manipulations for all four tasks were video recorded for subsequent analysis. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
Data were assessed with Shapiro-Wilk and Levene‘s tests and were log 
transformed to meet assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance 
for parametric analysis. Because some values comprised of zeros or ones, a 
value of 10 was added to each data point prior to transformation. 
Comparisons of log-transformed durations (seconds) of functional and non-
functional manipulations were made using Repeated Measures ANOVA. Log-
transformed counts of functional and non-functional manipulations were also 
assessed using Repeated Measures ANOVA. Planned post-hoc tests were 
not corrected for multiple pairwise comparisons, and were made using paired 
t-tests. The location of first touch manipulations (either functional or non-
functional) failed to meet assumptions of normality. Counts of functional and 
non-functional first touch locations were therefore summed across individuals 
and within subjects comparisons were made with a non-parametric Wilcoxon-
Signed Ranks test. Exact tests were reported for non-parametric analyses, 
following the procedures outlined by Mundry and Fischer (1998). All data 
were assessed in SPSS (SPSS for Mac OS X, 2007).  
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4.4: Results 
 
Durations of functional and non-functional manipulations  
 
All individuals from both species eventually solved each of the four innovative 
foraging tasks. There were however no significant between-species 
differences in the log-transformed durations of time required to solve each 
problem (macaws: mean = 2.90 ± 0.11 SEM; caiques: mean = 3.11 ± 0.04 
SEM; Table 4.1; Figure 4.2); Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 3.225, p = 
0.123. There was no significant within subjects effect of task (Task 1: mean = 
2.86 ± 0.16 SEM; Task 2: mean = 2.68 ± 0.12 SEM; Task 3: mean = 3.32 ± 
0.30 SEM; Task 4: mean = 3.17 ± 0.23 SEM); Repeated measures ANOVA, 
F3,18 = 1.425, p = 0.268, and no significant task x species interaction; 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F3,18 = 0.527, p = 0.669, suggesting that each 
task required similar amounts of time to solve and that both species 
performances were similar across tasks.  
 
A significant within subjects effect of manipulation type (functional: mean = 
1.57 ± 0.04; non-functional: mean = 1.29 ± 0.03; Figure 4.3); Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 51.512, p < 0.001, and no significant manipulation 
type x species interaction; Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 0.034, p = 
0.859, suggests that both species directed greater attention towards making 
functional, rather than non-functional, manipulations. 
 
A significant task x manipulation type interaction was however observed 
(Figure 4.4); Repeated measures ANOVA, F3,18 = 5.113, p = 0.01, suggesting 
that the amount of time spent making functional and non-functional 
manipulations differed for some tasks but not others. Planned, uncorrected 
post-hoc tests revealed that subjects spent significantly more time making 
functional manipulations for: Task 2 (functional: mean = 1.55 ± 0.07 SEM; 
non-functional: mean = 1.13 ± 0.06 SEM); paired t-test, t = 6.786, df = 7, p < 
0.001; Task 3 (functional: mean = 1.78 ± 0.15 SEM; non-functional: mean = 
1.53 ± 0.17 SEM); paired t-test, t = 2.687, df = 7, p = 0.031; and Task 4 
(functional: mean = 1.82 ± 0.13 SEM; non-functional: mean = 1.35 ± 0.13 
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SEM); paired t-test, t = 4.671, df = 7, p = 0.002; but not for Task 1 (functional: 
mean = 1.43 ± 0.10 SEM; non-functional: mean = 1.43 ± 0.08 SEM); paired t-
test, t = 0.075, df = 7, p = 0.943.   
 
Counts of functional and non-functional manipulations 
 
There were no significant between-species differences in the number of 
functional or non-functional manipulations (macaws: functional mean = 1.29 ± 
0.04 SEM; non-functional mean = 1.21 ± 0.06 SEM; caiques: functional mean 
= 1.26 ± 0.08 SEM; non-functional mean = 1.22 ± 0.05 SEM); Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 0.029, p = 0.869 (Table 4.2).  
 
A significant within subjects effect of manipulation type (functional: mean = 
1.27 ± 0.04 SEM; non-functional: mean = 1.22 ± 0.04 SEM); Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 28.743, p = 0.002, and no significant within subjects 
manipulation type x species interaction; Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 
4.588, p = 0.076, suggests that both species made more functional, rather 
than non-functional manipulations.  
 
There was no significant within subjects effect of task (Task 1: mean = 2.48 ± 
0.13 SEM; Task 2: mean = 2.25 ± 0.07 SEM; Task 3: mean = 2.61 ± 0.21 
SEM; Task 4: mean = 2.62 ± 0.10 SEM); Repeated measures ANOVA, F3,18 = 
1.259, p = 0.318, and no significant within subjects task x species interaction; 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F3,18 = 0.405, p = 0.751, suggesting that each 
task required a similar number of manipulations to solve, and that species 
performances were equivalent across tasks.  
 
A significant within subjects task x manipulation type interaction was however 
revealed (Figure 4.5); Repeated measures ANOVA, F4,24 = 5.952, p = 0.005, 
suggesting that the number of functional and non-functional manipulations 
were significantly different for some tasks but not others. Planned, 
uncorrected post-hoc tests revealed that subjects made a significantly greater 
number of functional manipulations for: Task 2 (functional: mean = 1.16 ± 
0.04 SEM; non-functional: mean = 1.09 ± 0.03 SEM); paired t-test, t = 2.509, 
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df = 7, p = 0.04; and Task 4 (functional: mean = 1.41 ± 0.06 SEM; non-
functional: mean = 1.21 ± 0.05 SEM); paired t-test, t = 4.200, df = 7, p = 
0.004, but not for Task 1 (functional: mean = 1.21 ± 0.06 SEM; non-
functional: mean = 1.26 ± 0.07 SEM); paired t-test, t = 1.285, df = 7, p = 
0.240, or Task 3 (functional: mean = 1.31 ± 0.10 SEM; non-functional: mean 
= 1.30 ± 0.11 SEM); paired t-test, t = 0.120, df = 7, p = 0.908. 
 
Location and type of first-touch manipulations 
  
There were no significant within subjects differences for the number of 
functional versus non-functional first-touch manipulations (functional: mean = 
2.25 ± 0.89 SEM; non-functional: mean = 1.75 ± 0.89 SEM; Table 4.3); 
Wilcoxon-Signed Ranks test, z = 0.816, N – Ties = 8, p = 0.75. However, one 
caique, Gold, made functional first touch manipulations for all four tasks. 
 
Dominance hierarchy and duration to retrieve food 
 
To assess whether dominance rank was associated with problem solving 
ability, durations to retrieve the reward between the two most dominant 
individuals and the two most subordinant individuals were compared (Table 
2.2). No significant differences in problem solving durations were found 
between dominant and subordinant individuals (Dominant: mean = 3.07 ± 
0.09 SEM; Subordinant: mean = 2.94 ± 0.09 SEM); independent t-test, t = 
1.05, df = 6, p = 0.33 (Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 4: Innovative Foraging  
 
 180 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Raw durations of functional and non-functional manipulations (sec) required to retrieve a food reward from each 
innovative foraging problem 
 
Task 1: 
 
Petri Lid 
 
Task 2:  
 
Jam Jar 
 
 
Task 3: 
 
String Pulling 
 
Task 4: 
 
Extraction Tube 
 
MACAWS Functional Non-functional Functional Non-functional Functional Non-functional Functional Non-functional 
No.2 2.00 13.00 14.00 3.00 203.00 118.00 6.00 4.00 
No.4 5.00 16.00 41.00 6.00 35.00 0.00 20.00 2.00 
No.5 58.00 14.00 7.00 0.00 25.00 14.00 48.00 2.00 
No.8 40.00 63.00 34.00 1.00 35.00 9.00 153.00 14.00 
CAIQUES 
        
Green 7.00 9.00 48.00 3.00 21.00 0.00 130.00 105.00 
Gold 15.00 8.00 46.00 22.00 40.00 65.00 93.00 9.00 
Purple 44.00 31.00 28.00 0.00 14.00 14.00 116.00 36.00 
Red 10.00 7.00 13.00 1.00 319.00 162.00 36.00 2.00 
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Table 4.2: Raw counts of functional and non-functional manipulations required to retrieve a food reward from each 
innovative foraging problem 
 
Task 1: 
 
Petri Lid 
 
Task 2:  
 
Jam Jar 
 
 
Task 3: 
 
String Pulling 
 
Task 4: 
 
Extraction Tube 
 
MACAWS Functional Non-functional Functional Non-functional Functional Non-functional Functional Non-functional 
No.2 1 2 3 2 57 33 3 4 
No.4 2 6 10 5 3 0 10 2 
No.5 21 13 1 0 5 7 10 2 
No.8 19 41 8 1 12 5 37 12 
CAIQUES 
        
Green 2 5 5 3 1 0 18 17 
Gold 5 4 8 9 6 16 21 6 
Purple 10 13 2 0 2 3 29 9 
Red 2 2 1 1 38 60 15 2 
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Figure 4.2: Mean log transformed durations (sec ± SEM) to solve four 
innovative foraging tasks for each individual.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean log transformed durations (sec ± SEM) of functional and 
non-functional manipulations required to solve four innovative foraging tasks.  
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Figure 4.4: Mean log transformed durations (sec ± SEM) of functional and 
non-functional manipulations required to solve each innovative foraging task 
for pooled subjects.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Mean log transformed counts (± SEM) of functional and non-
functional manipulations required to solve each innovative foraging task for 
pooled subjects. 
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Table 4.3: Functional (Yes) and non-functional (No) locations of first touch 
manipulations for each task. 
 
 
4.5: Discussion  
 
Results from this study reveal that red-shouldered macaws and black-headed 
caiques share broad propensities for innovative problem solving behaviours. 
All individuals from both species demonstrated comparable abilities to solve 
each of the four innovative foraging tasks. Although both species showed no 
initial preference for manipulating functional components of the tasks, 
subjects later directed the majority of their attention towards manipulating 
functional, rather than non-functional, components of each apparatus. These 
findings reveal that subjects not only learned the affordances associated with 
manipulating functional peripheral components of the tasks, but were also 
capable of inhibiting non-functional prepotent responses towards a clearly 
visible reward, suggesting inhibitory control. Furthermore, all subjects showed 
comparable performances at solving innovative foraging problems 
irrespective of differences in their hierarchical social status (Figure 4.2 & 
Table 2.2 respectively). The comparable performances of both species on 
these tasks, irrespective of their intrinsic differences to interact with objects 
(Chapter 3), also suggests that the intensity of neophobia and object 
exploration may have little overall influence on propensities for innovative 
foraging behaviours in species that are tested in captivity.  
 
 
  Macaws    Caiques   
Task No.2 No.4 No.5 No.8 Green Gold Purple Red 
(1) Petri Dish No No No No No Yes No No 
(2) Jam Jar No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
(3) String Pulling Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
(4) Extraction 
Tube 
No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
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The high proportion of successful individuals in this study suggests that these 
tasks may not have been particularly difficult for these species to solve, and 
that macaws and caiques may be broadly capable of generating innovative 
behaviours to solve a variety of novel foraging problems. However, high rates 
of innovation are often reported in captive species in comparison to their wild 
counterparts, for example in primates (Reader and Laland, 2003), hyenas, C. 
crocuta (Benson-Amram et al., 2013) and a number of bird species (Bouchard 
et al., 2007, Gajdon et al., 2004, Morand-Ferron et al., 2011a, Webster and 
Lefebvre, 2001). In the wild, few individuals within a social group successfully 
solve innovative foraging problems. Success rates of 15% of 62 individuals 
have been reported for wild hyenas (C. crocuta), even after repeated 
exposure to a novel foraging task (Benson-Amram and Holekamp, 2012). 
Similar findings have been observed in wild vervet monkeys (Cercopithicus 
aethiops), where only 32% of 53 individuals successfully solved a novel 
foraging task (van de Waal and Bshary, 2010). Moreover, success rates as 
low as 7% of 30 individuals were reported in vervet groups that had minimal 
exposure to humans (van de Waal and Bshary, 2010). In a study involving 
135 meerkats (S. suricatta), 63 individuals interacted with innovative foraging 
tasks, while only 13 individuals (10%) successfully retrieved the food reward 
(Thornton and Samson, 2012). Similar findings have also been reported for 
birds, where only 14% of 236 great tits (P. major), and blue tits (Cyanistes 
caeruleus) successfully solved an innovative foraging problem (Morand-
Ferron et al., 2011a).   
 
The relatively low number of successful innovators in the wild, in comparison 
to captivity, suggests that individual propensities for innovative behaviours 
may be mitigated by certain socio-ecological influences. Testing individuals in 
isolation may therefore alleviate some of the external social influences that 
discourage object exploration, such as enhanced competition or displacement 
from conspecifics. Individuals tested in isolation may therefore show greater 
exploratory behaviours, which may enhance their foraging success, as 
observed in captive hyenas in contrast to their wild counterparts (Benson-
Amram et al., 2013).  
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In this study, both macaws and caiques revealed comparable propensities for 
innovative problem solving behaviours. Such findings may be expected, given 
that both species possess an equivalently large relative brain size (Iwaniuk et 
al., 2005), and a large forebrain size that corresponds positively with rates of 
innovative foraging behaviours in birds (Lefebvre et al., 1997). However, 
results from previous studies reveal that macaws are intrinsically more 
neophobic (Chapter 3.1) and less explorative (Chapter 3.2) of objects than 
caiques. While, numerous studies support an inverse relationship between 
innovative performances, object exploration and neophobia (Auersperg et al., 
2011, Benson-Amram and Holekamp, 2012, Bouchard et al., 2007, Day et al., 
2003, Greenberg, 2003, Overington et al., 2011, Reader and Laland, 2003, 
Seferta et al., 2001, Webster and Lefebvre, 2001), results from the current 
study suggest that differences in neophobia and object exploration may have 
little overall influence on innovative propensities per se. The intensity of 
neophobia may therefore diminish over time as animals become habituated, 
through repeated exposure, to particular novel objects or foods. As the extent 
of neophobia diminishes, habituation may then facilitate greater object 
exploration (Greenberg, 2003). Certainly, some of the most innovative taxa, 
such as corvids and parrots, show strong neophobic and explorative 
behaviours; suggesting that explorative tendencies may be adaptive when 
species depend on exploring new situations to survive, while neophobia may 
promote high levels of fear as a mechanism to conserve exploratory 
behaviours, and hence maintain foraging efficiency, in habitats characterised 
by abundant resources (Greenberg, 2003, Greenberg and Mettke-Hofmann, 
2001).  
 
Macaws and caiques both showed no initial preference for manipulating the 
functional components of each apparatus. Yet subjects later focused the 
majority of their behaviours towards manipulating functional, rather than non-
functional, components. Subjects showed clear preferences for manipulating 
functional, rather than non-functional, components in the two tasks that 
involved removing tissue paper to retrieve the reward (Task 2 & Task 4; 
Figure 4.4 & 4.5). However, the duration and frequency of functional and non-
functional manipulations were similar in Tasks 1 and 3, which did not use 
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tissue paper, but instead required subjects to remove a lid or pull up a string 
(Figure 4.4 & 4.5). Hence, subjects had difficulty in targeting, and 
subsequently manipulating, tasks when they were required to manipulate 
potentially more complex functional components. Macaws and caiques 
initially required experience of each apparatus before learning which of the 
components were functional and could therefore be manipulated to obtain a 
reward. Complex and novel foraging apparatuses are however likely to 
require initial exploration, and hence trial and error experience, before 
solutions to such problems may be revealed and learned through association. 
Similar findings have also been reported in wild hyenas, C. crocuta (Benson-
Amram and Holekamp, 2012) and meerkats, S. suricatta (Thornton and 
Samson, 2012), where successful individuals reduced the amount of time 
spent manipulating non-functional components with repeated presentations of 
the same task. These findings also suggest that both macaws and caiques 
learned to inhibit non-functional prepotent actions towards the food reward 
through the clear Plexiglas barrier, and instead focus their efforts on 
manipulating functional, but peripheral, components of the tasks. Through 
experience, subjects could have potentially learned to immediately attend to 
the functional components of each novel task. However, like meerkats 
(Thornton and Samson, 2012), caiques and macaws did not appear to 
generalise these learned inhibitory behaviours across different tasks. This 
study not only reveals that red-shouldered macaws and black-headed 
caiques are broadly capable of generating innovative problem-solving 
behaviours, but that that intrinsic differences in neophobia and object 
exploration may have little overall influence on propensities for innovative 
foraging behaviours.  
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5.0.1: Abstract 
 
Physical cognition has traditionally been assessed in large-brained tool-using 
species, such as corvids and apes. Parrots, like corvids and apes, also 
possess a relatively large brain, yet comparable performances on physical 
cognition tasks are rarely reported in this group, possibly because parrots do 
not regularly use tools in the wild. This study was therefore designed to 
investigate physical comprehension of object relationships between tool-using 
and non tool-using species using a series of means-end tasks. In Experiment 
1, the Connected problem, subjects were tested on their ability to discriminate 
between pulling familiar materials that were either connected to rewards, or 
disrupted by a gap. After reaching a significant criterion of correct choices, 
subjects were presented with a novel transfer task involving a functionally 
equivalent problem, but with unfamiliar materials. Macaws and caiques both 
rapidly solved the connected discrimination problem, with some birds 
demonstrating near spontaneous comprehension. However, success on the 
novel transfer task was relatively poor, suggesting that novel materials 
impeded their performances. In Experiment 2, the Trap-Gaps Problem, six of 
eight birds solved the initial task, but required extensive trial-and-error 
experience to learn to discriminate between pulling food-trays through gaps 
while attending to the respective width of the gaps and size of the trays. 
However, four of these six birds rapidly solved the transfer task, with one 
caique demonstrating spontaneous comprehension of the problem. Overall, 
these findings suggest that non tool-using parrots may possess capacities for 
sophisticated physical cognition and an ability to solve novel problems by 
generalising learned rules. 
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5.0.2: General Introduction 
 
Although much of the research on physical cognition has traditionally focused 
on apes, which frequently use tools in the wild (Povinelli, 2000, Tomasello 
and Call, 1997), non tool-using species may also show capacities for physical 
cognition when tested in captivity. For example, vervet monkeys, which do not 
regularly use tools in the wild, have been found to outperform tool-using 
chimpanzees on a Trap-Table problem that requires subjects to rake in a 
reward while avoiding a trapping hole (Povinelli, 2000, Santos et al., 2006). 
Moreover, some species of corvids, which do not regularly use tools in the 
wild, show advanced capacities for manufacturing and using tools in captivity 
(Bird and Emery, 2009a, 2009b, Cheke et al., 2011, Seed et al., 2006); 
demonstrating performances that are comparable to frequent tool-using 
corvids (Taylor et al., 2009, Weir et al., 2002) and possibly apes (Hanus et al., 
2011, Mendes et al., 2007). 
 
Successful performances of species on physical cognition tasks may not 
necessarily correspond with whether or not an animal naturally uses tools in 
the wild. However, the extent to which subjects are trained on particular tasks, 
as well as their previous experiences on similar problems or with particular 
objects or materials, may vary widely between studies, and hence influence 
such findings. For example, when non-tool-using cotton-top tamarins were 
provided with training prior to testing, subjects successfully solved a variety of 
tasks that required some understanding of object relationships and the 
functionality of tools (Hauser, 1997, Hauser et al., 1999, 2002b, Santos et al., 
2006). However, tool naïve cotton-top tamarins failed to solve such problems 
without prior training or familiarity with testing materials (Spaulding and 
Hauser, 2005). Similar findings have also been reported from studies on 
apes, which appear to be capable of solving simple object-related problems 
without previous exposure to the testing materials, but have difficulty solving 
more challenging problems when using unfamiliar, rather than familiar, 
materials (Herrmann et al., 2008). Comparisons between tool-using and non 
tool-using species that are raised under similar conditions, but subjected to 
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experimental differences in their pre-exposure to testing materials, may 
therefore reveal whether familiarity and experience of particular materials 
influence subjects‘ performances on object related tasks.     
 
However, surprisingly few accounts of spontaneous tool-use have been 
reported in captive parrots, in comparison to primates or corvids, and even 
fewer accounts from wild populations. Hyacinth macaws (Anodorhynchus 
hyacinthinus) have been observed using wooden wedges as tools to better 
secure and manipulate hard cased nuts with their upper mandible, both in the 
wild (Schneider et al., 2002) and in captivity (Bertagnolio, 1994, Borsari and 
Ottoni, 2005). Similar observations have also been reported for wild palm 
cockatoos, Probosciger aterrimus, by Wallace (2000) in 1869. Perhaps the 
most convincing and recent account of spontaneous tool innovation in captive 
parrots has been described from one individual, Figaro, a Goffin‘s cockatoo, 
Cacatua goffini, (Auersperg et al., 2012). In this instance, Figaro used a 
number of techniques and materials to successfully manufacture stick tools to 
retrieve otherwise out-of-reach cashew nuts (Auersperg et al., 2012). Other 
studies on captive kea have also revealed detailed capacities for tool related 
behaviours (Huber and Gajdon, 2006). Although kea do not naturally use 
tools, they are highly inquisitive and readily adopt multiple tool-oriented 
techniques to access rewards; demonstrating performances that are 
comparable to species that regularly use tools in the wild, such as New 
Caledonian crows (Auersperg et al., 2011). While parrots may be infrequently 
challenged with the necessity to use tools in their natural environment, and 
hence spontaneous tool-use may be rarely observed among wild parrots, 
these findings suggest that some parrots may potentially possess 
sophisticated capacities for tool-using behaviours. As such, controlled 
experiments that assess tool-using behaviours among captive species of 
parrots may help reveal their capacities to comprehend object related 
problems. Classical approaches used to assess means-end reasoning, 
planning and insight are vertical and horizontal string-pulling problems.    
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Vertical String Pulling 
 
The ability to pull up a vertically hanging string to obtain an out-of-reach 
reward is generally considered a cognitively complex task (Schuck-Paim et 
al., 2009). For birds, this task requires the sequential use of novel behavioural 
actions such as grasping the string with their beak, pulling it up and holding 
the slack with their foot. Along with the ability to monitor the string, food and 
body movements, these actions, if accomplished repeatedly, result in the 
acquisition of the food attached to the end of the string. The spontaneous 
accomplishment of this task has been suggested to indicate insight and 
planning, as well as demonstrate an appreciation for the causal properties of 
the string, by understanding invisible forces, such as gravity, and observable 
physical rules, such as connectedness, that mediate object relationships 
(Heinrich, 1995a, Heinrich and Bugnyar, 2005, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009). 
However, the sting-pulling performances of New Caledonian crows become 
impaired when their visual information of the approaching reward is restricted, 
suggesting that string-pulling behaviours may be reinforced by a perceptual-
motor feedback cycle, and hence mediated by processes of operant 
conditioning, rather than spontaneous insight (Taylor et al., 2010).   
 
While some species of birds, such as goldfinches (Carduelis carduelis) and 
siskins (Carduelis spinus) have difficulty retrieving an out-of-reach reward 
suspended from a string (Seibt and Wickler, 2006), other species, such as 
budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus) and starlings (Acridotheres tristis) may 
be capable of pulling up strings, but require extensive experience before 
learning to discriminate between pulling strings that are connected to a 
reward, rather than strings where no rewards are present (Ducker and 
Rensch, 1977). Some parrots and corvids, however, show an ability to 
spontaneously, if not rapidly, solve more complicated configurations of this 
task, by correctly discriminating between rewarded, rather than unrewarded 
crossed-strings and broken-strings (Bagotskaya et al., 2012, Heinrich, 1995a, 
Heinrich and Bugnyar, 2005, Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Werdenich and 
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Huber, 2006), as well as discriminating between pulling strings based on the 
perceived effort required to retrieve a reward (Pfuhl, 2012).  
 
Most parrots and corvids tested on string-pulling tasks efficiently solve simple 
problems that require no discrimination between strings, without training, and 
on their first trial (Bagotskaya et al., 2012, Heinrich, 1995b, Heinrich and 
Bugnyar, 2005, Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Magat and Brown, 2009, 
Pepperberg, 2004, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009, Werdenich and Huber, 2006); if 
not after minimal experience (Funk, 2002). Overall findings from the string-
pulling paradigm suggest that parrots and corvids can discriminate between 
strings that are baited with rewards and those without rewards (Bagotskaya et 
al., 2012, Funk, 2002, Heinrich, 1995b, Heinrich and Bugnyar, 2005, 
Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Pepperberg, 2004, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009, 
Werdenich and Huber, 2006), with some species capable of determining 
connectedness through physical continuity (Bagotskaya et al., 2012, Heinrich, 
1995a, Krasheninnikova et al., 2013). Mixed performances have however 
been reported when subjects are presented with more difficult tasks, such as 
crossed rewarded and non-rewarded strings. Kea (Nestor notabilis), 
spectacled parotlets (Forpus conspicillatus) and ravens (Corvus corax) have 
demonstrated abilities to discriminate between rewarded and non-rewarded 
crossed strings of the same colour, whereas rainbow lorikeets (Trichoglossus 
haematodus), green-winged macaws (Ara chloroptera) and sulphur-crested 
cockatoos (Cacatua galerita) fail to solve this task (Heinrich, 1995a, 
Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Werdenich and Huber, 2006). Subjects‘ 
performances may however improve when different colours are used to help 
visually track the course of the rewarded crossed string (Krasheninnikova et 
al., 2013). However, hyacinth macaws (Anodorhynchus hyacinthinus), Lear‘s 
macaws (Anodorhynchus leari), blue-fronted Amazons (Amazona aestiva), 
and crows (C. cornix) failed to solve crossed strings tasks even when the 
strings were different colours, suggesting that this problem may be 
particularly challenging (Bagotskaya et al., 2012, Schuck-Paim et al., 2009).  
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While numerous species of birds have been tested on vertical string-pulling 
tasks, only parrots and corvids appear capable of solving complicated 
discriminations between strings. Another common approach to assess 
physical cognition in non-tool using and tool-using species, particularly 
primates, is through horizontal means-end physical support problems.  
 
Horizontal Support Problems 
 
Like string pulling, the retrieval of rewards on horizontal support problems 
requires an ability to discriminate between cues pertaining to physical 
relationships (spatial relationships, contact, surface continuity), and hence 
may also suggest an understanding of ―Folk Physics‖ (Povinelli, 2000). There 
are two main types of means-end support problem: the On problem, where 
subjects are required to discriminate between retrieving rewards that are 
placed either on, or off supports; and the Connected problem, requiring the 
discrimination between pulling a functional (i.e. a continuous connection to 
the reward), rather than a non-functional support (i.e. a disrupted connection 
separated by a gap). 
 
Although great apes essentially demonstrate spontaneous comprehension of 
the connected problem (Herrmann et al., 2008, Mulcahy et al., 2012), there 
are few reports of such abilities in birds. Funk (2002) however, showed that 
young kakariki (parakeets) could retrieve out-of-reach seeds by pulling a 
piece of paper that the seeds were resting on into their cage. One blue-
fronted Amazon (parrot) learned, although after a considerable number of 
trials, to retrieve food that was resting on, rather than off, cloths of varying 
configurations (de Mendonca-Furtado and Ottoni, 2008). Pigeons also 
required an extensive number of trials to solve similar tasks (Schmidt and 
Cook, 2006). The only convincing evidence that any species of bird possess 
an advanced ape-like comprehension of the connected problem is 
demonstrated by the kea; which rapidly solved both the On and Connected 
problems (Auersperg et al., 2009). In this study, one of six birds (Anu, a 
juvenile) demonstrated spontaneous comprehension of the Connected 
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problem, by pulling continuous, rather than disrupted, wooden slats to 
successfully retrieve food rewards. Impressively, this individual correctly 
chose the connected slat in 10 out of his first 10 trials on the problem 
(Auersperg et al., 2009). However, to date, there is only one published study 
detailing the performances of a single species of parrot, the kea, on the 
means-end Connected problem (Auersperg et al., 2009) and comparable 
studies remain to be reported for corvids. Ravens and crows, however, show 
an ability to solve potentially more complicated crossed support problems, 
although, in contrast to apes, the corvids did not appear to comprehend the 
causal principles of this task (Albiach-Serrano et al., 2012).   
 
Together, these findings suggest that parrots have some understanding of the 
physical properties of tools, even if they are not regularly presented with such 
challenges in the wild. Experimental paradigms that make tool-use necessary 
for the acquisition of food in captivity may therefore provide an essential 
opportunity to reveal what non-tool-using species understand about the 
physical relationships of objects. However, while some species show 
apparent capacities for spontaneous problem solving on simple means-end 
problems, comparisons between species on more complicated tasks, that 
initially require trial-and-error experience, may be influenced by differences in 
subjects‘ previous experience of particular materials, their training regimes, or 
exposure to similar types of problems.   
 
Trap-Tables, Trap-Tubes and Transfer Tasks 
 
Another method used to assess whether previous experience influences 
performances on subsequent tasks is to present subjects with novel, but 
functionally equivalent transfer tasks. Subjects can first learn to solve an initial 
problem through trial and error. After mastering this problem, subjects are 
then presented with a novel transfer task. As the presentation order of the 
initial task and the transfer task can be counterbalanced across subjects, 
subjects that slowly learn to solve the initial task, but spontaneously solve the 
transfer task may reveal capacities for generalised learning. Such abilities 
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suggest that subjects may comprehend similarities in the underlying causal 
relationships of the problems.  
 
Two tasks that share similar functional problems are the Trap-Tube (Seed et 
al., 2006) and Trap-Table problems (Povinelli, 2000). Both tasks require 
subjects to avoid a functional trapping hole by attending to surface continuity; 
somewhat similar to the means-end Connected problem. However, success 
on the Trap-tube and Trap-Table problems have provided mixed results. 
While rooks (Seed et al., 2006), New Caledonian crows (Taylor et al., 2009) 
and apes (Seed et al., 2009b) demonstrate a causal understanding of the 
Trap-Tube problem, six kea, three red-and-green macaws, and a sulphur-
crested cockatoo failed to avoid the traps (Liedtke et al., 2010). Apes have 
also failed to transfer learned information between these two problems 
(Martin-Ordas et al., 2008), whereas New Caledonian crows that were 
capable of solving a Trap-Tube problem could also solve a Trap-Table 
problem (Taylor et al., 2009). Such findings provide tentative evidence that 
certain animals are capable of solving problems based on a causal 
understanding object relationships. However, further evidence of such 
abilities is required to bolster support for such findings and new paradigms 
that can be applied across a variety of tool-using and non tool-using species 
are necessary.   
 
In the current study I assess the comprehension of object relationships in two 
species of captive hand-reared Neotropical parrots, using two different 
means-end tasks; the Connected problem, and a new paradigm, the Trap-
Gaps problem. Both means-end tasks were developed to incorporate novel, 
but functionally analogous transfer problems. Performances on such transfer 
problems may therefore reveal whether parrots are capable of generalising 
learned information across novel tasks by attending to causally relevant 
information. 
 
Subjects were initially presented with the Connected problem, which required 
an ability to discriminate between pulling connected or disrupted lengths of 
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strings or cloths to retrieve an otherwise out-of-reach reward. Subjects were 
first presented with problems using familiar materials, and then presented 
with a novel transfer task using unfamiliar, but functionally equivalent, 
materials. The purpose of familiarising subjects with the initial testing 
materials was first to eliminate any neophobic responses subjects may have 
towards the novel objects, which might impair their performances, and 
second, to provide subjects with limited experience of the functional 
properties of the materials. Hence, if familiarity with materials improves 
subjects‘ performances, we may predict subjects to solve the initial test phase 
with fewer errors than the novel transfer phase. Alternatively, subjects that 
solve the novel transfer phase with fewer errors than the test phase may 
instead show capacities to transfer relevant information across problems 
irrespective of their prior experience with certain materials. This procedure 
therefore addresses whether subjects require some familiarity of materials to 
understand functional properties, or whether subjects are able to infer 
material functionality from visual information alone.      
 
In a second experiment, using a newly-designed task, the Trap-Gaps 
problem, subjects were assessed on their ability to discriminate between 
pulling food-trays through gaps while attending to the respective width of the 
gaps and size of the trays. Subjects were presented with two novel tasks; one 
in which the size of the gaps varied, but the size of the trays remained 
constant and another task where the size of the trays varied, but the size of 
the gaps were held constant. Hence, subjects may learn the object 
relationships through trial-and-error in the first task, but could potentially solve 
the second task spontaneously if they transferred learned principles of object 
relationships across problems.  
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5.0.3: General Methods 
 
Subjects  
 
Subjects were approximately nine months old when tested on the Connected 
Problem and 33 months old when tested on the Trap-Gaps problem. Subjects 
had no previous experience with means-end problem solving tasks but had 
experience on foraging problems requiring object manipulation, such as up-
turning plastic cups to retrieve concealed food rewards.  
 
 
5.1: The Connected Problem 
 
5.1.1: Methods 
 
Apparatus 
  
Subjects were presented with a typical black A4 letter-tray (35cm x 25cm) 
attached horizontally to the exterior of their enclosure at 1.5m in height 
(Figure 5.1). The tray was partitioned in the middle by an opaque barrier (4cm 
x 30cm).  Depending on the test condition, either a length of green string or 
white cloth was placed on either side of the partition. A small plastic lid 
containing a preferred food item was attached at the distal end of each 
string/cloth.    
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects were transferred to a visually isolated but familiar experimental 
enclosure (2m3) and tested individually. The presentation order of trials 
commencing with either strings or cloths was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Strings were coloured green with a white 2cm diameter plastic lid 
attached at the distal end. Cloths were white in colour, with a blue 2cm 
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diameter lid attached at the distal end (Figure 5.1). Both lids were baited with 
a preferred food reward (crumbled Lafeber Nutri-Berries). Trials were 
completed when subjects pulled one of the strings/cloths. Subjects were 
presented with one block of ten trials per day and were only allowed one 
choice per trial. Subjects were not rewarded for pulling disrupted 
strings/cloths. If subjects pulled the disrupted string/cloth, the experimenter 
immediately retrieved the string/cloth from the subject. The experimenter 
prepared the strings/cloths so that they were initially out of the subject‘s 
reach; simultaneously positioning the strings/cloths on either side of the 
partition. When the strings/cloths were in position, the experimenter waited 
five seconds before simultaneously moving the strings/cloths forward so that 
they were within reach of the subject. Subjects were presented with a total of 
10 blocks of 10 trials each, independent of their performance or test condition 
(i.e. subjects participated in exactly 100 trials each). Subjects were not 
corrected for side biases. All trials were recorded on a digital video camera 
(JVC Everio, Model No. GZ-MG645BEK, Malaysia). During trials, the 
experimenter placed his hands behind his back and monitored the subject‘s 
behaviour via the video display. 
 
Training Phase: food/no food discrimination  
 
During training, subjects were presented with two 5cm long (continuous) 
strings/cloths (cloth 2.5cm wide), depending on their assigned condition. Only 
one string/cloth was baited with a reward. Hence, subjects not only had to 
habituate to pulling a novel material, but also differentiate between selecting 
baited rather than un-baited strings/cloths. To proceed to test, subjects were 
required to retrieve the reward five consecutive times in one block of 10 trials. 
A relaxed criterion (i.e. not significant according to a binomial test) was used 
during training to ensure that subjects had minimal experience pulling 
strings/cloths, while ensuring that subjects were both motivated and 
physically capable of retrieving the reward. The position of the baited and un-
baited strings/cloths was pseudorandomised across trials and never occurred 
on the same side for more than three consecutive trials. Once subjects 
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reached the training criterion, they proceeded to the test condition in the 
following session. 
 
Test Phase: Connected problem 
 
Subjects in the test condition were presented with an identical, but elongated, 
version of the strings/cloths (16cm) as during the training sessions. Rewards 
were placed in both lids attached to the distal ends of the strings/cloths. Only 
one string/cloth was continuous, while the other was separated in the middle 
by a 1.5cm gap (Figure 5.1). To retrieve the reward, subjects had to choose 
the continuous string/cloth. The positioning of the continuous and 
discontinuous strings/cloths was pseudorandomised as in the Training phase. 
Trials were prepared within the subject‘s view, with both the continuous and 
discontinuous strings/cloths positioned simultaneously on the tray.  
 
Novel Transfer Phase 
 
Subjects were considered to have demonstrated an understanding of the Test 
condition once they reached a criterion of 15 or more correct responses over 
two consecutive blocks of ten trials (a result that is significant according to a 
Binomial test with a probability of choosing either side set at 0.5). Once 
subjects reached this criterion, they were presented with a novel transfer task 
on the following day. The transfer task was functionally equivalent to the initial 
task i.e. transferring from pulling cloths to pulling strings and vice versa, 
however subjects had no prior experience with the novel transfer materials. 
So, subjects that had received training to pull strings were then tested on 
pulling strings, and then transferred to pulling cloths and vice versa. Subjects 
were deemed to have transferred relevant, learned rules across tasks if they 
rapidly solved the problem by making at least 15/20 correct trials in their first 
two consecutive blocks.   
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Statistical Analysis 
 
I used a binomial test (with a probability of choosing either side set at 0.5) to 
determine our transfer criterion of at least 15/20 correct trials over two 
consecutive blocks of 10 trials (significant at 0.05). A non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test was used to compare between-species differences in the 
number of errors to reach the transfer criterion. All tests were two-tailed, with 
alpha set at 0.05. Exact tests were reported for all analyses, following the 
procedures outlined by Mundry and Fischer (1998).  
 
 
5.1.2: Results 
 
Both species rapidly learnt to pull the strings/cloths. Subjects typically 
grasped the accessible end of the materials with their beak, as this procedure 
possibly required careful dexterity. Subjects then proceeded to retrieve the 
materials using either their beak or feet.  
 
Training Phase  
 
Macaws made between 0-30 errors before proceeding to the test condition 
(Figure 5.2). Three of four birds (No.4, No.5 and No.8) made correct choices 
on their first trial of the training condition  
 
Caiques performed similarly to macaws, making between 0-13 errors before 
proceeding to the test condition (Figure 5.2). Three of four caiques (Green, 
Purple and Red) also chose the baited side on their first trial of the training 
condition.  
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Test Phase  
 
All subjects from both species participated in the Connected Problem (Figure 
5.3). All macaws chose the correct side on their first test trial. Two macaws, 
No.2 and No.8, rapidly reached criterion in the test condition after making a 
total of eight and five errors, respectively (Figure 5.4). While No.2 made four 
errors on the first block and another four errors on the second block, this bird 
successfully solved all 10 trials on its third block before proceeding to the 
transfer phase. The other successful macaw, No.8, made two errors on its 
first block and three errors on its second block before proceeding to the 
transfer phase.  
 
The remaining two macaws, No.4 and No.5, failed to reach criterion for the 
transfer task within 100 trials. However, No.4 made eight correct choices in 
her first 10-trial block, and No.5 made nine consecutive correct choices in his 
third block. Although No.5‘s performance on the third block did not reach the 
predetermined criterion of success for transferring to the second task, this 
bird‘s performance remains significant according to a binomial test, with a 
probability of choosing either side set at 0.5 (9/10 correct; p < 0.05).   
 
Two of four caiques chose the correct side on their first trial. Two caiques, 
Gold and Green, reached transfer criterion after making five and 17 errors 
respectively (Figure 5.4). Gold spontaneously reached binomial significance 
after making eight consecutive correct choices and only one error in his first 
10-trial block (i.e. 9/10 correct; p < 0.05). Gold then made four errors on his 
second block before proceeding to the transfer phase. Figure 5.4 illustrates 
that Green made 19 errors before reaching criterion in the test phase. 
However, Green only completed 8 out of 10 trials before his first block was 
terminated (after 60min of inactivity). Hence, Green made 5 errors out of 8 
trials during his first block, rather than 7 errors as depicted in Figure 5.4. 
Statistical analyses, as reported above, were therefore made using the 17 
errors that Green ,made before reaching criterion (i.e. Block 1 = 5 errors; 
Block 2 = 7 errors; Block 3 = 2 errors; Block 4 = 3 errors). 
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The remaining two caiques failed to reach the criterion for transfer within 100 
trials. Of those caiques that failed to reach criterion, Purple made eight 
correct choices in his second block, with six consecutive correct choices 
(significant according to a binomial test (with a probability of choosing either 
side set at 0.5), and Red‘s poor performance was due to a side bias, which 
began from his first trial and persisted throughout testing.  
 
There were no between-species differences in the number of errors to reach 
the initial criterion for transfer; Mann-Whitney Test, U = 1.5, N1 =2, N2 =2, p = 
1.00. None of the subjects that reached the transfer criterion solved the 
transfer task within their first two blocks, or with fewer errors than in their 
previous task.   
 
Transfer Phase  
 
Two macaws (No.2 & No.8) and two caiques (Gold & Green) participated in 
the transfer task (Figure 5.4). Only one subject, No.8, successfully reached 
criterion on this task, making a total of 26 errors across six blocks. This 
subject was then presented with a further two blocks on the initial problem, 
making five and four errors respectively. All of the other subjects that 
participated in the transfer task (No.2, Gold and Green) failed to reach 
criterion.  
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Figure 5.1. Schematic of the Training and Test apparatus for the Connected 
problem (not to scale).  
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Figure 5.2. Number of errors to reach a criterion of 5 consecutive correct 
choices during training trials. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. (a) A red-shouldered macaw and (b) A black-headed caique 
pulling cloths on the Connected problem. 
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Figure 5.4. Performances on the means-end connected problems using (A) familiar materials and (B) novel materials. The 
horizontal dotted line in each graph shows chance performance (5 out of 10 trials correct). Subjects received a total of 10 x 
10-trial sessions. Green only completed 8, rather than 10, trials in his first block.  
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5.1.3: Discussion 
 
Red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques could spontaneously 
discriminate between pulling baited, rather than un-baited, strings/cloths to 
retrieve an otherwise out-of-reach food reward. After minimal experience on 
this training task, subjects were then required to discriminate between pulling 
either connected or disrupted strings/cloths to retrieve rewards. Two macaws 
and two caiques rapidly reached the transfer criterion, demonstrating near 
spontaneous comprehension of the connected problem.  
 
Subjects, however, showed inconsistent performances across blocks, 
resulting in a relatively low transfer success considering the overall within-
session performances of some individuals. Consequently, our criterion, which 
required consistent performances across two successive blocks, may 
understate our subjects‘ comprehension of the task. One caique, Gold, for 
example correctly chose the continuous string on his first 8 trials; reaching 9 
out of 10 correct choices in his first block. Gold‘s performance here is 
significantly above chance (p < 0.05; according to a binomial test), suggesting 
that he had a spontaneous comprehension of the connected problem. 
However, Gold failed to perform above chance on his second block. Likewise, 
one macaw, No.5, also made one error on the first trial of his third block, after 
which he chose the correct string for the following nine trials. Although No.5‘s 
performance here was significantly above chance, this bird failed to reach the 
predetermined transfer criterion within 100 trials.  
 
The variable performances of subjects across blocks may suggest that 
macaws and caiques were not able to retain previously learned information to 
aid their performances across subsequent blocks. This explanation, however, 
fails to account for the spontaneous success of subjects during their initial 
training and testing trials. Subjects‘ performances appeared to plateau across 
blocks, possibly a result of their increasing familiarity of the rewarded 
materials. Subjects‘ inconsistent performances may therefore be associated 
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with the onset of certain motivational issues. Hence, as subjects became 
increasingly familiar with the task they may have become less motivated to 
interact with the rewarded materials, and more interested in exploring the 
relatively less familiar, but unrewarded, materials.  
 
Of the four individuals that rapidly reached criterion for transfer, all performed 
poorly when they were presented with unfamiliar materials. Subjects therefore 
appeared to have failed to generalise relevant information, based on physical 
relationships, to solve the novel transfer task. Red-shouldered macaws and 
black-headed caiques, however, show diverse exploratory behaviours when 
repeatedly presented with a variety of objects (Chapter 3.2), yet their 
interactions with novel objects are initially constrained by neophobic 
behaviours (Chapter 3.1). The presentation of unfamiliar materials may have 
therefore induced neophobic responses, requiring subjects to first explore the 
objects before establishing goal-directed behaviours. Consequently, minimal 
familiarity and experience with materials, as provided during the initial training 
phase, may be required to reduce neophobic responses, and hence promote 
goal directed behaviours. Hence, highly familiar or novel materials may 
influence subjects‘ performances by diverting their attention from the goal-
directed retrieval of food rewards, towards greater object exploration and 
manipulation. Subsequent studies may therefore benefit by first habituating 
subjects to all materials in an attempt to control for differences in neophobic 
or neophilic responses across training, testing and transfer conditions. 
 
Although subjects spontaneously retrieved baited rather than un-baited 
materials during the training trials, they may during this process have also 
inadvertently formed an association between the reward and the continuous 
material. Hence, as subjects were presented with the same (albeit shortened) 
materials on the Connected problem as in the Training problem, they could 
potentially ignore the novel configuration of a disconnected string/cloth and 
solve the problem through previously learned contextual associations; without 
any concept of connectedness. Hence, subsequent studies may also benefit 
from using training materials that differ from those used in the testing 
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conditions. In this study however, subjects experienced the testing materials 
during training but had no experience with the materials in the transfer 
condition. As a result, prior experience of materials appeared to facilitate 
success on subsequent tasks requiring physical manipulation, while novel 
materials impeded subjects‘ performances.  
 
While the parrots in this study failed to rapidly solve the transfer task when 
they were presented with novel materials, highly neophobic ravens 
spontaneously solved a simple, vertical string-pulling problem using novel 
materials. Heinrich (1995a), conditioned ravens to retrieve a food reward by 
pulling up a light-coloured twine string. After the ravens became familiar with 
this task they were subsequently presented with a choice between pulling the 
familiar, but this time un-baited, light-coloured twine string, or a novel but 
baited, dark green woven shoelace. The ravens spontaneously selected the 
novel baited shoelace, suggesting that they were attending to the presence of 
a reward, rather than particular materials. Apes also show an ability to 
understand the Connected problem when presented with familiar and 
unfamiliar materials (Herrmann et al., 2008). However, apes required 
additional experience to solve a more complex connectivity problem, when 
presented with unfamiliar plastic canes, rather than familiar cloth (Herrmann 
et al., 2008). Moreover, apes perform better on the Connected problem when 
they were presented with naturally familiar tools, such as sticks fashioned 
from tree branches which they are likely to have had extensive experience 
manipulating, rather than artificial familiar tools made from plastic with which 
they may have had less experience (Mulcahy et al., 2012).  
 
Cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), which do not naturally use tools, 
appear to successfully transfer functionally relevant information to solve novel 
means-end problems that vary in irrelevant features, such as colour or shape 
(Hauser et al., 1999). However, tamarins with experience as tool users were 
more successful than tool-inexperienced tamarins when selecting tools based 
on their functionally relevant features (Hauser et al., 2002b). Furthermore, 
tool-naïve tamarins and closely related common marmosets (Callithrix 
Chapter 5: Means-End Comprehension of Object Relationships  
 
 210 
jacchus) that had no prior training or experience on means-end tasks showed 
no preferences for functional characteristics of tools (Spaulding and Hauser, 
2005). Apes also appeared to have difficulty transferring learned information 
across functionally identical problems involving trapping holes (Martin-Ordas 
et al., 2008, but see Martin-Ordas et al., 2012). Together, these findings 
suggest that familiarity with materials may be necessary for animals to 
develop an understanding of the physical properties of objects that they 
interact with. Moreover, such experience also appears to be particularly 
valuable when animals are presented with increasingly challenging problems.  
 
The performances of macaws and caiques on the Connected Problem, may 
however be considered particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, subjects 
were only 9 months old when tested, which is relatively young when 
compared to findings from apes, which ranged between 3-31 years old, with a 
median age of 11 (Herrmann et al., 2008). Stereotyped object manipulations 
have been observed to precede more sophisticated tool-related behaviours in 
juvenile New Caledonian crows (Kenward et al. 2006). Hence, age and life 
experience may play an important role in advancing physical cognition. 
Moreover, proficient tool-use in primates—which may regularly use tools—
can take years of practice to achieve (Fragaszy et al., 2010, Matsuzawa, 
1994). Second, the performances of macaws and caiques on this task have 
rarely been revealed in other animals without extensive training with 
materials.   
 
The performances of red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques on 
the connected problem has only been rivalled by one other avian species; the 
kea, an alpine parrot indigenous to New Zealand (Auersperg et al., 2009). In 
this study, subjects were provided with minimal experience of the functional 
properties of materials before being presented with the connected problem. 
One of six birds (Anu, a juvenile) chose the connected side in 10 out of his 
first 10 trials, demonstrating spontaneous comprehension of the task. 
However, we might expect similar performances from other species of parrots 
and corvids, considering their motivation to pull vertical strings to retrieve food 
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rewards (Heinrich and Bugnyar, 2005, Krasheninnikova and Wanker, 2010, 
Pepperberg, 2004), discriminate between certain physical properties of 
vertical strings (Heinrich, 1995a, Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, Pfuhl, 2012, 
Schuck-Paim et al., 2009), and horizontal support problems (Albiach-Serrano 
et al., 2012,).  
 
In contrast to our subjects‘, four pigeons, were initially presented with 140-200 
food/no-food discrimination training trials. Yet after such experience, all 
pigeons failed to perform above chance within their first 20 trials of the 
connected problem (Schmidt and Cook, 2006). Similarly, one Asian elephant, 
Authai a 6 year-old female, first participated in 100 food/no-food 
discrimination trials (of which she could retrieve both trays, and hence a 
reward, in her first 50 trials), and 250 on/off discrimination trials, before being 
presented with the connected problem. This elephant then proceeded to 
choose the connected side in eight out of her first 10 trials, but only reached 
binomial significance after 40 trials (Irie-Sugimoto et al., 2008).  
 
This study reveals that macaws and caiques can spontaneously solve a 
means-end problem that requires an ability to discriminate between the 
presence and absence of a food reward. Moreover, both species rapidly 
solved a more complicated connected problem when using familiar materials. 
Yet subjects‘ performances on the connected task where impaired when they 
were presented with novel materials, suggesting that familiarity and 
experience may be necessary for these species to learn the functional 
properties of materials. However, as subjects in this study were tested on 
familiar materials that were identical to the materials used during the training 
sessions, it remains unclear whether subjects successfully discriminated 
between connected or disrupted materials or whether they simply failed to 
attend to the disrupted materials. A new Trap-Gaps transfer paradigm using a 
novel test and transfer condition was therefore designed to further investigate 
physical comprehension of means-end object relationships in parrots.  
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5.2: The Trap-Gaps Problem 
 
5.2.1: Methods 
 
Apparatus  
 
Task (A): Small and large gaps/medium sized cups 
 
Two identical yellow cups (60mm diameter x 20mm deep) were baited with 
food rewards and positioned out of the subjects reach at the distal end of a 
partitioned A4 letter tray (as above). A 200mm long green string was attached 
to each cup and placed within reach of the subject, allowing the cups to be 
pulled towards the cage (Figure 5.5).  
 
To retrieve the food reward, subjects were required to discriminate between 
two different sized gaps: one gap was large enough to allow the passage of 
the cup (70mm wide x 50mm high), whereas the other gap restricted access 
to the cup (50mm wide x 50mm high). Both gaps were positioned towards the 
front of the apparatus, approximately 170mm from the subject. To access the 
reward, subjects were required to select, and then pull, the string attached to 
the appropriate cup by attending to the size of the intervening gap.  
 
Task (B): Small and large cups/small gaps  
In this experiment, both gaps were positioned in the same location as above, 
but each gap was the same size (65mm x 50mm high). Subjects were 
presented with two baited blue cups containing equal rewards, one large 
(75mm diameter, 20mm deep) and one small (55mm diameter x 20mm deep). 
Apart from their size, both cups were identical. The gaps were large enough 
to allow passage of the small cup, but restricted access to the large cup. To 
access the reward, subjects were required to attend to the size of the cups, 
with respect to the gap size (Figure 5.5).   
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Procedure 
 
The apparatus and strings were set in position at the beginning of each trial, 
with the location of the accessible reward pseudorandomised so that it did not 
occur on the same side over more than two consecutive trials. The apparatus 
was positioned so that the strings were initially out of the subjects reach. The 
experimenter then waited until the subject was positioned within 10cm of the 
front of the apparatus. A five second delay was then administered before the 
experimenter simultaneously moved both strings forward so that they were 
within the subjects reach.  
 
Subjects were only allowed to pull one string per trial. Subjects were 
considered to have made a correct choice if they retrieved the reward. 
Subjects that pulled the incorrect string were not rewarded. Subjects were 
provided with a maximum of 10 trials per day. The apparatus was re-baited 
out of view of the subject. The outcome of each trial was coded live, and 
recorded on a digital camcorder (JVC Everio, Model No. GZ-MG645BEK, 
Malaysia). 
 
Training Phase 
 
During training sessions, subjects were presented with two green cups 
(55mm x 20mm deep), each attached to a 200mm long piece of green string. 
Subjects were not presented with gaps during training trials and both cups 
could be retrieved by pulling their respective strings. However, during training 
only one cup was baited. To proceed to the test condition, subjects were 
required to reach a successful criterion of seven consecutive correct choices 
in one block of 10 trials. This procedure ensured that the subjects were 
attending to the cups and could competently pull the string to retrieve the 
reward. Once subjects reached the training criterion, they proceeded to the 
test condition on the following day. 
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Subjects were considered to have developed a side bias if they chose the 
same side over six or more trials. To correct for side biases, the non-preferred 
side was consistently baited until the subject retrieved the reward over two 
consecutive trials. The presentation order then resumed to its original 
pseudorandomised configuration.  
 
Testing Phase 
 
The presentation order of Task (A) and Task (B) was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Subjects were required to reach a successful criterion of 7 
consecutive correct choices in one block of 10 trials, or 9 out of 10 correct in 
one block of 10 trials (a result that is significant according to a Binomial test 
(with a probability of choosing either side set at 0.5) before transferring 
between experiments.  
 
Subjects that chose the same side over six or move consecutive trials were 
considered to have developed a side bias. To correct for side biases, subjects 
were provided with the training discrimination task, with the baited cup 
presented on the non-preferred side. Subjects were presented with one 10-
trial session per day using this configuration until they selected the baited cup 
(on the non-preferred side) for two consecutive trials. Subjects then reverted 
back to the pseudorandomised testing condition. Corrective trials from the 
training task were not included in the analysis. Testing ceased if a subject 
failed to reach the initial test criterion within 200 trials (20 blocks). Subjects 
that failed to reach criterion in the first task were not presented with a transfer 
task. Testing also ceased for the transfer task if subjects failed to reach 
criterion with fewer errors than their previous task.        
 
To determine whether subjects retained information from their past 
experience with the apparatus, subjects that reached criterion both on their 
initial task and on the transfer task were re-tested with one additional block of 
10 trials on their initial task (Table 5.1: Task 1b). 
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Statistical Analysis 
 
Independent t-tests were used to compare the number of errors for each 
species to reach training criterion. Subjects were considered to have solved 
the tasks if they successfully retrieved the food in either seven consecutive 
correct choices in one block of 10 trials, or nine correct choices in one block 
of 10 trials. A binomial test was used to assess the statistical significance of 
these performance criteria. Alpha was set at 0.05. 
 
 
5.2.2: Results 
 
Training Phase 
 
Both species rapidly solved the training discrimination task. There were no 
significant between-species differences in the number of errors to reach the 
initial training criterion (Figure 5.6); independent t-test, t = 0.736, df = 6, p = 
0.489 (macaws mean = 10.00 ± 3.00 SEM, caiques mean = 7.00 ± 3.00 
SEM).  
 
As there were no between-species differences in errors to reach criterion 
during the training sessions, two individuals from each species were randomly 
assigned to either receive trials commencing with changes to the size of the 
cups (where the gap size remained consistent), or changes to the size of the 
gaps (where the cup size remained consistent). Hence, four individuals (two 
caiques & two macaws) participated in each of the two conditions. There were 
also no significant differences in errors to reach the training criterion between 
the two groups that either began the test trials with cups or gaps; independent 
t-test, t = 1.287, df = 6, p = 0.246 (cups first mean = 11.00 ± 3.00 SEM, gaps 
first mean = 6.00 ± 3.00 SEM). 
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Test and Transfer Phase 
 
Cups Problem 
 
All four subjects that commenced trials with the cups problem reached the 
criterion to transfer to the second task (mean number of errors: 41.00 ± 11.98 
SEM; mean number of trials: 90.50 ± 24.85 SEM; Table 5.1).  
 
Only two individuals in this group (No.4 and Red), however, reached criterion 
in the transfer condition. Of the two birds that reached criterion, one macaw, 
No.4, showed similar performances on both tasks; making 20 errors out of 45 
trials on the first task, and 21 errors out of 68 trials on the second task. 
Hence, No.4 showed no transfer of learned information across tasks. 
However, when re-tested on the first problem, this bird successfully chose the 
correct cup on all 10 trials (p < 0.05 according to a binomial test). One caique, 
Red, spontaneously solved the transfer task. Red made 57 errors out of 133 
trials on the first task, but reached the second criterion without making any 
errors (errors: 0; trials 7; binomial test; p < 0.05). Although trial-by-trial data 
for this bird is not presented in Table 1, this subject chose the correct side for 
its first nine consecutive trials of the transfer task, only choosing the 
unrewarded side only on its 10th trial. Red was then retested on the first 
problem and successfully chose the correct cup on all 10 trials (p < 0.05 
according to a binomial test with a probability of choosing either side set at 
0.5).  
 
Gaps Problem 
 
Only two individuals that commenced trials with the gaps problem 
successfully reached criterion (No.5 and Gold). Of these successful birds, 
No.5 made 24 errors out of 67 trials, and Gold made 10 errors out of 32 trials 
(mean number of errors: 17.00 ± 7.00 SEM; mean number of trials: 49.50 ± 
17.50 SEM; Table 5.1). Two subjects (No.8 and Purple) did not reach the 
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initial task criterion within 200 trials, and therefore were not presented with the 
transfer task. 
 
Of the two subjects that participated in the transfer task, one subject, No.5, 
reached criterion in the transfer task with fewer errors than the initial task 
(Test task: 24 errors in 67 trials; Transfer task: 11 errors in 38 trials; Table 
5.1). While the other successful subject, Gold, rapidly reached criterion in the 
transfer task, it made twice as many errors than on its first task (Test task: 10 
errors in 32 trials; Transfer task: 20 errors out of 46 trials). After reaching 
criterion on the cups transfer problem, two subjects (No.5 and Gold) were 
retested with a further 10 trials on the initial gaps problem (Table:5.1; Task 
1b). Gold made three errors and No.5 made five errors on their first 10 trials 
of this task. Both subjects therefore failed to reach criterion when retested on 
their initial task (binomial test with a probability of choosing either side set at 
0.5; p > 0.05).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Schematic of the Trap Gaps Training and Test apparatus (not to 
scale). ―F‖ indicates a food-reward tray, which can be pulled toward the 
subject via a green string. The Gaps Task can only be solved by attending to 
the large gap, whereas the Cups Task can only be solved by attending to the 
small tray.  
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Figure 5.6. Box and Whisker plot of Inter Quartile Range (25%-75%) and 
median number of errors for each species to reach criterion in the training 
session.  
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Table 5.1. Number of errors to reach a binomially significant criterion for 
groups commencing with the cups task and then transferring to the gaps task 
and vice versa. Total number of trials are presented in parentheses. Task 1b 
shows errors for the first 10 trials. Boxes denoted by a ―+‖ indicates that 
individuals failed to reach criterion within the corresponding number of errors; 
―n/a‖ indicates that subjects were not presented with the transfer test as they 
did not reach criterion for the previous task; ―*‖ indicates that subjects 
reached binomial significance within 10 trials on (p < 0.05).      
 
SUBJECTS TASK 1: Cups TASK 2: Gaps TASK 1b: Cups 
No.2  21 (50) + 33 (100) n/a 
No.4 20 (45) 21 (68) 0* (10) 
Green 66 (134) + 70 (139) n/a 
Red 57 (133) 0* (9) / 1* (10) 0* (10) 
 TASK 1: Gaps TASK 2: Cups TASK 1b: Gaps 
No.5 24 (67) 11 (38) 5 (10) 
No.8 + 91 (202) n/a n/a 
Gold 10 (32) 20 (46) 3 (10) 
Purple + 98 (216) n/a n/a 
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5.2.3: Discussion 
 
While six of eight parrots (three macaws and three caiques) learned to solve 
their initial Trap-Gaps problem, subjects‘ performances to achieve a 
successful criterion varied considerably. Such variable performances suggest 
that the ability to discriminate between the size relationships of the cups and 
gaps was a particularly difficult task for subjects to learn. Four of six birds 
(two macaws and two caiques), however, solved the transfer task; one caique 
spontaneously reached criterion without making any errors, and one macaw 
solved the problem with less than half as many errors than in its initial 
problem. Although two other birds rapidly reached criterion in the transfer task 
(one macaw and one caique), neither demonstrated capacities that were 
superior to their initial performances. The spontaneous performance of one 
subject (Red) on the transfer task may therefore provide tentative evidence 
that parrots possess capacities to transfer learned information across novel 
tasks. Subjects also appear to retain learned information. When subjects 
were retested on ten trials of their original task, two of the four birds that 
reached criterion in the transfer task (one macaw and one caique) solved the 
problem without making any errors.  
 
These experiments demonstrate that both macaws and caiques are capable 
(in some cases) of rapidly learning to solve a complicated means-end 
problem. Such performances suggest that parrots solve problems through 
trial-and-error associative learning; in which the affordances of a problem are 
revealed through repeated experience. Hence, because subjects repeatedly 
made errors before solving their initial task, it appears that solutions to such 
problems were initially achieved without any causal understanding of the 
relationships between the gaps and the cups. Subjects may therefore have 
learned to solve these initial problems by applying a procedural rule that was 
based on an arbitrary cue. Impressively however, when retested on their 
initial task, macaws and caiques could later recall this learned information. 
Such performances suggest that the formation and retention of learned 
procedural rules may be a particularly efficient approach to solving problems 
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within a task-specific context. The striking performance of at least one subject 
however, which spontaneously solved a novel transfer task that had no 
perceptual cues in common with the first task, suggests that parrots may also 
be capable of higher-order cognitive processing, such as rule abstraction. The 
transfer tasks were designed to preclude solutions from simple procedural 
rules that may have been learned during the initial task. Hence, it appears 
that at least one subject solved the transfer task by generalising previously 
learned principles about physical relationships between the cups and gaps 
across tasks. Yet only one of eight parrots demonstrated such capacities. 
While the ability to transfer conceptually learned information across novel 
problems might therefore be considered particularly challenging, the results 
from this study may also be constrained by a small sample size. Hence, such 
capacities may be broadly revealed in subsequent studies that incorporate a 
greater number of subjects.  
 
 
5.3: General Discussion 
 
By presenting non tool-using species with tasks that do not require an ability 
to use tools, but which require an understanding of the physical relationships 
between objects, it may be possible to reveal whether physical cognition has 
evolved as an adaptive specialisation that is restricted to tool-using species, 
or whether physical cognition may be a domain general trait that is shared 
among species that possess relatively large brains. However, many of the 
more subtle intricacies of means-end comprehension in birds may be 
overlooked when interpreting the more elaborate aspects of folk physics. 
Although means-end tasks have been presented to numerous species of 
birds, they were initially designed to assess physical cognition in tool-using 
primates (Klüver, 1933, Köhler, 1927). Hence, success on such tasks in non 
tool-using species of birds may reveal a suite of causal mechanisms that 
have previously been established in primates. For example, it should not be 
taken lightly that birds are capable of understanding the concepts involved 
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when pulling a string and retrieving a reward. Subjects must discriminate 
between lids that are either attached or disconnected to strings, understand 
that a reward resting in a lid can be retrieved by certain motor actions, and 
understand that the actions have to be directed towards the self for the food 
to move within reach. Such tasks may therefore be considered complex and 
challenging, even before assessing subjects‘ abilities to discriminate between 
connectivity and the size of lids or gaps that rewards have to pass through. 
 
The findings presented here reveal that non-tool-using macaws and caiques 
both possess an ability to comprehend means-end object relationships. 
Furthermore, such capacities may be restricted to species that possess a 
relatively large brain size, suggesting that large brains confer capacities for 
sophisticated physical cognition. Results from the Connected problem reveal 
that subjects may possess a spontaneous comprehension of connectivity, 
suggesting that macaws and caiques are capable of understanding the causal 
relationships between objects. While subjects performances on the 
Connected transfer problem were impaired by novel materials, results from 
the more challenging Trap-Gaps paradigm reveal that parrots may be capable 
of using previously learned information to solve subsequent problems through 
rule abstraction. Such results highlight the need to further investigate the 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie animal physical cognition. 
 
Many species can successfully discriminate between vertical or horizontal 
materials that are connected or disconnected to rewards, or rewards that are 
resting on or off materials, for example; apes (Herrmann et al., 2008, Mulcahy 
et al., 2012, Povinelli, 2000), monkeys (Hauser et al., 1999, Hauser et al., 
2002b), parrots (Auersperg et al., 2009, Krasheninnikova et al., 2013, 
Werdenich and Huber, 2006), ravens (Heinrich, 1995a) and elephants (Irie-
Sugimoto et al., 2008). Few species, however, have demonstrated the ability 
to successfully solve a similar means-end task, the Trap-Table problem. In 
this task, subjects are required to rake in a reward while avoiding a trapping 
hole. Hence, like the means end connected problem, subjects must attend to 
a continuous and discontinuous surface. One in six chimpanzees successfully 
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solved this problem in two 10 trial sessions (Povinelli, 2000, p. 137). Hoolock 
gibbons (Hylobates hoolock) also solved the Trap-Table problem, with one 
subject performing successfully from the first trial (Cunningham et al. 2006). 
However, subjects in the above studies were initially provided with training on 
a Trap-Table without a trap. Hence, the successful individuals may have 
solved the problem not through a causal understanding of traps, but due to a 
learnt association between the reward and the continuous surface (a similar 
limitation to the findings for the means-end Connected problem in Section 5.1 
and also Auersperg‘s (2009) study). While vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus 
aethiops) showed some comprehension of the problem, selecting the correct 
no-trap surface on 65% of trials (Santos et al., 2006), capuchin (Fujita et al., 
2003) and tamarin monkeys (Santos et al., 2006) failed to solve the Trap-
Table problem. However, when provided with a single tool, 20 out of 24 apes 
avoided the trap on the first trial, suggesting that they may be sensitive to the 
causal relationships of the task (Girndt et al., 2008). Although it was not clear 
whether the apes in this study had a natural tendency to avoid holes.  
 
While subjects may eventually solve such complex problems by trial-and-error 
learning, the ability to transfer learned information across tasks may be 
particularly challenging. None of the macaws or caiques in the current study 
successfully transferred from familiar to novel materials in the Connected 
problem. Moreover, only one of eight successfully transferred learned 
information to spontaneously solve the Trap-Gaps problem. Mixed results 
have also been reported for similar studies in other species. A similar problem 
to the Trap-Table task is the Trap-Tube task (Seed et al., 2006). While seven 
of eight rooks rapidly solved the Trap-Tube task, only one rook demonstrated 
capacities to understand the causal principles underlying the traps by solving 
a series of transfer tasks that had no visual cues in common (Seed et al., 
2006). Chimpanzees have also demonstrated capacities to solve this problem 
when allowed to move the reward with their fingers (Seed et al., 2009b). 
However, numerous species of parrots have previously failed to avoid the 
traps in this task (Liedtke et al., 2010).  
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Due the functional similarities of the Trap-Tube and Trap-Table tasks, these 
problems have also been used to assess the ability to transfer learned 
information across both tasks. After initially learning to solve either a Trap-
Tube or Trap-Table problem, great apes, however, failed to successfully 
generalise learned information when presented with the corresponding novel, 
but functionally similar transfer task (Martin-Ordas et al., 2008). In contrast, 
three of six New Caledonian crows, revealed capacities to solve a Trap-Tube 
problem, based on an understanding of causal principles (Taylor et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, these successful birds also solved a Trap-Table transfer task 
within 20 trials, whereas the birds that failed to solve the Trap-Tube task also 
failed the Trap-Table task. In a similar study involving Traps and Barriers, 
apes received prior experience with either a Barrier or Trap platform, or a 
non-obstacle platform (Martin-Ordas et al., 2012). When presented with 
subsequent Barrier or Trap transfer problems, apes that had previously 
experienced obstacle platforms outperformed those subjects that initially 
received the non-obstacle platform (Martin-Ordas et al., 2012). Together, 
these findings suggest that rooks (Seed et al., 2006), New Caledonian crows 
(Taylor et al., 2009), apes (Martin-Ordas et al., 2012, Seed et al., 2009b), as 
well caiques and possibly macaws, possess capacities to solve sophisticated 
problems by generalising learned information across novel transfer tasks. 
Such mechanisms may account for the flexible behaviours observed in these 
species, which may result in a domain general intelligence that is shared 
among relatively large brained species.   
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6.0.1: Abstract  
 
Serial reversal learning of colour discriminations was assessed as an index of 
behavioural flexibility in two captive species of Neotropical parrots. Both 
species improved their performances with experience, but no between-
species differences were observed, suggesting similar capacities for flexible 
responses to the alternating reward contingencies. In a second task, the 
mechanisms behind serial reversal learning in parrots were investigated, by 
comparing subjects‘ performances at a low or high pre-reversal training 
criterion. If reversals are solved through processes of associative learning, a 
high pre-reversal training criterion is expected to strengthen learned 
associations and hence impede post-reversal performances. However, highly 
reinforced associations may alternatively be used to generate conditional 
rules that can be generalised across reversals problems, thus rapidly 
improving post-reversal performances. I found that high criterion subjects 
made fewer post-reversal errors than low criterion subjects. Red-shouldered 
macaws and black-headed caiques therefore demonstrate capacities for 
solving reversal problems by applying conditional rules, hence demonstrating 
cognitive, rather than associative, modes of learning. Such performances 
coincide with findings in great apes, but contrast with findings in monkeys and 
prosimians, which generally show impaired reversal performances when 
trained to a highly rigorous pre-reversal criterion. Overall, these findings 
provide empirical support for an evolutionary convergence of behavioural 
flexibility between parrots and non-human great apes. Behavioural flexibility 
may therefore be related to similar socio-ecological variables shared among 
these families.  
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6.0.2: Introduction 
 
While the behaviours of some animals appear to be restricted by inflexible 
stimulus-response action patterns, other animals appear to possess an ability 
to respond flexibly to environmental stimuli by generalising learned 
information to novel situations. For example, corvids (blue jays, rooks, 
jackdaws, and Eurasian jays), monkeys and apes, appear to extract general 
rules to rapidly solve a series of novel, but functionally identical discrimination 
problems, whereas pigeons slowly learn each novel discrimination problem 
anew, suggesting an inability to transfer previous learned information across 
similar problems (Hunter and Kamil, 1971, Wilson et al., 1985). Hence, the 
ability to transfer abstract information across problems appears characteristic 
of certain species, possibly because it is cognitively demanding. Behavioural 
flexibility has therefore been considered as one of the cognitive tools that are 
shared among species which possess particularly large relative brain sizes, 
such as apes, corvids and possibly parrots (Emery and Clayton, 2004a).  
 
Among the methods used to compare behavioural flexibility across species is 
serial reversal learning, as success on this task requires an ability to flexibly 
respond to a fixed set of stimuli with a fluctuating reward regimen (Bond et al., 
2007). Serial reversal learning typically requires subjects to make a binary 
choice discrimination between one colour, which is repeatedly rewarded and 
another colour, which is not. Subjects eventually learn to discriminate 
between the rewarded and non-rewarded colours, after which the reward 
contingencies are reversed (i.e. A+B– becomes A–B+). Reversed 
contingencies therefore require subjects to inhibit responses to previously 
learned associations and re-learn each new association using potentially 
conflicting information. Subjects initially require many trials to successfully 
respond to reversals, but may improve their performances with experience. 
However, as there are no cues to predict when the contingencies have been 
reversed, subjects will make at least one error after each reversal. Hence, an 
optimal performance may eventually be achieved on the second post-reversal 
trial. To do this, subjects have to adopt a win stay–lose shift rule: always try 
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the response that was last rewarded, and if that is no longer rewarded, shift to 
the other response, otherwise stay (Levine, 1959, Levine, 1965). Animals 
may therefore use their previous experience to develop conditional rules that 
enable them to rapidly switch between contingencies; demonstrating an ability 
to   generalise information across reversal problems (Bond et al., 2007, Day 
et al., 1999).  
 
Performances on reversal learning tasks have previously been used to 
quantify differences in learning across a wide variety of species (Bitterman, 
1965). Yet distantly related species possess dramatically different perceptual, 
motivational and morphological traits, which can make direct comparisons of 
their cognitive traits difficult to interpret (Bitterman, 1960, 1965, 1975, Breland 
and Breland, 1961, Macphail, 1982, Warren, 1965, Tomasello and Call, 
1997). One approach that attempts to alleviate such concerns is the 
comparative method (Harvey and Pagel, 1991). Closely related species may 
be expected to share similar physiological and cognitive traits as a result of 
common descent. Hence, by comparing closely related species that differ in 
certain socio-ecological aspects, any cognitive divergences can be attributed 
to contrasts in a species ecology or life history (Balda et al., 1996, Bond et al., 
2003, 2007, Day et al., 1999). Bond and colleagues (2003, 2007), for 
example, used the comparative method to reveal that increased sociality 
among corvids predicts aptitude on a number of cognitive tests; including 
serial reversal learning. Another approach that has been applied specifically 
to serial reversal learning paradigms to reduce the confounds of interspecific 
differences in perception, manual dexterity and motivation, among primates, 
is to standardise each species‘ pre-reversal acquisition performances 
(Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984b). That is, initially training subjects to a certain 
level of correct choices, irrespective of the number of trials that it takes to do 
so, and then comparing subjects‘ immediate performances after the 
contingencies have been reversed. Thus, the structural relationships of 
animal intelligence are assessed rather than making direct comparisons 
based on the absolute number of trials that each species requires to solve a 
certain problem (Bitterman, 1960, Mackintosh, 1988). 
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The extent of pre-reversal training, however, also appears to have contrasting 
influences on the post-reversal performances of different species. Prosimians 
and monkeys, for example, tend to show impaired post-reversal 
performances when trained to a rigorous pre-reversal criterion of 84% correct 
choices, but enhanced post-reversal performances when trained to a low pre-
reversal criterion of 67% correct choices (Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984b). 
Conversely, apes show enhanced performances when trained to a high pre-
reversal criterion and impaired post-reversal performances when trained to a 
low criterion (Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984b). 
 
The impaired post-reversal performances of prosimians and monkeys when 
presented with a high, rather than low, pre-reversal criterion reveals that as 
the strength of the learned associations increases, the ability of these species 
to inhibit responses to previously learned associations decreases (De Lillo 
and Visalberghi, 1994, Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984a, 1984b). This is because 
each previously learned association must first be extinguished and then each 
new association re-learned. Consequently, prosimians and monkeys are 
considered to solve serial reversal problems through associative processes of 
repeated conditioning and extinction (De Lillo and Visalberghi, 1994, 
Rumbaugh, 1970, Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984b). Mixed results have however 
been reported for rhesus monkeys (Essock-Vitale, 1978, Washburn and 
Rumbaugh, 1991) and capuchin monkeys (Rumbaugh, 1970) subjected to 
different testing procedures; although recent studies place capuchin 
performances among those of other monkeys rather than apes (Beren et al., 
2008, De Lillo and Visalberghi, 1994).  
 
Apes, on the contrary, perform better on post-reversal trials when they are 
presented with a high, rather than low, pre-reversal learning criterion (Essock-
Vitale, 1978, Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984a, 1984b). Animals that quickly adjust 
to reversed contingencies can only do so by understanding the underlying 
principles of serial reversals (Shettleworth, 2010). Apes may therefore 
develop a win stay–lose shift rule in response to alternating contingencies 
when subjected to a high learning criterion, but fail to extract this information 
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when presented with a low pre-reversal criterion. Apes are therefore 
considered to demonstrate higher-order learning, as they mediate their post-
reversal responses by means of their pre-reversal experience; hence 
transferring conditional rules across reversals (Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984a, 
1984b).  
 
Such qualitative differences in learning processes among primates suggest 
that the ability to generalise conditional rules across reversal tasks may be 
cognitively demanding as it appears restricted to larger-brained species, such 
as apes (Rumbaugh, 1971). Although I am not aware of any studies that have 
investigated the serial reversal learning performances of parrots or corvids 
using high and low pre-reversal criteria, evidence suggests that both families 
demonstrate flexibility on similar paradigms. Red-billed blue magpies and 
Yellow-crowned Amazon parrots, for instance, outperformed White Leghorn 
chickens, and Bob White quail on serial reversals of a spatial discrimination 
problem (Gossette et al., 1966). Corvids, but not pigeons, also demonstrate 
abilities to solve problems that require the abstraction of a general rule across 
a change of stimuli, such as matching or oddity discriminations (Wilson et al., 
1985) and learning-set problems (Mackintosh, 1988). Corvids also 
demonstrate an ability to positively transfer learned rules between colour and 
spatial serial reversal problems (Bond et al., 2007), and can transfer learned 
information from successive reversals to better solve learning set problems by 
applying a win stay–lose shift strategy (Kamil et al., 1977). Such findings 
suggest that parrots and corvids, along with apes, demonstrate similar 
generalised learning strategies and flexible behaviour.  
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether two species of Neotropical 
parrots are capable of generating flexible behaviours in response to a serial 
reversal-learning paradigm. Parrots are a particularly attractive species for 
investigating such questions as they share with apes and corvids many of the 
socio-ecological precursors associated with complex cognition, such as a 
relatively large brain size, manual dexterity, extractive foraging, longevity and 
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a large, multi-layered social organisation (van Horik and Emery, 2011, van 
Horik et al., 2012). 
 
Two experiments are reported in the current study. In the first experiment, 
red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques were presented with a 
serial reversal learning task and between-species performances were 
compared as a suggested index of behavioural flexibility (Bond et al., 2007). 
As both species possess a similar relative brain size, and live in complex 
social groups, we may expect red-shouldered macaws and black-headed 
caiques to demonstrate similar responses to the alternating contingencies. 
However, between-species differences may also be predicted based on the 
contrasting selection pressures that each species may experience due to 
differences in their natural habitats.  
 
A second experiment was also designed to reveal the psychological 
mechanisms underlying reversal learning in parrots. Here two alternative 
hypotheses are addressed: (1) that parrots only solve reversal problems 
through processes of associative learning and conditioning; and (2) that 
parrots are capable of transferring a conditional rule across serial reversal 
discrimination problems, and may therefore use cognitive, rather than 
associative mechanisms to solve such tasks.  
 
 
6.0.3: General Methods 
 
Apparatus and Training 
 
Two 6 cm diameter plastic lids, of different colours (depending on the 
experiment), were attached to a wooden base (28 cm x 7 cm), and separated 
by 12 cm. Both lids were fixed to hinges and could be manipulated to reveal a 
concealed food reward of crushed Lafeber Nutri-Berries (Figure 6.1). The 
apparatus was initially presented to subjects without lids and with one food-
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well containing food. After subjects fed from the apparatus without hesitation, 
an orange lid was fixed to each of the baited food wells, again with only one 
well baited. To proceed to test, subjects were required to retrieve the 
concealed food by opening the lids at least ten times in one 10min session.     
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects were not food deprived, although testing was conducted in the 
morning prior to their regular feeding schedule. Each subject was provided 
with one session of 10 trials per day. The presentation of rewarded and un-
rewarded coloured lids was counterbalanced and randomly assigned across 
subjects. To prevent the development of side biases, the position of the lids 
(i.e. left or right hand side presentation) was pseudo-randomised within 
sessions so that the lids did not occur on the same side for more than two 
consecutive trials. Each subject was tested individually in a familiar but 
visually isolated enclosure. During testing days, all subjects participated in the 
experiment. During trials, the experimenter attempted to avoid providing 
subjects with any inadvertent cues to the location of the concealed reward by 
holding and presenting the apparatus in a symmetrical fashion and then 
placing his hands behind his back and looking only at the centre of the 
apparatus. Subjects were allowed to upturn one lid per trial and were 
considered to have made a correct choice if they chose the baited lid. If 
subjects upturned the correct lid, they were allowed to retrieve the food 
reward. However, if subjects upturned the un-baited lid, then the apparatus 
was immediately removed. If subjects failed to retrieve the baited lid on one 
trial, the succeeding trials followed the predetermined pseudorandomised 
order. The apparatus was re-baited out of view of the subject. Subjects that 
chose the same side over six consecutive trials in one block were considered 
to have developed a side bias. To correct for side biases, I presented the 
baited lid on the non-preferred side until the subject chose the baited side for 
two consecutive trials. Trials then reverted to the original pseudo-randomised 
configuration. Corrected and non-corrected trials were combined for analysis. 
I recorded all trials with a digital camcorder (JVC Everio, Model No. GZ-
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MG645BEK, Malaysia) and scored the number of errors to reach criterion for 
each reversal.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
All data were assessed with Shapiro-Wilk‘s and Levene‘s tests and met 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance for parametric 
analysis. Between-species comparisons of the number of trials to reach the 
initial colour association (CA) criterion were assessed using Independent t-
tests. The number of trials to reach the CA and first reversal (R1) criterion in 
Experiment 1 were compared with a paired t-test. The number of trials to 
reach the CA criteria for the High and Low groups were compared using an 
independent t-test. As any effects of extinction were expected to be most 
prominent in the initial post-reversal trials (Bond et al., 2007), between-
species differences in errors for the first 10 post-reversal trials across 
subsequent reversals were assessed with a Repeated measures ANOVA. 
Planned within subjects‘ comparisons were performed using Paired t-tests. All 
analyses were two-tailed and conducted in SPSS (SPSS for Mac OS X, 
2007). 
 
 
6.1: Between-species Comparisons of Serial Reversal Learning 
Performances 
 
6.1.1: Methods 
 
Apparatus  
 
The same apparatus as the training sessions was used but with novel 
coloured lids, one green and one blue (Figure 6.1). 
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Procedure 
 
Subjects were presented with one block of 10 trials per day. Once subjects 
reached a predetermined criterion of seven consecutive correct trials in one 
block of 10 trials (significant according to a binomial test with a probability of 
choosing either side set at 0.5), they were immediately presented with a block 
of 10 trials with reversed contingencies (i.e. S+ becomes S–). Each subject 
was presented with as many blocks as required to reach eight serial 
reversals.  
 
 
6.1.2: Results 
 
There were no significant differences in the total number of trials that each 
subject participated in, between macaws (mean = 503.75 ± 67.38 SEM) and 
caiques (mean = 554.75 ± 47.46 SEM): Independent t-test; t = 0.619, df = 6, p 
= 0.559. No between-species differences in the number of trials to reach 
criterion were revealed for the initial CA trials (Figure 6.2); Independent t-test; 
t = 1.817, df = 6, p = 0.119, (macaws mean = 28 ± 3.94 SEM; caiques mean 
= 41 ± 5.97 SEM). However, these findings are constrained a low sample size 
(Observed Power = 0.33), suggesting that a significant result may be 
revealed with additional subjects. Macaws may therefore have reached CA 
criterion in significantly fewer trials than caiques if more subjects participated 
in this study. The number of initial post-reversal blocks where subjects 
developed a side bias were as follows (R1 represents the first reversal; R8 
represents the last reversal): Macaws; No.2 (R1), No.4 (R7, R8), No.5 (R5), 
No.8 (R2, R6, R7), Caiques; Green (R2, R4, R6), Gold (R5), Purple (R5, R6, 
R8), Red (R3, R6). 
 
Because there were no significant between-species differences in the number 
of trials to reach the CA criterion, subjects were pooled and the cumulative 
number of trials to reach CA (mean = 34.5 ± 4.12 SEM) and R1 criterion 
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(mean = 67.75 ± 7.80 SEM) were compared. Subjects reached criterion with 
significantly fewer trials in the initial CA condition than compared to the R1 
condition (Figure 6.2); Paired t-test, t = 3.567, df = 7, p = 0.009.  
 
Analysis of the number of errors in the first 10 post-reversal trials across 
serial reversals (R1-R8) showed no significant effect of species (Figure 6.3); 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F1,6 = 2.647, p = 0.155, and no significant 
reversal x species interaction; Repeated measures ANOVA, F7,42 = 1.874, p = 
0.098, suggesting that both species‘ serial reversal performances were similar 
(Figure 6.3). 
 
There was however a significant within subjects effect of reversal (Figure 6.3); 
Repeated measures ANOVA, F7,42 = 2.550, p = 0.028, although a planned 
within subjects comparison between the first reversal (R1; mean = 7.63 ± 
0.67 SEM) and the last reversal (R8; mean = 6.50 ±  0.45 SEM ) did not 
reveal any significant differences in errors; Paired t-test, t = 1.468, df = 7, p = 
0.185, suggesting that subjects performances may have improved, but not 
consistently with experience.  
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Figure 6.1: (a) a red-shouldered macaw and (b) a black-headed caique 
performing a discrimination trial on the Serial Reversal Learning apparatus.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Experiment 1. Mean number of trials (± SEM) to reach reversal 
criterion for the colour association (CA) and first reversal (R1) conditions, for 
macaws and caiques.    
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Figure 6.3: Experiment 1. Mean number of errors (± SEM) for (a) pooled 
subjects and (b) macaws and caiques, for the first 10 post reversal trials 
across eight successive colour reversals (R1-R8).  
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6.1.3: Discussion 
 
In Experiment 1, the serial reversal learning performances of two species of 
parrots were compared as a suggested index of behavioural flexibility (Bond 
et al., 2007). Both species showed comparable performances during the CA 
trials and across eight serial reversals. Although there were no statistical 
differences in reversal performances between species, macaws generally 
required fewer trials than caiques to reach criterion during the initial CA trials. 
Any between-species differences may have therefore been revealed by using 
a larger sample size. Both species, however, required more trials to reach 
criterion during first reversal than compared to the CA problem. These 
findings suggest that previously learned associations initially impaired 
subjects‘ reversal performances. Both species therefore required trial and 
error experience of the reversed contingencies to first extinguish the 
previously learned associations and then re-learn each following association 
anew.  
 
Although subjects‘ performances between the first and last reversals (R1 and 
R8) were similar, a within subjects improvement in errors across reversals 
was revealed, suggesting that macaws and caiques may use their previous 
reversal experience to mediate their subsequent responses. These findings 
correspond with those of previous studies, where the ability to rapidly recover 
from reversed contingencies has been interpreted as an index of behavioural 
flexibility (Bond et al., 2007, Day et al., 1999).   
 
To further investigate behavioural flexibility in parrots, I presented subjects 
with a second experiment that was designed to reveal the psychological 
mechanisms underlying reversal learning. As no between-species differences 
in reversal learning performances were observed, I decided to pool subjects 
and randomly assign individuals from both species into one of two conditions 
that required either a high or low learning criterion of successful 
discriminations prior to each reversal. High criterion subjects were therefore 
exposed to a more rigorous pairing of the colour associations and hence were 
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expected to be confronted with greater interference during their post-reversal 
trials; requiring a greater number of trials to extinguish and then re-learn each 
new contingency. By contrast, subjects exposed to a low criterion were 
provided with the minimal number of trials required to reach binomial 
significance, and therefore are expected to experience less interference 
during post-reversal trials. 
 
Hence, if parrots only use associative learning to solve each reversal 
problem, then I predict subjects in the high criterion condition to make more 
errors than low criterion subjects. Conversely, if subjects in the high criterion 
condition solve post-reversals with fewer errors than low criterion subjects, 
then there must be some transfer of abstract information across reversals.  
 
 
6.2: The Mechanisms Underlying Serial Reversal Learning  
 
6.2.1: Methods 
 
Subjects, Apparatus and Training 
 
The same subjects and general procedures as in Experiment 1 were used, 
however, in this experiment novel coloured lids; either pink with a green circle 
sticker, or yellow with orange circle sticker were introduced. The colour of the 
rewarded lids was counterbalanced across subjects.   
 
Procedure 
 
As no between-species differences were observed in Experiment 1, subjects 
were pooled and individuals from each species were randomly assigned into 
either High or Low Criterion conditions. Each session consisted of up to 20 
trials.  
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The High Criterion group (No.4, No.5, Green & Red) were presented with 
reversals once they scored at least 19/20 correct choices in one 20 trial 
session. Conversely, the Low Criterion group (No.2, No.8, Gold & Purple) 
were presented with reversals once they achieved either: 15 correct choices 
in one 20 trial session, 7 consecutive correct choices in the first 10 trials of 
one session, 9/10 correct choices in either the first or last 10 trials of a 20 trial 
session, or 10 consecutive correct choices within one 20 trial session. The 
Low Criterion group included a number of different pre-reversal criteria to 
ensure that the number of trials subjects required to reach each learned 
association was minimised and hence subjects were not over-trained. All 
criteria were significant according to a binomial test, with a probability of 
choosing either side set at 0.5, and alpha set at 0.05. Subjects were 
presented with as many trials as required to reach 11 reversals.    
 
If subjects reached criterion within one 20 trial session, they were immediately 
presented with one reversal session. On two occasions, subjects (No.8 and 
Gold) reached a second criterion within their first post-reversal session. On 
these occasions I did not provide a further post-reversal session and resumed 
testing on the following day. Subjects were therefore presented with up to a 
maximum of 40 trials per day. These procedures attempted to maintain 
motivation by prohibiting subjects from becoming satiated on rewards. Side 
biases were corrected for, and included in the analysis as in Experiment 1. I 
ceased testing individual subjects once they had participated in 11 reversals. 
All trials were coded live but digitally recorded for subsequent analysis if 
required. 
 
 
6.2.2: Results 
 
There were no significant differences in the total number of trials that each 
subject participated in, between Low (mean = 744.75 ± 24.87 SEM) and High 
(mean = 695 ± 28.72 SEM) Criterion groups: Independent t-test; t = 1.309, df 
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= 6, p = 0.238. There were no significant differences in the number of trials to 
reach criterion for the initial CA trials between Low Criterion (mean = 72.75 ± 
23.86 SEM) and High Criterion groups (mean = 75 ± 9.57 SEM; Figure 6.4); 
Independent t-test; t = 0.088, df = 6, p = 0.933. The number of initial blocks 
where subjects developed a side bias are as follows: High Criterion; No.4 
(R4, R10), No.5 (R4, R5), Green (R6), Red (R1), Low Criterion; No.2 (R3), 
No.8 (R1, R2, R7, R10, R11), Gold (R4, R5, R9, R10, R11), Purple (R2, R3, 
R7, R10, R11). 
 
Analysis of errors in the first 10 post reversal trials across successive 
reversals (R1-R11) showed a significant effect of condition, with the High 
Criterion group making fewer errors in the first 10 post reversal trials across 
successive reversals than the Low Criterion group (Fig. 6.5); Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F1, 6 = 23.133, p = 0.003. There was no significant 
reversal x criterion interaction; Repeated measures ANOVA, F10, 60 = 1.635, p 
= 0.119. 
 
There was however a significant within-subjects effect of reversal; Repeated 
measures ANOVA, F10, 60 = 4.404, p < 0.001. A planned comparison of R1 
and R11 performances revealed a significant reduction in errors across 
reversals for the High Criterion group (R1 mean = 7.75 ± 0.95; R11 = mean 3 
± 0.00 SEM); Paired t-test, t = 5.019, df = 3, p = 0.015, but not for the Low 
Criterion group (R1 mean = 7.75 ± 0.75; R11 mean = 5.75 ± 0.48 SEM); 
Paired t-test, t = 2.449, df = 3, p = 0.092.  
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Figure 6.4: Experiment 2. Mean number of trials (± SEM) to reach criterion 
for the Colour Association (CA) task, for High Criterion and Low Criterion 
conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Experiment 2. Mean number of errors (± SEM) for the first 10 post 
reversal trials across eleven successive colour reversals (R1-R11), for Low 
and High Criterion conditions.  
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6.2.3: Discussion 
 
In Experiment 2, the psychological mechanisms underlying reversal learning 
in parrots were investigated. As there were no between-species differences in 
reversal performances in Experiment 1, all subjects were pooled and 
randomly assigned to either High or Low Criterion groups. Subjects in the 
High Criterion group made fewer post-reversal errors than subjects in the Low 
Criterion group. The High Criterion group thus improved their performances 
across subsequent reversals, whereas there was no apparent effect of 
learning for subjects in the Low Criterion group.  
 
It therefore appears that the High Criterion group used the enhanced 
associative strength of the learned contingencies to generate a conditional 
win stay–lose shift rule to rapidly respond to subsequent reversals. The Low 
Criterion group on the other hand, failed to generate such concepts and 
hence required a greater number of trials to first extinguish the previously 
learned associations and then re-learn new discriminations through 
processes of conditioning. Overall, these results support our second 
hypothesis; that parrots are capable of transferring learned information across 
serial reversal discrimination problems, and may therefore use higher order 
cognitive mechanisms, such as rule abstraction, to flexibly solve such tasks. 
 
 
6.3: General Discussion 
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from these results. The first is that 
macaws and caiques appear to show similar capacities to respond to 
alternating contingencies in a serial reversal learning task, and hence 
behavioural flexibility. Second, it appears that parrots, like corvids and apes, 
differ from pigeons, monkeys and prosimians in their ability to generate 
conditional rules to flexibly solve reversal problems.  
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Subjects trained to low pre-reversal criteria showed no improvements in their 
performances across reversals. When presented with reversed contingencies, 
each previously learned association required a number of trials before it was 
lost through extinction. Each new association then required further trials to re-
learn through conditioning. Hence, at a low criterion, reversed contingencies 
appeared to be learned through associative processes. Conversely, when 
presented with a high pre-reversal criterion, subjects made fewer post-
reversal errors across successive reversals. Rather than being impaired by 
the increased strength of the conditioned associations, subjects rapidly 
learned to respond to the alternating contingencies. Such findings suggest 
that parrots may understand the conditional principles underlying serial 
reversals. These results are also consistent with reversal performances of 
other large-brained species, such as the great apes; in contrast to monkeys 
and prosimians (Essock-Vitale, 1978, Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984a, 1984b), 
suggesting that the ability to rapidly respond to serial reversals when trained 
to a highly rigorous pre-reversal learning criterion may be a trait shared 
among species with particularly large brains. 
 
Rumbaugh (1995) argues that great apes, because of their ability to transfer 
abstract information across reversal tasks, are capable of mediating their 
behaviour through more cognitively demanding modes of learning than 
monkeys and prosimians. Such findings also correspond with species‘ 
encephalisation coefficients (Jerison, 1973, Rumbaugh and Pate, 1984b), 
suggesting a link between relative brain size and behavioural flexibility. 
Further evidence of generalised learning strategies, demonstrated by the 
positive transfer of information across serial reversal or learning set tasks 
involving disparate stimulus dimensions (i.e. space and colour), also support 
our findings. For example, chimpanzees and a number of species of 
macaques (reviewed in Macphail, 1982) and corvids (Bond et al., 2007, 
Gossette et al., 1966, Kamil et al., 1977, Mackintosh, 1988, Wilson et al., 
1985) rapidly develop generalised learning strategies, whereas rats, cats, and 
pigeons do not (Durlach and Mackintosh, 1986, Macintosh et al., 1968, 
MacKintosh and Holgate, 1969, Warren, 1966). More recently however, 
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pigeons have been shown to adopt a win stay–lose shift rule when presented 
with a midsession reversal task involving short inter-trial intervals (Rayburn-
Reeves et al., 2013); although short inter-trial intervals have long been 
recognised to enhance serial reversal learning performances (Stretch et al., 
1964).    
 
It is possible, albeit unlikely, that the High Criterion group produced fewer 
post reversal errors due to an Overtraining Reversal Effect (ORE). First 
observed by Reid (1953), the ORE is a phenomenon where overtraining on 
discrimination problems enhances post-reversal performances. Reid (1953) 
presented rats with a black-white discrimination problem in a Y maze. All of 
the rats were initially trained to a specific criterion, and then separated into 
three conditions depending on the amount of their post-criterion training. Rats 
exposed to increasingly rigorous training regimes made fewer post-reversal 
errors. Such findings are considered paradoxical as overtraining, according to 
classical learning theory, is predicted to increase the excitatory strength of S+ 
and inhibitory strength of S– and thus impede extinction when contingencies 
are reversed (Hull, 1943, Spence, 1956). Although ORE is commonly 
observed in rat studies, it is rarely reported in monkeys (Essock-Vitale, 1978, 
Sutherland and Mackintosh, 1971), with the exception of one account from 
stump-tailed macaques (Schrier, 1974). Typically, when presented with 
increasing numbers of acquisition trials, monkeys show impaired post 
reversal performances and do not improve with subsequent experience. Like 
monkeys, overtraining has also been reported to impair reversal 
performances in birds, such as myna (Gossette, 1969), chicks (Mackintosh, 
1965, Warren et al., 1960), pigeons and Japanese quail (Gonzalez et al., 
1966), suggesting that in these species, the ability to learn each new 
contingency is governed by processes of association and extinction. 
However, it has been suggested that post-reversal performances typical of an 
ORE should not only be highest following overtraining, but that performances 
on early post-reversal trials should also be lowest following overtraining 
(Sutherland and Mackintosh, 1971, pp. 258-261). Hence, in contrast to 
monkeys and the aforementioned species of birds, the improved 
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performances of great apes when presented with high training criterions are 
not considered typical of an ORE as high criterions facilitate apes‘ 
performances during both early and late post-reversal trials (Essock-Vitale, 
1978). In the current study, subjects in the High Criterion condition showed a 
significant reduction in errors across subsequent reversals, while subjects in 
the Low Criterion condition did not improve their performances. If these 
findings were due to an ORE, we might also expect subjects in the High 
Criterion condition to perform significantly worse than Low Criterion subjects 
during initial reversals. However, performances on the first 10 post-reversal 
trials across the first three reversals were comparable for both Low and High 
Criterion subjects (see R1-R3; Figure 6.5), revealing that subjects were not 
initially impaired by the different reversal criteria. These findings therefore 
suggest that subjects‘ performances in the High Criterion condition were 
unlikely to be a result of an ORE.   
 
The performances of parrots in the High Criterion condition also appear to 
support a relationship between brain size and behavioural flexibility, 
suggesting that large brains afford a selective advantage when responding to 
unusual, novel or complex socio-ecological challenges. For instance, large 
brains may provide a foundation for novel or altered behaviours, which may 
be applied to solve an array of problems through domain general cognitive 
processes (Sol, 2009). Moreover, the rationale that relatively large brains are 
found across phylogenetically distinct species, suggests that certain cognitive 
traits may have evolved independently among several vertebrate groups that 
share similar socio-ecological selection pressures (van Horik et al., 2012).  
 
Indeed brain size appears to be a good proxy for the ability of species to 
flexibly respond to environmental change and hence fluctuations in resource 
abundance. As such, brain size positively correlates with the ability of species 
to accommodate habitat change (Shultz et al., 2005), climatic change 
(Schuck-Paim et al., 2008), invade novel environments (Sol and Lefebvre, 
2000, Sol et al., 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008) and generate innovative foraging 
behaviours (Lefebvre et al., 2004, 1997, Reader and Laland, 2002). Hence, 
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large brains may be particularly advantageous in complex environments or 
habitats that are novel or likely to change.  
 
Given that red-shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques naturally 
inhabit contrasting environments (Juniper and Parr, 2003), such differences 
do not appear to have resulted in any obvious divergences in their abilities to 
respond flexibly to a serial reversal paradigm. Both macaws and caiques, 
however, possess a similar relative brain size (Iwaniuk et al., 2005), and 
share a complex social organisation characterised by long-term pair bonded 
relationships and fission-fusion foraging groups (Juniper and Parr, 2003). 
Similarities in the complexity of their social relationships, rather than habitat or 
foraging niche, may therefore promote behavioural flexibility in these species.   
 
Social complexity has long been considered to play an important role in the 
evolution of a flexible and intelligent mind (Social Intelligence Hypothesis: 
Humphrey, 1976), with social group size and neocortex size corresponding 
positively in primates (Dunbar, 1998), ungulates (Shultz and Dunbar, 2006) 
and cetaceans (Marino, 1996). Brain size, however, also correlates positively 
in birds and mammals that form stable or pair-bonded relationships (Dunbar 
and Shultz, 2007, Emery et al., 2007, Shultz and Dunbar, 2007). Species that 
live in stable social groups, in contrast to more solitary or asocial species, 
may therefore develop particular cognitive adaptations to accommodate for 
the additional complexities that arise from maintaining relationships and 
interpreting others‘ behaviours. For example, primates that live in groups 
characterised by high fission-fusion social dynamics, demonstrate enhanced 
inhibitory control (another proposed index of behavioural flexibility), in 
contrast to species that live in more cohesive groups. Fission-fusion societies 
may therefore promote cognitive adaptations that result in greater behavioural 
flexibility; independent of phylogenetic relatedness or feeding ecology (Amici 
et al., 2008). Serial reversal learning also involves inhibitory control, as it 
requires an ability to restrain responses to previously reinforced stimuli, and 
instead flexibly direct behaviours towards potentially unrewarded alternatives. 
Hence, it has been suggested that serial reversal learning also bears 
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resemblance to the demands of a complex social system (Bond et al., 2007). 
Comparative research on corvids provides support for such suggestions by 
revealing that variation in serial reversal performances is best explained by 
social complexity, rather than ecological or spatial complexity (Bond et al., 
2007). Certainly, the reversal learning performances among the two species 
of social parrots reported here appear to support such claims. Moreover, 
social corvids have been found to outperform more solitary corvid species on 
other cognitive tasks that require flexibility, such as transitive inference (Bond 
et al., 2003). Hence, social living may also promote cognitive adaptations that 
favour an individual‘s ability to interpret, predict and flexibly respond to the 
subtle intricacies of others‘ behaviours. 
 
Although some socio-ecological contexts may be more influential than others, 
it is likely that there are a number of selection pressures acting on cognitive 
evolution. Yet familiar to each challenge is the construction of new or altered 
behavioural patterns (Sol, 2009). Behavioural flexibility may therefore 
represent a domain general trait that is shared among species that possess a 
relatively large brain size. Indeed, flexibility has been suggested as one of the 
fundamental cognitive tools that arose as a result of the evolution of complex 
cognition in corvids and apes (Emery and Clayton, 2004a). Overall, these 
findings provide further empirical support of an evolutionary convergence of 
behavioural flexibility between distantly related species that possess relatively 
large brains. 
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7.1.0: General Conclusions  
 
Despite many similarities in their biology, life histories and socio-ecology, red-
shouldered macaws and black-headed caiques were found to display 
differences in their social dynamics (Chapter 2) and have contrasting 
propensities to interact with objects (Chapter 3). Macaws invest more time in 
affiliative behaviours, such as allopreening, and were observed to spend 
more time in social groups than compared to caiques. Conversely, caiques 
spent more time engaged in solitary behaviours but demonstrated relatively 
low levels of object neophobia and were highly explorative of objects. Such 
differences may correspond with particular socio-ecological selection 
pressures that each species experience in their contrasting natural 
environments. Macaws naturally inhabit open homogeneous wooded 
environments that are characterised by a stable supply of resources. Caiques 
by contrast inhabit dense, heterogeneous, closed canopy forest, in which the 
availability of particular resources may fluctuate more widely (Juniper and 
Parr, 2003, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002). Differences in each species‘ 
natural habitats may promote different socio-ecological selection pressures, 
which correspond with differences in behaviours. Macaws, for example, may 
invest more in affiliative behaviours, because an enhanced strength of pair-
bonded relationships may be required to aid coordination and cooperation to 
raise offspring (Emery et al., 2007). Conversely, caiques may be particularly 
explorative of objects due to the requirements of adopting generalised 
foraging strategies that are necessary to acquire or extract food in their 
particular environment (Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 
2002, Webster and Lefebvre, 2000). However, as little is known about the 
behaviours of these species in the wild, such speculation must be interpreted 
cautiously. Without comparing a greater variety of species, it may also be 
difficult to interpret whether such behavioural differences are solely driven by 
differences in each species respective niches. Yet, irrespective of these 
behavioural and ecological differences, macaws and caiques demonstrated 
comparable performances on a series of tasks that assessed physical and 
social cognition, such as four innovative foraging tasks (Chapter 4), two 
means-ends reasoning tasks (Chapter 5) and two serial reversal learning 
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tasks (Chapter 6). Moreover, these species also reveal performances that are 
similar to other large-brained species of parrots, corvids and apes).  
 
Different selection pressures are likely to correspond with particular adaptive 
specialisations to solve challenges that animals face within their respective 
environments (Shettleworth, 2010). A classic example of this is found among 
food-storing bird species that rely on maintaining a consistent supply of 
resources may benefit from adaptive specialisations that help enhance their 
foraging success (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998). Social or physical cognition 
may have therefore evolved as a domain specific adaptation to particular 
socio-ecological selection pressures that a common ancestor of parrots 
experienced. However, the contrasting life history traits of red-shouldered 
macaws and black-headed caiques do not appear to have influenced their 
abilities to solve a variety of cognitively demanding tasks. Hence, the notion 
that social cognition is enhanced in social species, or species that naturally 
use tools possess advanced physical cognition, may oversimplify such 
relationships. Adaptive specialisations can be flexible with respect to the 
current environmental conditions (Pravosudov and Clayton, 2001). Findings 
reported in this thesis suggest that advanced cognitive abilities may be 
generalised across social and physical domains, through processes of 
behavioural flexibility, and hence result in capacities for a domain general 
intelligence. Such results may complement findings from recent studies 
suggesting that the spontaneous and insightful comprehension of problems 
requiring an understanding of tools is not limited to species that naturally use 
tools in the wild (Auersperg et al., 2011, 2012, Bird and Emery, 2009a). The 
relatively large brain size of parrots and possibly corvids may have evolved in 
response to particular socio-ecological challenges. Such cognitive 
specialisations may allow animals to rapidly respond to a variety of domain 
specific problems through processes of behavioural flexibly. This ability to 
flexibility respond to a variety of challenges may then be extended across 
specific domains to afford capacities for a domain general intelligence (Emery 
and Clayton, 2004a).  
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7.1.1: Are innovative behaviours influenced by different propensities for 
object exploration & neophobia? 
 
In Chapter 4, macaws and caiques revealed broad capacities to solve a 
series of innovative foraging problems. Both species rapidly learned to inhibit 
prepotent actions towards a clearly visible, but inaccessible food reward that 
was placed behind a clear Perspex barrier, and instead focussed their 
attention towards manipulating peripheral, but functional, components of the 
tasks. These findings suggest that parrots possess a degree of behavioural 
flexibility to overcome such problems. While all individuals from both species 
solved each task, there were no apparent between-species differences in the 
durations and types of functional or non-functional manipulations required to 
retrieve the rewards. However, as relative brain size and rates of innovative 
behaviours correlate positively among birds and primates (Lefebvre et al., 
1997, 2002, 2004, Reader and Laland, 2002), macaws and caiques might be 
expected to show comparable performances due to their comparable, and 
relatively large, brain size (Iwaniuk et al., 2005). 
 
This study reveals that capacities for innovative foraging behaviours, at least 
within these particular tasks and species, do not differ between two species of 
parrots that have contrasting predispositions to interact with objects (Chapter 
3). Macaws are highly neophobic of objects, whereas caiques are highly 
explorative of objects. Yet, numerous studies suggest that neophobia inhibits 
innovative behaviours in animals in the wild, such as birds (Bouchard et al., 
2007, Seferta et al., 2001, Webster and Lefebvre, 2000, 2001), primates (Day 
et al., 2003) and hyenas (Benson-Amram and Holekamp, 2012). However, 
findings from this study support the view that neophobia and neophillia may 
have little overall influence on innovative rates once animals become 
habituated to certain problems after repeated exposure (Benson-Amram et 
al., 2013). These findings also reveal that the mechanisms underlying 
innovative behaviours in individuals do not necessarily correspond with 
certain species-wide predispositions towards interacting with objects. For 
example, dietary generalists may be relatively more explorative of objects as 
a requirement of their natural foraging repertoires. Yet, findings reported here 
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suggest that dietary generalists and specialists, that possess a similar relative 
brain size, may reveal comparable propensities for innovative behaviours. 
One explanation that may account for the contrasting findings observed in this 
study, compared to the wild, is the natural frequency that animals are 
repeatedly exposed to novel objects. In the wild, neophobic animals may 
easily avoid repeated exposure to novelty. Animals confined to captivity, on 
the other hand, may not easily avoid such experiences. Hence, animals in 
captivity may habituate to novelty more rapidly, and therefore be more likely 
to interact with novel objects more frequently, than animals in the wild.   
 
Although there were no obvious differences in innovative performances 
between individuals of different dominance ranks, an alternative explanation 
suggests that innovative behaviours are generated by certain motivational 
factors, such as a necessity to innovate to avoid competitive displacement 
from higher ranking individuals which dominate clumped resources (Thornton 
and Samson, 2012). Certainly low ranking caiques (Purple and Green) 
interacted with a greater variety of objects than high ranking caiques in a 
social setting (Chapter 3; 3.2). While the current study assessed solitary 
innovative behaviours, subsequent investigations that assess innovative 
behaviours in a controlled social setting may reveal further evidence to 
support such claims.  
 
7.1.2: Do different propensities for object exploration influence an 
understanding of object relationships?   
 
To investigate whether parrots are capable of comprehending physical object 
relationships, and whether different propensities for object exploration 
influence their understanding of object relationships, two Means-End tasks 
were presented to subjects (Chapter 5). The first Means-End task revealed 
that parrots could spontaneously pull strings and cloths to retrieve an 
otherwise out-of-reach reward. Moreover, parrots also showed spontaneous 
goal directed behaviours by discriminating between rewarded, rather than 
unrewarded materials. When using familiar materials, macaws and caiques 
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also discriminated between connected and disrupted problems. However, 
subjects‘ performances were impaired when they were presented with 
unfamiliar materials. 
 
Macaws and caiques demonstrated comparable performances to other 
species of parrots (Auersperg et al., 2009) and apes (Herrmann et al., 2008, 
Mulcahy et al., 2012) on these initial tasks. Yet their performances on a 
transfer task were relatively poor in comparison to those of apes, which could 
successfully solve tasks when presented with unfamiliar materials (Herrmann 
et al., 2008, Mulcahy et al., 2012). Prior experience of tools and materials, as 
found in some non tool-using primates on similar Means-End tasks (Hauser et 
al., 2002b, Spaulding and Hauser, 2005), therefore appears to influence 
subjects‘ subsequent performances. Yet, no differences in the comprehension 
of object relationships were observed between macaws, which are highly 
neophobic of objects, and caiques, which are highly explorative of objects 
(Chapter 3). Although caiques have a greater interest, per se, in manipulating 
objects, their capacities to understand object relationships remain similar to 
those of macaws.  
 
In a second novel Means-End task, the Trap-Gaps problem, macaws and 
caiques also showed comparable performances, although they required many 
trials before learning to solve their initial task. However, one caique 
spontaneously solved a novel transfer task, suggesting that it transferred 
relevant learned information from its previous experience of the initial task, 
across a functionally analogous, but novel, problem. One macaw also rapidly 
solved the transfer task, albeit not spontaneously (11 errors in 38 trials). 
These findings suggest that some caiques, and possibly some macaws, 
possess sophisticated capacities to generalise learned information across 
novel problems (Chapter 5) in this cognitive domain. Yet the spontaneous 
performance of one caique may also provide tentative evidence to suggest 
that caiques are more attentive to object relationships than macaws. 
However, with such limited sample sizes it remains difficult to support such 
conclusions without further testing. Future studies that incorporate larger 
numbers of subjects may therefore reveal more reliable conclusions.       
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7.1.3: Does Serial Reversal Learning Performance Correspond With 
Social Complexity?  
 
Serial Reversal Learning has previously been considered as an index of 
behavioural flexibility, which may be particularly relevant to animals that 
require an ability to rapidly respond to complex social dynamics (Bond et al., 
2007). Some of the most pronounced differences between macaws and 
caiques were revealed through detailed behavioural observations of their 
social interactions (Chapter 2). While the durations and frequencies of self-
preening behaviours of macaws and caiques appear similar, caiques do not 
seem to preen others more than they preen themselves, whereas macaws 
preen others much more frequently than themselves. Consequently, macaws 
spend much more time than caiques engaging in affiliative behaviours 
(Chapter 2). Macaws were also observed in pairs more frequently than 
caiques, and spent more time in collective groups of four individuals than 
caiques (Chapter 2). By contrast, caiques were more frequently observed to 
engage in solitary behaviours, although they engaged in social play more 
frequently than macaws. When exploring objects, macaws generally 
approached items together as a group of four individuals (Chapter 3). 
Conversely, certain individual caiques (usually low ranking subordinates) 
were the first to interact with objects.  
 
Overall findings suggest that macaws may be more social than caiques. Like 
other social, relatively large-brained species of birds, such as corvids, 
macaws may therefore be predicted to out-perform less social caiques on 
tasks that are associated with social complexity (Bond et al., 2003, 2007). 
Certainly there was some evidence, albeit a non-significant result due to a low 
sample size, that macaws learned an initial colour association and a 
subsequent reversal of these contingencies in fewer trials than caiques 
(Chapter 6). However, both macaws and caiques displayed similar Serial 
Reversal Learning performances, and also appeared to show capacities for 
flexible behaviours when trained to a particularly high learning criterion 
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(Chapter 6; 6.2). Macaws and caiques use highly reinforced associations to 
generate higher-order conditional rules to respond to alternating rewarded 
contingencies, rather than re-learning each reversal by lower-level processes 
of association and extinction. Irrespective of differences in the complexity of 
their social relationships, macaws and caiques appear to show comparable 
performances on Serial Reversal Learning tasks that have previously been 
linked to social complexity. The comparable, relatively large, brain-size of 
these subjects may therefore afford such behavioural flexibility.    
 
7.2: Limitations of these experiments 
 
One major constraint associated with this research, and other comparative 
studies, is the limited number of subjects used in each study. While it may be 
possible to identify some of the more fundamental characteristics of these two 
species when using a small sample size, subtle between-species differences 
may be lost due to within-species individual variation. A limited selection of 
subjects also relies on the compliance of certain individuals who are less 
motivated to participate in experiments. Individuals within each species often 
revealed dramatic variation in their performances and it was often difficult to 
acquire data from all subjects. Hence, with a much larger sample size, 
possibly 9-11 birds per group, these findings are likely to have been more 
robust and informative. Another constraint associated with a small sample 
size is the necessity to interpret all findings cautiously, as it is difficult to 
generalise the behaviours of only a few individuals to make broad species-
wide comparisons, particularly between captive and wild species.  
 
The above limitations, associated with small sample sizes, were however 
unavoidable. These studies were restricted to only four birds per species as a 
consequence of the available funding, the number of individuals that could be 
acquired from registered breeders, the space available for testing and the 
time required to individually test each bird. Parrots are also expensive 
animals to purchase and require much investment to maintain, both financially 
and socially.  
Chapter 7: General Conclusions 
 257 
 
In light of these limitations, similar studies, that use comparably small sample 
sizes, have reported striking findings (Bird and Emery, 2009a, Cheke et al., 
2011, Seed et al., 2006). Parrots are however an excellent family to 
investigate physical and social cognition because they are highly social, 
inquisitive and enjoy the company of human experimenters.   
 
7.3: Future Directions 
 
Animal cognition is built on studies of socially isolated species in captivity. 
Although similar experiments to those presented in this thesis may be difficult 
to perform in the wild, such complementary research is likely to provide robust 
and ecologically valid results, and hence be valuable and much needed 
addition to advance the field of comparative cognition. Furthermore, many of 
the experiments reported here were undertaken while individuals were 
socially isolated. While this procedure is necessary to control for aspects of 
social learning, which may have biased results, these conditions are unlikely 
to be experienced by social species in the wild. Hence, experiments that 
assess cognitive behaviours of individuals within a more social setting, 
particularly those socially bonded species, may provide particularly valid 
ecological information. 
 
Future studies may also benefit from testing pet parrots in a domestic setting. 
This approach has been successfully adopted for studies on dogs as it 
provides access to a wide variety of subjects of different breeds. Moreover, 
this approach avoids many of the problems associated with funding and 
maintaining large populations of subjects. However, testing domestic pet 
parrots involves an array of associated problems. I initially tried this approach 
and found it very difficult to extract unbiased data due to the inadvertent 
enthusiasm of proud pet owners.   
 
Future studies may also provide valuable insight to cognitive evolution by 
comparing more closely related species, such as those within a given genus, 
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that have well established socio-ecological differences in their natural 
habitats, sociality or foraging behaviours. Hence, any divergences in cognitive 
behaviours may be directly inferred from differences in socio-ecological 
selection pressures, rather than common descent (Balda et al., 1996, Harvey 
and Pagel, 1991) 
 
7.4: Concluding Remarks 
 
The tendency to explore and interact with objects has been considered an 
adaptive trait that is driven by ecological selection pressures, such as the 
need to actively search for food in particular habitats, extract otherwise out of 
reach foods that are embedded in substrates, or manipulate foods encased in 
hard shells (Glickman and Sroges, 1966, Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002, 
Webster and Lefebvre, 2000). The active manipulation of the environment, for 
example by using tools to extract otherwise inaccessible resources, may 
present further selection pressures that favour an understanding of the 
functional properties of tools, and causal reasoning that underlies certain 
behavioural actions (Byrne, 1997). Similarly, the ability to interpret and use 
social information has also been considered an important driver of cognitive 
evolution (Byrne and Whiten, 1988, Dunbar, 1998, Emery et al., 2007, 
Humphrey, 1976). For example, selection pressures may favour an ability to 
attend to social information, such as direction of attention conveyed through 
eye gaze or pointing to aid in the acquisition of resources (Dally et al., 2006, 
Emery et al., 1997, Hare et al., 2001). However, while cognition may have 
evolved in response to such domain specific problems, a by-product of 
cognitive evolution may result in the ability to adapt to domain general 
challenges. The two study species investigated here possess a similar 
relative brain size (Iwaniuk et al., 2005), thus suggesting similar levels of 
cognitive ability, and their contrasting natural habitats appear to coincide with 
divergent social and object-related behaviours. Indeed, both species appear 
to show equivalent performances on tasks associated with social and physical 
cognition. A relatively large brain size may therefore allow animals to respond 
Chapter 7: General Conclusions 
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to a variety of socio-ecological challenges through behavioural flexibility 
(Emery and Clayton, 2004a, Sol et al., 2005).         
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